The Will to Truth and the Will to Believe: Friedrich Nietzsche and William James Against Scientism by Cristy, Rachel
 
THE WILL TO TRUTH AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE: 






PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY 
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE 
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 












© Copyright by Rachel Cristy, 2018. All rights reserved. 
iii 
 
Abstract: My dissertation brings into conversation two thinkers who are seldom considered 
together and highlights previously unnoticed similarities in their critical responses to scientism, 
which was just as prevalent in the late nineteenth century as it is today. I analyze this attitude as 
consisting of two linked propositions. The first, which Nietzsche calls “the unconditional will to 
truth,” is that the aims of science, discovering truth and avoiding error, are the most important 
human aims; and the second is that no practice other than science can achieve them. Both 
Nietzsche and James criticize the unconditional will to truth for privileging a transcendent ideal 
over the demands of human life. This unconditional will regards truth as valuable in itself and 
demands that we pursue it under all circumstances—even if that demand comes into conflict with 
other values. I lay out the ways in which Nietzsche and James view the value of truth and the 
imperative to pursue it as conditional on its promotion of human flourishing. In response to the 
second proposition of scientism, both philosophers argue that science can neither tell us what we 
should value, nor fully account for the value we in fact find in certain objects, activities, and 
experiences. And crucially, science cannot tell us whether or why its own goal of attaining truth 
is valuable. Nietzsche and James reach different conclusions about what is ultimately valuable, 
and whether traditional religious belief is defensible in light of the discoveries of science. 
Nonetheless, the hitherto unappreciated similarities I have uncovered in their arguments show 
that principled opposition to scientism need not be associated with any particular moral or 
religious viewpoint. This analysis is not only of historical interest: those who consider scientism 
to be ill-founded and intellectually confining can take some cues from our nineteenth-century 
predecessors’ strategies for combating it. 
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General Introduction: The Problem of Scientism 
 
 
Since the Enlightenment, science has taken on more and more of the roles that religion 
used to play in the lives of educated Westerners. Now it is science, not religion, that explains the 
origins of the universe, life, and humankind, and science that foretells how these things might 
end. We turn to the natural and social sciences rather than religion for an account of human 
nature, of the human capacities for both good and evil. But it is not only as a source of factual 
information that science now encroaches on the former territory of religion. Some champions of 
science go so far as to claim that science can tell us what counts as good or evil, and therefore 
what projects we should devote our lives to. Still others claim that the project of science itself is 
what provides life with meaning and purpose after science has undermined the authority of 
religion and speculative philosophy to furnish such purposes. 
These last two claims illustrate a faith in science that goes beyond a well-founded respect 
for its achievements and into the realm of scientism. At its most basic, scientism is an attitude of 
science-worship. It involves an uncritical faith in the methods of the modern sciences, an 
uncritical acceptance of their assumptions and conclusions (at least until they are replaced by 
newer ones), and a quasi-religious faith in the overriding value of the scientific enterprise. For 
reasons I will explain a little further on, I explicate scientism as a pair of linked propositions: (1) 
that the aims of science—namely, discovering truth and avoiding error—are the most important 
human aims; and (2) that no practice other than science can achieve these aims. 
Scientism is very popular today, both within and outside the academy. It can be seen in 




sciences1; in public intellectuals who declare all religious belief to be indefensible in light of the 
discoveries of science, and thus a sign of weak-minded gullibility2; in academic philosophers 
who dismiss the “softer” humanities disciplines and subfields, and take philosophy seriously 
only if it is somehow made “scientific”—for example, by incorporating formal and quantitative 
methods from the sciences, or limiting itself to interpreting their results. But scientism is by no 
means a new attitude; it was just as prevalent in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when 
institutional academic science was becoming established and successful, and powerful new 
theories—evolution by natural selection, molecular thermodynamics, electromagnetism—were 
capturing the popular imagination. This dissertation explores and compares the critical responses 
of two late nineteenth-century philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche and William James, to the 
scientism they encountered among their contemporaries. 
Nietzsche and James may seem like an unlikely pair of philosophical allies. True, they 
were close contemporaries: James was born only two years before Nietzsche and died only ten 
years after him, and his active writing career almost entirely overlapped Nietzsche’s.3 But they 
had no influence on each other: Nietzsche never read James’s work (indeed, had probably never 
heard of him), and while James read some of Nietzsche’s writing—at least the passage from On 
the Genealogy of Morality that he quotes (and misinterprets) in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (VRE 295–6)—he dismisses him as a “peevish” pessimist in the vein of 
Schopenhauer (VRE 39). It is understandable that on a cursory reading, James, as well as current 
                                                          
1 An especially striking example: in response to “a letter from education minister Hakubun Shimomura sent to all 
of Japan’s 86 national universities, which called on them to take ‘active steps to abolish [social science and 
humanities] organizations or to convert them to serve areas that better meet society’s needs,’” twenty-six Japanese 
universities agreed to “either close or scale back their relevant faculties” (Grove 2015). 
2 One thinks here of the “New Atheists” or the so-called “Brights”—a term intended to suggest that religious 
believers are, by contrast, dim—such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, Penn 
Jillette, and Steven Pinker. 
3 James was born in 1842, Nietzsche in 1844; James died in 1910, Nietzsche in 1900. James was publishing from 




readers, would not see Nietzsche as his ally: James was a defender of equality, democracy, and 
the right to believe in God—or at least an eternal moral order to the universe—with a clean 
epistemic conscience. Nietzsche, meanwhile, was a champion of both social and spiritual 
hierarchy, who considered a continued belief in God and providential order, in light of modern 
scientific and philosophical developments, to be “mendaciousness […], weakness, and 
cowardice” (GS 357). 
But on many epistemological matters, Nietzsche and James’s views are remarkably 
similar. No, Nietzsche did not have a pragmatic theory of truth (contra Danto [1965]). 
Nonetheless, they agree extensively about the workings of human cognition and the historical 
and evolutionary origins of the basic categories of thought, which I believe is at least partly a 
result of the common influence of early naturalistic neo-Kantians like F.A. Lange and Ernst 
Mach.4 More importantly, for my purposes, their statements about the value of truth and the 
limitations of the scientific pursuit thereof resonate with each other in surprising ways. These 
similarities do not seem to be attributable to any common influence5; it appears that their 
conclusions converged simply because of their attunement to a shared cultural environment and 
their careful consideration of the philosophical problems raised by attitudes and assumptions that 
were ubiquitous in that environment—scientism being one of the most prevalent and, to both 
Nietzsche and James, one of the most troubling. 
                                                          
4 Nietzsche read Lange’s History of Materialism in 1866–7 and made extensive notes on its contents (Brobjer 2004: 
26); in 1886 or 1887 he purchased and read Mach’s Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations and seems to 
have approved of Mach’s work because he sent Mach a copy of On the Genealogy of Morality when it was 
published (2004: 43–4). James cites both Lange and Mach extensively in his writings on psychology, and also 
counts Mach among his fellow “humanists” regarding truth (MT 44). 
5 While both counted Emerson as a positive influence, he does not engage in any extended, systematic exploration of 
truth, knowledge, or science of the kind that both Nietzsche and James do, so it seems implausible that he accounts 




A number of different definitions of scientism have been proposed both by those who 
oppose it and by those who, paradoxically, “reclaim” the term and defend it, such as Alex 
Rosenberg (2011) and Steven Pinker (2013). From the negative side, Susan Haack describes it as 
“an exaggerated kind of deference towards science, an excessive readiness to accept as 
authoritative any claim made by the sciences” (2007: 17–8). Tom Sorell identifies as the core of 
scientism “the belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of 
human learning”—perhaps even “the only valuable part of human learning”—“because it is 
much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial,” often accompanied by the related view 
“that it is always good for subjects that do not belong to science to be placed on a scientific 
footing” (1991: 1). He goes on to say, “What is crucial to scientism is […] the thought that the 
scientific is much more valuable than the non-scientific, or the thought that the non-scientific is 
of negligible value” (9). Rosenberg, one of scientism’s defenders, describes it as “the conviction 
that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure knowledge of anything” (2011: 
6) and that “[s]cience provides all the significant truths about reality” (7). 
Mikael Stenmark (2001) helpfully distinguishes a number of different, and progressively 
more extreme, types of scientism, illustrating each with examples from twentieth-century 
scientistic thinkers. Scientism could be the relatively restricted “academic-internal” view that 
“all, or at least some, of the genuine, non-scientific disciplines can eventually be reduced to (or 
translated into) science proper, i.e. natural science” (2001: 1–2) or the “academic-external” view 
“that all or, at least, some of the essential non-academic areas of human life can be reduced to (or 
translated into) science” (3). This academic-external scientism can be divided into different types 
depending on which areas of human life are to be taken over by science. Stenmark identifies two 




know anything about is the one science has access to” (4), and rationalistic, the stronger claim 
“that we are rationally entitled to believe only what can be scientifically justified” (6). These, in 
turn, are distinguished from ontological scientism, “[t]he view that the only reality that exists is 
the one science has access to” (8; emphasis added in all of the foregoing). Then there is 
axiological (or, as I prefer, ethical) scientism, the view “that science alone can explain morality 
and replace traditional ethics” (2001: 12). 
Most of the types of scientism I have named are no doubt familiar enough, but the reader 
may wonder whether anyone really espouses ethical scientism. Stenmark (2001: 12) cites the 
biologist E.O. Wilson as endorsing both of its components. On the matter of explaining existing 
moral practices, he says, “science may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and 
meaning of human values from which all ethical pronouncements and much political practice 
flow” (Wilson 1978: 5). But he also makes the more contentious claim that science can replace 
traditional ethics: “through neurophysiological and phylogenetic reconstructions of the mind, ‘a 
biology of ethics [will be fashioned], which will make possible the selection of a more deeply 
understood and enduring code of moral values’” (Stenmark 2001: 12, quoting Wilson 1978: 96) 
or, as he touts it elsewhere, a “genetically accurate and hence completely fair code of ethics” 
(Wilson 1975: 575). Nietzsche and James encountered ethical scientism in the late nineteenth 
century as well: in his widely read and influential book The Data of Ethics (1879), Herbert 
Spencer—whom both Nietzsche and James singled out for mockery at various points—attempted 
to derive an ethical theory from Darwin’s theory of evolution, as he understood it. In his review 
of the book, James quotes Spencer as saying: “My ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate 
purposes, has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large, a 




Lest the reader think that such hubris has been left behind in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, here are a couple of examples from recent years of writers who claim that science can 
deliver ethical truth (though amusingly, both writers are at pains to insist that it is not what they 
are claiming): 
[T]he worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview 
given to us by science. Though the scientific facts do not by themselves dictate values, they certainly 
hem in the possibilities. […] And in combination with a few unexceptionable convictions—that all of us 
value our own welfare and that we are social beings who impinge on each other and can negotiate codes 
of conduct—the scientific facts militate toward a defensible morality, namely adhering to principles that 
maximize the flourishing of humans and other sentient beings. This humanism, which is inextricable 
from a scientific understanding of the world, is becoming the de facto morality of modern democracies, 
international organizations, and liberalizing religions, and its unfulfilled promises define the moral 
imperatives we face today.  (Pinker 2013) 
 
I do not claim that utilitarianism is the moral truth. Nor do I claim, more specifically, and as some 
readers might expect me to, that science proves that utilitarianism is the moral truth. Instead, I claim 
that utilitarianism becomes uniquely attractive once our moral thinking has been objectively improved 
by a scientific understanding of morality. (Whether this makes it the “moral truth” I leave as an open 
question.) Although we may not be able to establish utilitarianism as the moral truth, I believe that we 
can nevertheless use twenty-first-century science to vindicate nineteenth-century moral philosophy 
against its twentieth-century critics.  (Greene 2014: 189, original emphasis) 
 
 Stenmark’s inventory continues with existential scientism, the view “that science alone 
can explain and replace religion” (2001: 14). Scientific explanations for religion, usually 
explanations that aim to debunk religion’s claims to truth, are common: works like Richard 
Dawkins’ The God Delusion (2006) provide deflationary explanations for the widespread belief 
in God in terms of evolutionary biology and psychology (while also arguing that the belief is 
both false and harmful). In the first lecture of The Varieties of Religious Experience (1901–2), 
“Religion and Neurology,” James describes under the heading of “medical materialism” a 
number of theories that purport to discredit religious luminaries and undermine their claims to 
insight by diagnosing them with various pathological conditions: 
Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a 
discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an 




of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon.  
  (VRE 20) 
 
 What about the belief that science can replace religion? Stenmark cites claims from both 
Richard Dawkins and Stephen Hawking that science can answer the existential questions that it 
has traditionally been the function of religion to answer. “Dawkins says that since we have 
modern biology, we have ‘no longer … to resort to superstition when faced with the deep 
problems: Is there a meaning to life? What are we for? What is man?’” (Stenmark 2001: 13, 
quoting Dawkins 1989: 1). The answer that biology provides, according to Dawkins, is this: “We 
are machines built by DNA whose purpose is to make more copies of the same DNA. […] That 
is exactly what we are for. […] It is every living object’s sole reason for living” (Dawkins 1991). 
Such an answer might settle the questions that have been traditionally answered by religion, but 
it can hardly fill all the traditional roles of religion. William James, however, reports attempts in 
his day to find scientifically respectable targets for the impulses of awe and worship. “Even the 
laws of physical nature have, in these positivistic times, been held worthy of divine honor and 
presented as the only fitting object of our reverence,” he says (WB 97). In a note to this passage, 
James remarks, with an undercurrent of snark, “Haeckel has recently (Der Monismus, 1893, p. 
37) proposed the Cosmic Ether as a divinity fitted to reconcile science with theistic faith” (WB 
97, n. 5). 
 In light of this variety of forms that scientism can take and has taken, it is a challenge to 
formulate a definition that captures the unifying spirit of scientism from the late nineteenth 
century to now, as well as precisely what Nietzsche and James were objecting to. Here, again, is 




error, are the highest human aims6; and (2) that no practice other than science can achieve these 
aims. For the purposes of brevity in referring, I call the first proposition “the unconditional will 
to truth” and the second “the hegemony of science,” borrowing two (perhaps grandiose-
sounding) phrases from Nietzsche. I have made this division in large part because I identified 
two distinguishable strands of criticism in both Nietzsche’s and James’s work that would best be 
discussed separately. Accordingly, the main body of the dissertation is divided into two parts. 
Part I, “Against the Unconditional Will to Truth,” addresses each philosopher’s objections to 
proposition (1): first Nietzsche’s in Chapter 1, then James’s in Chapter 2. Part II, “Against the 
Hegemony of Science,” similarly addresses in turn each philosopher’s objections to proposition 
(2). 
Each of these propositions can be held independently of the other. Proposition (1) alone, 
held without proposition (2), would of course no longer count as scientism. Nietzsche’s and 
James’s criticisms of (1) tend to focus on its role as a component of scientism, and so my 
analysis will as well. But they also recognize that there can be religious and philosophical rather 
than scientistic versions of the unconditional will to truth, and Nietzsche emphasizes (as I 
                                                          
6 Desmond Hogan wondered why I posit such “highly intellectualistic” aims for science in my proposed definition 
of scientism, as opposed to, e.g., Descartes’ conception of the aim of science as “mastery and possession of nature.” 
One reason is that Nietzsche and James seem to assume that the targets of their criticism regard truth as the aim of 
science; if they did not, there probably would not be such a close connection between their challenges to the 
overvaluation of truth and to the overvaluation of science. Another reason is that, even if “mastery and possession of 
nature” is regarded as the ultimate aim of science, attaining knowledge of the workings of nature is the distinctive 
means by which science (as opposed to mere technology) achieves this aim; that proximate aim is what is held in 
common between the champions of science who regard it as a means to control nature and those who regard 
knowledge of nature as an end in itself. Someone who takes mastery of nature to be the ultimate aim of science 
might still place that aim above all others and regard science’s pursuit of the truth about nature to be the best or only 
way to achieve it. A final concern one might have with this definition is that it appears to preclude anyone who is 
not a scientific realist—i.e., anyone who thinks that truth is not even a proximate aim of science, and replaces truth 
with some weaker aim like empirical adequacy or technological usefulness—from counting as a proponent of 
scientism. Since forms of scientific anti-realism, instrumentalism, etc. are often motivated by epistemic humility on 
behalf of science, this may not pose too much of a problem. However, in order to accommodate anti-realists whom 
we might like to label scientistic (the logical positivists, for example), the aims of “discovering truth and avoiding 




explain in Chapter 1) that the unconditional will to scientific truth is a descendant of these earlier 
versions. Proposition (2) held without proposition (1) might still be called scientism, but it would 
be a more benign form of scientism, in that it still might accord considerable value to pursuits 
whose goal is not epistemic. It is in combination that they constitute the strong form of scientism 
that, as I explain over the course of the dissertation, Nietzsche and James take to pose a 
distinctive danger to the psychological health of individuals and the cultural health of societies. 
Proposition (2) captures a combination of ontological and epistemological scientism; for 
the purposes of exploring Nietzsche’s and James’s arguments, it is not terribly important to 
distinguish between the view that any reality beyond the ken of science does not exist and the 
view that (even if it does exist) we have no epistemic access to it, and so are not justified in 
saying anything about it. The most extreme version of the hegemony of science claims that the 
methods of the quantitative natural sciences are the only legitimate path to truth, and tends to 
regard mathematical physics as the paradigmatic rigorous science after which all other sciences 
should be modeled, or to which they should be reduced. More moderate conceptions of the 
hegemony of science may permit a plurality of research methods and acknowledge that the 
quantitative methods of physics are not appropriate to all objects of study. But all versions of it 
draw a line between epistemic practices that count as “science” and those that are “non-science” 
and affirm that only those on the “science” side of the line have epistemic value. This is not to 
say that skepticism about pseudoscientific practices such as astrology or homeopathic medicine 
counts as objectionable scientism. Those who accept the hegemony of science deny that any non-
science practice has epistemic legitimacy. Religion is usually their primary target of scorn, but 




practices may be admitted to have some sentimental or hedonic value, but they should not be 
regarded as providing any meaningful information, let alone knowledge, about the world.7 
The hegemony of science, as (briefly) the idea that science can answer any question 
worth asking, also conditionally captures ethical scientism, as a consequence of ontological 
scientism, i.e., the view “that the only reality that exists is the one science has access to” 
(Stenmark 2001: 8). Understood as the conditional “If it is a question worth asking, science can 
answer it,” this view leaves open two possible approaches to the question about what is 
ultimately valuable. The modus ponens approach—which we have seen taken by Wilson (1975, 
1978), Pinker (2013), and Greene (2014)—is to conclude from the assumption that the question 
is worth asking that science can answer it. But one could also take the modus tollens route and 
conclude that because science cannot answer such questions, they cannot be answered at all. This 
is the route that Rosenberg (2011) takes: “In a world where physics fixes all the facts, it’s hard to 
see how there could be room for moral facts. […] We need to face the fact that nihilism is true” 
(2011: 94–5); “Real moral disputes […] can never really be resolved by finding the correct 
answers. There are none” (96).8 
It may be less obvious why my definition includes proposition (1), the unconditional will 
to truth: the view that the aims of science, discovering truth and avoiding error, are the most 
important human aims. Although, as I shall show in Part I, Nietzsche and James certainly argued 
against such a view, one might wonder whether anyone really held or still holds it. In Chapter 2, 
I provide some quotations from W.K. Clifford—an English mathematician and public 
                                                          
7 Thus Rosenberg: “When it comes to real understanding, the humanities are nothing we have to take seriously, 
except as symptoms. But they are everything we need to take seriously when it comes to entertainment, enjoyment, 
and psychological satisfaction” (2011: 307). 
8 However, he maintains, this is not really a problem because almost everyone is “committed to the same basic 




intellectual whose essay “The Ethics of Belief” (1877) was the primary target of opposition in 
James’s famous “The Will to Believe” (1896)—suggesting that he can justly be identified as an 
adherent to the unconditional will to truth. But is this also a component of contemporary 
scientism? 
Unlike the view that science can provide a complete account of everything that exists or 
is knowable, or can answer any question worth asking (even ethical ones), one does not generally 
find people explicitly voicing the view that truth is the most important aim of human life. 
However, I can provide some circumstantial evidence that this attitude still persists in some 
contemporary incarnations of scientism. Some proponents of scientism can be seen expressing 
the somewhat less bizarre-sounding attitude that science is the most important or valuable human 
pursuit: 
People frequently ask Richard Dawkins: “Why do you bother getting up in the morning if the 
meaning of life boils down to such a cruel pitiless fact, that we exist merely to help replicate a string 
of molecules?” As he puts it: “They say to me, how can you bear to be alive if everything is so cold 
and empty and pointless? […] One answer is that I feel privileged to be allowed to understand why 
the world exists, and why I exist […] I think science is one of the supreme things that makes life 
worth living,” he says. (Hughes 1998: 6) 
 
 Rosenberg (2011), in keeping with his avowed nihilism, is skeptical of such claims. He 
laments that “[e]ven so adamant an atheist as Richard Dawkins has succumbed to the delusion 
that a substitute for religion is required and available from science” (2011: 278). He doubts that 
Dawkins’ remedy for the meaninglessness of the universe can help most people. “More 
important,” he continues, “does Dawkins have an argument or a reason or a basis to claim that 
science makes life worth living for [anyone]? It’s hard to see how science itself could provide 





 Remarkably, Rosenberg has anticipated one of the points that both Nietzsche and James 
raise as a limitation of science (as I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively). But what 
Rosenberg fails to question at any point is that it is better to believe the truth, however bleak and 
depressing, than to entertain illusions about anything, including morality or the possibility of 
meaning. Dawkins needs “an argument or a reason or a basis” for the claim that science makes 
life worth living (Rosenberg 2011: 278): the repetition underlines the importance of the demand 
for justification. Had he not denied that anything is either right or wrong, one might suspect him 
of subscribing to Clifford’s Principle: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 1999 [1877]: 77). 
The subtitle of Chapter 1 of Rosenberg’s book, “Answering Life’s Persistent Questions,” 
is “Do You Want Stories or Reality?” (2011: 1), but he never even considers the possibility that 
it might be better, at least in some cases, to believe stories. His attitude toward illusion, including 
the natural tendency to prefer information that comes in narrative form—as he puts it, the fact 
that “[w]e are suckers for a good story” (8)—is consistently contemptuous, even when he 
acknowledges the psychological difficulty of confronting the truths that science presents: 
It’s true that scientism asks us to surrender a lot of complacent beliefs in exchange for the correct 
answers to the persistent questions. If this seems hard to take, the last chapter cushions the blow, 
showing that we can surrender all the illusions of common sense, religion, and new-age and 
traditional mystery mongering, along with the meretricious allure of storytelling; indeed, physics, 
chemistry, biology, and neurology have shaped most of us to survive very nicely without them. And 
just in case, there’s always Prozac.     (Rosenberg 2011: 19) 
 
According to Rosenberg, science has proven that nothing has genuine value, not even science 
itself. So why does he seem to assume that, however difficult, disappointing, or painful, it is 
always better to believe truth than to accept illusions, however beautiful or comforting? The 
answer Nietzsche would offer is that he is one of those supposed “free spirits” who, in spite of 




 As this example illustrates, our nineteenth-century predecessors can provide insights that 
help us to diagnose and challenge the assumptions underlying contemporary examples of 
scientism. An analysis of Nietzsche’s and James’s arguments against scientism is of interest not 
only for what it can reveal about the historical philosophers’ views, but also for the fresh 
ammunition it can provide for contemporary critics of scientism. The striking similarities 
between Nietzsche’s and James’s concerns about scientism—both its epistemic justification and 
its corrosive effect on the spiritual health of individuals and societies—and their strategies for 
attacking it are especially interesting in light of their dramatically different views about what is 
truly valuable, and about whether traditional religion is still viable in the face of modern 
science’s discoveries. These surprising points of convergence tell us that principled opposition to 
scientism need not be associated with any particular moral or religious viewpoint: devoted 
Christians and staunch atheists, egalitarian altruists and elitist defenders of hierarchy can be 






Part I: Against the Unconditional Will to Truth 
 
 In the General Introduction I laid out the definition of scientism that I am using, which 
consists of two linked propositions: (1) the aims of science—discovering truth and eliminating 
false belief—are the most important human aims; and (2) the only appropriate way to pursue 
those aims is through the methods of modern science. In the next two chapters, I will explore and 
compare Nietzsche and James’s critiques of the first proposition, to which I will refer using 
Nietzsche’s term “the unconditional will to truth.” Nietzsche introduces this expression in 
section 344 of The Gay Science (in Book V, published in 1887) and in the same section 
characterizes it as “the faith, the principle, the conviction […]: ‘Nothing is needed more than 
truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-rate value.’” 
There are two possible senses in which the version of the will to truth that Nietzsche and 
James both attack could be called unconditional (unbedingt), and Nietzsche intends the term to 
encompass both. First, this will regards the value of truth as unconditional in that its authority 
does not depend on any higher value or commandment: truth is a final rather than an 
instrumental aim, to be pursued for its own sake rather than as a means to some other goal. 
Second, this will is unconditional in that its application is unrestricted: truth is to be pursued 
always and everywhere, regardless of any other goals or values one might have, and whether the 
pursuit of truth advances or hinders these other aims, helps or harms the pursuer herself. 
These two senses of “unconditional” may sometimes be conflated (James does, as I 
discuss below) because they often non-coincidentally overlap. If a goal or value is unconditional 
in the first sense, i.e., final rather than instrumental, the obvious conditions that set limits on 




toward which it is instrumental—would not be applicable. For example, if the value of drinking 
wine is instrumental toward other values—the values of aesthetic and physical pleasure, for 
example, or of social ease—one should drink wine only as long as it advances these other aims, 
and stop drinking if it tastes bad, starts to make one sick, or makes the social situation more 
rather than less uncomfortable. It is clear, then, how an instrumental aim would also end up 
being a restricted aim; there is no such obvious mechanism for placing circumstantial restrictions 
on a final aim. 
Nonetheless, the two types of unconditionality can come apart. First, an end could be 
conditional in the sense of being instrumental toward a final end but unconditional in the sense 
of being unrestricted, because the final end to which it is a means is unrestricted and pursuing 
the instrumental aim necessarily advances the final aim under all circumstances. An example: 
suppose that someone takes doing God’s will to be both a final and an unrestricted end and 
believes that loving one’s neighbor is always an instance of doing God’s will, but also believes 
that the actions God commands are not valuable independently, but only in virtue of having been 
commanded by God. Such a believer would then regard the aim of loving one’s neighbor as 
unconditional in the “unrestricted” sense, but its value would still be conditional on (merely 
instrumental toward) the value of doing God’s will. 
Second, an end could be unconditional in that it does not derive its value from any higher 
aim, but the conditions under which it is to be pursued might still be limited by other final ends 
with which it competes.9 For example, one might think that creating art is valuable in itself, not 
merely as a means to advancing any other aim. But that certainly does not mean that artists 
                                                          
9 Of course, this kind of situation could only arise under a value theory that permits multiple final ends. It would not 
be a possibility according to utilitarianism, which holds that there is only one final value—happiness (or pleasure)—
which is to be pursued under all circumstances, and that any more specific end is valuable only in virtue of being 




should spend all their time creating art, or that all the ends they pursue when they are not 
presently creating art should be regarded as instrumental to the creation of art. If, say, an author 
regarded her friendships as valuable only because she could use her experience of friendship to 
inform her writing, then she would be missing the distinctive value of friendship. Artists, we 
imagine, should regard both their art and their friendships as final ends, each placing limits on 
the time and effort to be spent pursuing the other. And when the demands of one final aim 
interfere with the demands of another, it is a difficult question which of them should take 
precedence over the other, or what kind of balance should be struck between them. 
Most contemporary value theorists agree that the perfect duties10 of morality take 
precedence over all others, even if the values that impose these other duties—such as art or 
friendship—are also final rather than merely instrumental.11 The demands that artistic creation 
places on a morally virtuous artist are unconditional in that they do not derive their force from a 
value higher than art itself, but his obligation to follow them is conditional on their not 
conflicting with the demands of morality.12 But different agents will work out different balances 
among the imperfect duties imposed by different kinds of value, and may weigh the perfect 
duties of different value types differently.13 The duties ranked lower will be conditional on the 
                                                          
10 Kant characterizes perfect duties as those that agents may not neglect, regardless of any other private interests or 
desires they may have (Ak. 4: 421 n.). Imperfect duties, meanwhile, must be followed to some degree, but the extent 
to which one follows them, and the balance one strikes among different imperfect duties which may compete for 
one’s time, is a matter of choice for the agent (6: 390). 
11 Nehamas (2016) argues, contra the prevailing assumption, that the distinctive value of friendship and the duties 
that proceed from it are not moral, but closer in kind to aesthetic value. 
12 Such an artist, if faced with Gauguin’s decision between going to Tahiti to pursue his artistic inspiration and 
staying to support his family—to borrow Bernard Williams’ famous example—would unhesitatingly choose the 
latter. 
13 Kant might not approve of the use of the term “perfect duties” to describe duties imposed by non-moral values, 
but I think it is reasonable to suppose that there are things one absolutely must or must not do if one is to respect the 
value in question. Many perfect aesthetic duties (that one must not mix good wine with root beer, for example) are 
not the kind that could conflict with perfect duties of morality. Perfect duties of friendship, however, might—for 




ones ranked higher in the sense that their scope is restricted so that they do not conflict with the 
higher-ranked ones. 
It seems that Nietzsche intended the “unconditional will to truth” to include both 
meanings, non-instrumental and unrestricted.14 “Seek truth and avoid error” is regarded as a 
categorical rather than a hypothetical imperative. In calling the imperative “unrestricted,” we 
need not suppose that adherents of the unconditional will to truth are obligated to actively pursue 
truth at every moment when they aren’t meeting basic biological needs.15 Nonetheless, 
possessors of an unconditional will to truth do regard truth-seeking as their most important 
normative aim, in much the way that followers of altruistic morality regard helping others as the 
most important normative aim. 
Like deontological forms of altruism, the unconditional will to truth imposes imperfect 
positive duties and perfect negative duties. Just as followers of altruistic morality should seek out 
opportunities to help others, to an extent that may vary from agent to agent, followers of the 
unconditional will to truth are required to make the active pursuit of truth a central part of their 
lives. Just as altruistic morality demands that its adherents not pass up a clear opportunity to help 
another, the unconditional will to truth demands that its adherents not pass up an opportunity to 
uncover new truth, whether this is evidence that they stumble across or a line of reasoning that 
occurs to them; they must follow the evidence, or the argument, wherever it leads. And just as 
altruistic morality strictly forbids its followers to harm another deliberately or negligently, the 
unconditional will to truth forbids its followers to willfully or carelessly ignore evidence or 
                                                          
14 Of course, someone who takes the ultimate aim of science to be mastery of nature rather than truth (as discussed 
in note 6 to the General Introduction) will not regard science’s pursuit of truth as having final rather than 
instrumental value, which means that many of Nietzsche’s and James’s criticisms of the unconditional will to 
(scientific) truth will not apply to such a person. 
15 Still, some particularly fanatical devotees of truth, notably those employed by the academy, may do just that, as 
Nietzsche suggests with his remark about “[t]he proficiency of our finest scholars, their heedless industry, their 




arguments, or to place their belief in a proposition insufficiently supported by the evidence. As 
William James remarks in “The Will to Believe” (1896), the categorical imperative-like structure 
of the unconditional will to truth leads its adherents to rank the “avoid error” component of the 
imperative above the “seek truth” component—a tendency expressed especially forcefully in the 
negative formulation set forth by James’s opponent W.K. Clifford in “The Ethics of Belief”: “It 
is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” 
(Clifford 1999 [1877]: 77). Nietzsche, in his attacks on the unconditional will to truth, seems to 
assume a similar ordering of priority, though he does not acknowledge it explicitly. 
Because they regard the pursuit of truth as their highest normative duty, adherents to the 
unconditional will to truth will adjudicate any direct conflict of values in favor of the will to 
truth. This does not necessarily mean that they will always refrain from lying to others,16 and 
they may not make a point of debunking others’ comforting illusions (about, e.g., God, or an 
afterlife, or a “reason” for all misfortunes).17 But it does mean that they will not allow themselves 
to entertain any pleasant illusions even if doing so would make their lives better in practical 
respects, whether by furnishing more effective motivation to act or simply by providing comfort. 
Assuming that the will to truth with which Nietzsche and James find fault is 
unconditional in both senses—that it regards truth as having final rather than instrumental value, 
and the scope of the will to truth as unrestricted by other values—what kind of conditional will 
might they recommend as an alternative? The options are as follows: 
                                                          
16 As Nietzsche says in The Antichrist: “By lie I mean: wishing not to see something that one does see; wishing not 
to see something as one sees it. Whether the lie takes place before witnesses or without witnesses does not matter. 
The most common lie is that with which one lies to oneself; lying to others is, relatively, an exception” (A 55). 
17 However, since these unconditional devotees of truth most likely feel contempt for anyone who needs such 
illusions to function (see GS 2–3 on this point), they will not perceive a conflict here between the duties of truth and 





(A) A will to truth that is conditional only in the sense of being restricted. Such a will 
would regard the value of truth as final, in the same way as the value of friendship and of art, 
but would place it lower among the final values that the agent recognizes, so that other 
values—for example, the “life-affirming” values that Nietzsche prizes (strength, power, 
health, growth, courage, and self-overcoming, in his peculiar senses thereof)—take 
precedence in case of conflict.  
(B) A will to truth that is conditional only in the sense of being instrumental. The value of 
truth would be seen as unrestricted, but only because in all circumstances, pursuing truth 
advances a further aim to which it is instrumental. 
(C) A will to truth that is conditional in both senses, regarding the value of truth as 
merely instrumental to other values and, accordingly, restricted to the circumstances in which 
it promotes them. 
 First, in Chapter 1, I discuss the critique of the unconditional will to truth that Nietzsche 
delivers in his later works,18 which charges that this will, and the institution of science insofar as 
it is motivated by this will, is the latest incarnation of the ascetic ideal: the stance that privileges 
another, metaphysical world and its demands above the needs and well-being of living creatures. 
My discussion focuses in particular on GS 344, which presents his most sustained argument 
against the unconditional will to truth, and the Third Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality 
(1887), which reiterates and expands on the critique in GS 344. Then I explore the mode of 
                                                          
18 Starting with The Gay Science (1882) and devoting particular attention to the works of 1886–7 (Beyond Good and 
Evil, the second edition of The Gay Science, and On the Genealogy of Morality), in which his attack is strongest and 
most focused. Nietzsche does express concerns about the deleterious effects of the overvaluation of truth, and 
especially scientific truth, in his earlier works, including The Birth of Tragedy (1872) and the Untimely Meditations 
(1873–6). However, given that many of his views changed substantially between that period and that of the later 
works, it was easier to identify a coherent position by focusing on a narrower time period. Determining which 




pursuing truth that Nietzsche implicitly recommends as an alternative to the ascetic 
unconditional pursuit of the disciples of modern science: gay science. I shall argue that, based on 
the key texts of The Gay Science from which I draw my understanding of what the practice of 
gay science consists in, Nietzsche favors option (C) listed above: a version of the will to truth 
that is conditional in both senses. First, it regards the value of truth, and of the will to truth itself, 
as instrumental to promoting the life-affirming values of strength and courage; and second, it 
restricts the pursuit of truth to those circumstances in which it advances these higher values. In 
principle, this instrumental pursuit of truth could be conducted in an unrestricted fashion, if the 
agent is already strong and courageous enough that the dangers of too much truth no longer 
threaten her psychological well-being and her capacity to love life. In fact, I would regard the 
ability to pursue truth unrestrictedly as a kind of regulative ideal for Nietzsche. But this ideal still 
has value only in the service of other values; and it is important to know when one has not yet 
reached the point at which persisting in the pursuit of truth cannot pose a threat to the life-
affirming values that Nietzsche holds highest. 
Then, in Chapter 2, I present James’s critique of the unconditional will to truth, focusing 
on the criticisms, both implicit and explicit, that he levels at traditional conceptions of truth 
while presenting his alternative conception in Pragmatism (delivered as a public lecture series in 
1906 and published in 1907). In this discussion it becomes clear that James favors option (B). In 
fact, the pragmatic understanding of truth as that which will be, in the long run, beneficial for 
humans to believe (P 106–7) guarantees that the imperative to believe truth will be unrestricted, 
in the sense that there is no truth that it would be better for humankind not to know; but it is still 
only a hypothetical imperative, because the value of truth is merely instrumental toward the 




I will make the case that Nietzsche and James’s criticisms rest on the same basic idea: 
that the unconditional will to truth is ascetic, in Nietzsche’s terms. It elevates truth to the status 
of a god who imposes on human beings the demand that they believe only truth, regardless of 
their earthly needs and capabilities; it makes an idol of only one of many genuinely valuable 
goals, and sacrifices the rest of human life to the idol of truth. 
However, each thinker picks up on aspects of the problem that the other misses. 
Nietzsche, for example, explicitly acknowledges the usefulness of positively false beliefs and the 
potential harmfulness of truth where James does not. Meanwhile, James, unlike Nietzsche, 
underlines the distinction, and the difference in value for life, between the two goals of the 
unconditional will to truth: attaining as much truth as possible, and avoiding false beliefs to the 
extent possible. The unconditional will to truth, particularly as expressed by Clifford’s Principle, 
emphasizes the “avoid error” component of the imperative of truthfulness over the “seek truth” 
component. And because James regards all truths as beneficial, he considers this emphasis on 
avoiding error to be what makes Clifford’s position ascetic: it forces people to go without beliefs 
that may be true, and therefore may be beneficial, if they lack the kind of evidentiary support that 
scientific method would consider respectable. As I will argue in Chapter 2, these differences in 
their critiques of the unconditional will to truth—like the difference in their conclusions about 
what kind of conditional will to truth would be preferable—may be consequences of James’s 






Nietzsche’s Critique of the Unconditional Will to Truth 
1. “How we, too, are still pious”: the will to truth as a faith 
In his two sustained attacks on the unconditional will to truth—section 344 of The Gay 
Science and the Third Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality—Nietzsche explicitly connects this 
will to the aims and the practice of science. GS 344 starts with an observation about science: 
In science convictions have no rights of citizenship, as one says with good reason. Only when they 
descend to the modesty of hypotheses, of a provisional experimental point of view, of a regulative 
fiction, they may be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge […] —But 
does this not mean […] that a conviction may obtain admission to science only when it ceases to be a 
conviction? Would it not be the first step in the discipline of the scientific spirit that one would not 
permit oneself any more convictions? 
 
The stringency of this policy raises for Nietzsche a question about its motivation: “To make it 
possible for this discipline to begin, must there not be some prior conviction—even one so 
commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself?” Yes, he answers: 
“The question whether truth is needed must not only have been affirmed in advance, but 
affirmed to such a degree that the principle, the faith, the conviction finds expression: ‘Nothing is 
needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-rate value.’” 
Paradoxically, he concludes—to some degree anticipating the results of the argument that 
follows—“We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no science ‘without 
presuppositions.’” 
 What does Nietzsche mean by calling the unconditional will to truth a “faith” (Glaube), 
or a “conviction” (Ueberzeugung) of the kind that scientific inquiry does not permit? Nietzsche 
offers a definition of “conviction” in Human, All Too Human (1878): “Conviction 




possession of the unqualified truth” (HAH I, 630). A conviction, then, is a view that is no longer 
open to question for those who hold it. In the same section, Nietzsche maintains (as he does nine 
years later) that scientific thinking precludes convictions: the presuppositions of having a 
conviction as he has defined it—“that unqualified truths exist; likewise that perfect methods of 
attaining to them have been discovered; finally, that everyone who possesses convictions avails 
himself of these perfect methods”—“demonstrate at once that the man of convictions is not the 
man of scientific thought” (HAH I, 630). Thinking scientifically requires regarding everything as 
open to question and defeasible by the evidence, even the methods of science itself. 
However, this definition of convictions does not explain how they could naturally 
“descend to the modesty of hypotheses” or “a provisional experimental point of view”—as 
Nietzsche says they must in order to be “granted admission” into science (GS 344)—since these 
are decidedly not regarded by those who entertain them as unqualified truths. What such tools of 
inquiry do have in common with convictions as defined in Human, All Too Human is that they 
are not presently open to question; they are being assumed until the evidence for or against them 
comes in. Bernard Reginster (2003) argues that Nietzsche’s “man of conviction” (HAH I, 630ff.) 
is the same type of person as the “fettered spirit” whom he earlier on (HAH I, 225ff.) contrasts 
with the “free spirit.” According to Nietzsche, the fettered spirit can justify his beliefs only by 
“reasons judged a posteriori on the basis of consequences”: “only regard this as true, he says, 
and you will see how much good it will do you” (HAH I, 227). In a sense, this is true of 
hypotheses and regulative fictions as well; they are adopted in advance of the evidence, “without 
first having given [oneself] an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con,” (GS 
219), and their adoption is (one hopes) vindicated by their usefulness in guiding inquiry. 
                                                          
19 Reginster also ties this section, which laments the rarity of possessing an “intellectual conscience,” to the issue of 




The difference is that the fettered spirit will not give up his belief even if the evidence 
runs counter to it: having formed a belief “out of habit,” “he may perhaps have also devised a 
couple of reasons favorable to his habits; but if one refutes these reasons, one does not therewith 
refute him in his general position” (HAH I, 226). “An article of faith could be refuted before [the 
believer] a thousand times—if he needed it, he would consider it ‘true’ again and again” (GS 
347). A scientific hypothesis, by contrast, is genuinely on trial, and while it may be adopted as “a 
provisional experimental point of view” (GS 344) ahead of the evidence, it must be abandoned if 
the predictions made on its basis are not borne out or if it leads nowhere as a guide for a research 
program.20 But the principle that one must “not permit oneself any more convictions” (GS 
344)—that any assumption is subject to revision—is itself not merely a provisional assumption 
of scientific practice, but an unrevisable one. The integrity of science depends on applying this 
requirement to regard everything as open to question, except for the assumption of this 
requirement itself. 
Why does Nietzsche draw the extreme conclusion that the prohibition on convictions 
expresses the conviction that “[n]othing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything 
else has only second-rate value” (GS 344)? We can understand this inference by considering, 
first, that if some belief were placed beyond question, one would not be open to any evidence 
indicating that it, or any conclusion drawn from it, was in fact false. True, it is the desire to avoid 
or eliminate false beliefs rather than to acquire true beliefs that primarily motivates this rule of 
                                                          
20 I’m not sure that what Nietzsche has in mind by “hypothesis” or “provisional experimental point of view” is what 
has come to be the technical meaning of hypothesis in scientific methodology: namely, the possibility that a 
particular experiment is designed to test. This may be one of the things he has in mind; this kind of hypothesis does 
resemble a conviction in the way I’ve suggested above, in the limited sense that experiments are often designed by 
assuming temporarily that the hypothesis is true, and then predicting what would happen under certain producible 
conditions. I suspect, however, that what he means is more along the lines of a candidate theory or a component of a 




method21; as noted above, the unconditional will to truth tends to emphasize avoiding false 
beliefs over attaining true ones. However, the desire not to miss new truths also plays a role: a 
mistaken assumption could lead scientific inquiry down the wrong path, blocking discoveries 
that might have been available otherwise. And Nietzsche’s point in saying that the principle 
“Nothing is needed more than truth” is a “prior conviction” or a “faith” is that it is not genuinely 
open for question—violating the rule that the principle itself imposes on all other propositions by 
forbidding any (other) convictions. 
But why does Nietzsche claim that the commitment to question every assumption 
presupposes that “in relation to [truth] everything else has only second-rate value” (GS 344)? 
After all, scientific inquiry is only one area of life; and while ensuring that one has the truth 
about every scientific matter is also the highest scientific priority, this does not mean that science 
or its practitioners claim that truth must be the highest value in life overall. Nietzsche has not 
established yet that overvaluing truth in the way that science demands interferes with the conduct 
of life or the pursuit of other values. In section 2.2 below I will present and discuss samples of 
the many texts in which Nietzsche argues that the unconditional will to truth, particularly as it is 
expressed in science, can be detrimental to human life. As a preview of those arguments, 
however, I will say here that the pursuit of scientific truth cannot be so easily cordoned off from 
the rest of life. Some of the convictions that science orders us to sacrifice might be ones that 
many people need to make the world or their own lives seem valuable or even merely bearable. 
 GS 344 continues with the question how one might arrive at the unrevisable conviction 
that truth has overriding value and must be pursued under all circumstances. Nietzsche’s answer 
comes in the form of one of the few relatively conventional (albeit still somewhat elliptical) 
                                                          
21 William James does point out this distinction in “The Will to Believe” (James 1979 [1896]: 24), and calls this 




philosophical arguments in his oeuvre. All quotations in the following reconstruction are from 
GS 344.22 
1. The unconditional will to truth might be a prudential rule (“I will not allow myself to be 
deceived”) or a moral rule (“I will not deceive, not even myself”). 
2. The conviction that it is most prudent or useful to know the truth under all circumstances 
“could never have come into being if both truth and untruth constantly proved to be 
useful”—or, relatedly, if “much trust as well as much mistrust” of appearances (i.e., 
endorsing one’s immediate impression as well as stopping to investigate further) were 
both useful in some situations. That is, someone who believed that one should always 
seek the truth on the grounds that truth is always more useful than ignorance or falsehood 
could not long hold onto such a view if, in fact, truth were not always more useful, 
because her own commitment to the pursuit of truth would lead her to that conclusion. 
3. Both “truth and untruth,” “trust and mistrust,” are sometimes useful. 
4. Therefore, from (2) and (3), the unconditional will to truth is not prudentially motivated: 
“the faith in science, which after all exists undeniably, cannot owe its origin to such a 
calculus of utility; it must have originated in spite of the fact that the disutility and 
dangerousness of ‘the will to truth,’ of ‘truth at any price’ is proved to it constantly” (I 
will remark on this point following the reconstruction). 
5. From (1) and (4), the unconditional will to truth is a moral principle. 
6. Morality in general, understood as an unconditional rule to do or refrain from something, 
is highly unusual in the world we live in (“life, nature, and history are ‘not moral’”). So, 
                                                          
22 Reginster gives a helpful reconstruction of the argument of that section (2003: 65–8); I take some cues from him 




more specifically, is the moral injunction always to be truthful (“especially if it should 
seem—and it does seem!—as if life aimed at semblance, meaning error, deception, 
simulation, self-delusion, and when the great sweep of life has actually always shown 
itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi”23). 
7. “[T]hose who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the 
faith in science” thus set themselves apart from the rest of the world. 
8. This “might perhaps be a quixotism, a minor slightly mad enthusiasm; but it might also 
be something more serious, namely, a principle that is hostile to life and destructive.” 
Nietzsche seems to dismiss the first option and favors the second, leading him to: 
9. Conclusion: Those who espouse the unconditional will to truth “thereby affirm another 
world than the world of life, nature, and history,” and consequently “negate its 
counterpart, this world, our world.” 
Why does Nietzsche conclude that, by following the unconditional will to truth as a 
moral principle, the champions of science “affirm another world” and negate our own? We can 
make sense of this opaque inference by recalling the “world-to-mind” direction of fit of 
normative claims: if a norm and the world do not agree, it is the world that we take to be at fault 
and to need to change. Prudential norms demand that a subject make certain changes to the 
world in order to satisfy her own needs or desires. But this subject’s needs and desires, like all 
natural parts of the world, are changeable; and if they change, the former prudential norms no 
longer hold. Prudential norms are by nature responsive to the needs and desires of creatures in 
the world. Moral norms, by contrast, are unconditional: they always apply, no matter what 
                                                          
23 Probably what Nietzsche has in mind with this rather grandiose statement is that in the natural world, defense 
mechanisms based on deception—camouflage, mimicry of predatory or poisonous species—do tend to promote the 




circumstances obtain in the world. What, then, is holding the world accountable to a demand that 
it should change? The norm cannot come from the moral agent who honors it,24 because she 
takes herself to be subject to it as well. As part of the world governed by it, she too is at fault and 
must change her conduct if she violates it; and no change in her desires or situation can cancel it. 
Nothing in the natural world is as unchanging as a moral imperative. Even laws of nature take 
the form of a hypothetical imperative: the way things behave always depends on the antecedent 
circumstances in which the law operates. Nietzsche concludes that unconditional moral rules 
presuppose another world, a “metaphysical” world, that imposes demands on our world and 
holds it at fault, condemns it, if it fails to obey them.25 Nietzsche puts the point succinctly in a 
note from 1887: “Insofar as we believe in morality we pass sentence on existence” (KSA 
12:10[192], published as WP 6). 
 We must still ask how Nietzsche arrives at premise (3) in the argument above, i.e., that 
both truth and untruth are sometimes useful—or, as he puts it more strongly in the passage 
quoted under premise (4), that “the disutility and dangerousness of ‘the will to truth,’ of ‘truth at 
any price’ is proved […] constantly.” Alexander Nehamas offers an example to illustrate the 
weaker claim: if your friend was eaten by a large yellow spotted animal and you see another such 
animal, it is not in your interest to count the spots to make sure it is the same animal; you should 
                                                          
24 Kant notwithstanding: the moral law may come from the agent regarded abstractly as a purely rational subject, 
stripped of all contingent distinguishing features, but it does not come from her qua human being in the phenomenal 
world. Nietzsche indicates that he does not credit Kant’s claim that only moral actions are truly autonomous 
(because the moral law is legislated by the agent as transcendental subject, while non-moral actions are caused by 
natural events outside the agent) with his quip that “‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive” (GM II, 2). 
In any event, Kant certainly is not immune from the charge of “affirming another world” over our own! 
25 Nietzsche’s claim that acceptance of unconditional moral rules commits us to a “metaphysical world” sounds odd 
and hyperbolic, and deliberately conjures up fanciful images of the Christian or Platonic Heaven, but this 
“metaphysical world” can be understood in a much more minimal sense. Nietzsche is arguing that there can be no 
naturalistic explanation for unconditional moral norms; they require metaethical non-naturalism. The overlay of 
non-natural moral facts condemning natural states of affairs and making demands on human agents is already a 




trust the initial false judgment that it is the same one and run away (Nehamas 2017: 317). But 
Nietzsche appeals to a very different example to defend the stronger claim, about “the disutility 
and dangerousness of ‘the will to truth’”: “‘At any price’: how well we understand these words 
once we have offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar!” (i.e., of truth; GS 
344). One of Nietzsche’s central criticisms of the unconditional will to truth is that it tends to tear 
down the ideals that people once lived by, depriving them of the sources of meaning and value in 
their lives, by showing the metaphysical assumptions on which they rested to be false and the 
divine sources of their authority to be counterfeit. This example points to the potential utility of 
holding wholly false beliefs, as opposed to merely trusting imprecise heuristics or inaccurate first 
impressions.  
Nietzsche’s criticism of the unconditional will to truth, on the basis of this analysis, is 
twofold. The first component is an internal criticism, effectively a charge of hypocrisy. We have 
already seen one version of this charge in Nietzsche’s rhetorical question: “To make it possible 
for this discipline [science] to begin, must there not be some prior conviction—even one so 
commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself?” (GS 344). As I 
noted before, the conviction motivating the rule against convictions—that truth has overriding 
value—violates its own rule: it stands unquestioned as long as the rule to permit oneself no 
convictions is obeyed. Or, to put it differently, the will to truth is not truly unconditional as long 
as it does not question itself.26 More specifically, Nietzsche finds it ironic that “It is still a 
metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests […], we seekers after knowledge today, 
we godless anti-metaphysicians” (GS 344). The partisans of science and adherents to the 
                                                          
26 Nietzsche, of course, does pose this question, acknowledging that he is motivated to the will to truth (see BGE 1 
and GM III, 27, which I will discuss in section 3). But his criticism of (fellow?) adherents to the unconditional will 
to truth—of which there are many among the late-nineteenth century admirers of science—is that they are 




unconditional will to truth are committed to skepticism about anything that cannot be observed 
or otherwise verified by the methods of science. They may, for example, subscribe to Clifford’s 
Principle, that it is wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence, and accordingly withhold 
belief from any invisible supernatural entities (including God or a Platonic heaven) for which 
evidence, particularly of the kind demanded by science, is scant. Nonetheless, Nietzsche argues, 
their own unconditional will to truth implicitly commits them to the existence of some sort of 
invisible world beyond the one we live in, for which there is little to no evidence—certainly not 
enough to satisfy someone who consistently follows Clifford’s Principle. 
The second component of Nietzsche’s critique of the unconditional will to truth is ethical: 
that it expresses an attitude of condemnation toward the world we live in—the only world there 
is, according to Nietzsche. With his assertion that “life, nature, and history are ‘not moral’” (GS 
344), he implies that our world will inevitably flout such moral rules. Meanwhile, claims he 
makes elsewhere about our extremely limited condition as knowers (see, e.g., GS 107, 110; BGE 
24, 34) imply, more specifically, that we will inevitably fail to conform to the demand that we 
believe nothing but truth. Finally, those who endorse and hold themselves bound by 
unconditional moral rules thus declare their allegiance to this metaphysical world (be it the 
Platonic world of Forms, the Christian Heaven, or the Kantian noumenal realm) in preference to 
our own. They declare their willingness to condemn our world for its inevitable moral 
shortcomings and (as I will detail in what follows) to sacrifice the needs and interests of life on 
earth to the moral demands of the metaphysical world. 
2. The asceticism of science 
 The third essay of On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), entitled “What is the Meaning 




explicates in the remainder of the essay (GM Pref. 8). This aphorism runs through the meaning of 
ascetic ideals for several types of people: artists, “philosophers and scholars,” women, “the 
physiologically deformed and deranged (the majority of mortals),” priests, and saints (GM III, 1); 
he does not specifically mention science here. He explains why “the ascetic ideal has meant so 
many things” to so many different types of people in terms of the “horror vacui” of the human 
will: “it needs a goal—and it will rather will nothingness than not will.” Then after asking, 
“Have I been understood?” and answering himself, “Not at all, my dear sir!”, he declares, “Then 
let us start again, from the beginning” (I, 1), and embarks on the “commentary” or “exegesis” he 
promised in the Preface (section 8), explaining his remarks on each of the groups in the 
aphorism, more or less in order. 
 In the commentary, however, he makes a couple of alterations to the inventory in the 
aphorism (“scholars” have been removed from their place with philosophers, who are the topic 
of GM III, 6–9, and are now explained in the same terms as saints or the sick majority of 
mankind, as I will discuss below; mercifully, women are missing entirely). And another group 
has been added: “the last idealists left among philosophers and scholars,” “these last idealists of 
knowledge” (III, 24). He introduces them by way of considering a proposed counterexample to 
his thesis that the ascetic ideal has been so prevalent only because humanity has lacked any rival 
ideal, and needs some ideal or other. “But they tell me it [a rival ideal] is not lacking,” Nietzsche 
remarks (III, 23); 
it has not merely waged a long and successful fight against [the ascetic] ideal, it has already 
conquered this ideal in all important respects: all of modern science is supposed to bear witness to 
that—modern science which, as a genuine philosophy of reality, clearly believes in itself alone […] 
and has up to now survived well enough without God, the beyond, and the virtues of denial.  
  (GM III, 23) 
 
But Nietzsche rejects this purported counterexample and shoots back that “where [science] still 




rather the latest and noblest form of it” (III, 23)—that for the “idealists of knowledge” who 
pursue science with passion, love, and ardor, who suffer for its sake, “this ideal is precisely their 
ideal, too; […] they themselves are its most spiritualized product” (III, 24). “Does this sound 
strange to you?” he asks (III, 23)—because he intends that it should. This revelation, that science 
is not the enemy but the “kernel” (III, 27) of the ascetic ideal, is, in the terms of his description 
of the Genealogy in Ecce Homo, the “new truth” that “in the midst of perfectly gruesome 
detonations […] becomes visible […] among thick clouds” (EH “GM”). He therefore could not 
preview it in the opening aphorism: he needed to lure in his readers, many of whom are probably 
such “idealists of knowledge” themselves. 
 In this section, I will explain first what Nietzsche understands by the ascetic ideal, and 
then why he takes science to be “the latest and noblest form of it” (GM III, 23). In brief: the 
ascetic ideal denigrates the world we live in; it is “life-denying” above all. And science, insofar 
as it is motivated by the unconditional will to truth introduced in GS 344, is life-denying because 
it is willing to sacrifice any of the needs and interests of life to the pursuit of truth. 
2.1 Science as the “kernel” of the ascetic ideal 
 At its most basic level, the ascetic ideal is the devaluation of worldly goods and pleasures 
of the flesh, the glorification of “poverty, humility, chastity” (GM III, 8). This is the component 
of the ascetic ideal that, according to Nietzsche, makes it appealing to philosophers: they espouse 
ascetic ideals not because they are opposed to life, but because the avoidance of worldly 
distractions provides “an optimum condition for the highest and boldest spirituality” (III, 7). But, 
he claims, the appeal of these surface trappings of the ascetic ideal sometimes seduces 
philosophers into promoting the attitude at the heart of the ideal, as embodied by the ascetic 




The idea at issue here is the valuation the ascetic priest places on our life: he juxtaposes it (along with 
what pertains to it: “nature,” “world,” the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness) with a quite 
different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, unless it turn against itself, deny itself: in 
that case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that other mode of existence. The 
ascetic treats life as a wrong road on which one must finally walk back to the point where it begins, or 
as a mistake that is put right by deeds—that we ought to put right […] (GM III, 11) 
 
As should be obvious from this description, Christianity is an important and typical expression of 
the ascetic ideal. God, who is pure spirit, eternally changeless, perfectly wise and loving, 
represents the “different mode of existence” opposed to our own corporeal, time-bound, limited 
and selfish one. God is “the ultimate antithesis of [our] own animal instincts,” and we come to 
see “these animal instincts themselves as a form of guilt before God” (GM II, 22). Nietzsche also 
names Indian Vedanta philosophy (GM III, 12) and Buddhism (III, 17) as religious incarnations 
of the ascetic ideal. These religions turn their adherents away from things of the flesh, at best 
through self-denial (moderation, chastity, minimization of attachments), at worst through self-
torment (long fasts, flagellation, violent guilt and self-hatred) (see GM III, 17–21). 
 But of course, not all incarnations of the ascetic ideal are religious; some (officially) non-
religious philosophies have expressed it in various ways. One whom Nietzsche clearly has in 
mind is Schopenhauer, who, inspired by Indian philosophy and religion, argued from the 
ubiquity and inevitability of suffering that the world ought not to exist, and so we should all 
make an effort to take it out of existence by extinguishing our desires. In Schopenhauer’s case, 
the only “different mode of existence” being contrasted favorably with our own is non-existence. 
Another philosophical example Nietzsche names is Kant, who posits a noumenal realm of things 
in themselves (including, ultimately, God and the perfectly free rational agent, standing in for the 
“immortal soul”) that we can think about but never know. In Kant’s philosophy, Nietzsche 
claims, “the ascetic self-contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: ‘there is a realm of truth 




 How, then, is modern science not an opponent of the ascetic ideal, but “the latest and 
noblest form of it” (GM III, 23)? The people whom Nietzsche charges with perpetuating the 
ascetic ideal are “the last idealists among philosophers and scholars” (GM III, 24) mentioned 
above: 
These Nay-sayers and outsiders of today who are unconditional on one point—their insistence on 
intellectual cleanliness; these hard, severe, abstinent, heroic spirits who constitute the honor of our 
age; all these pale atheists, anti-Christians [Antichristen], immoralists, nihilists; these skeptics, 
ephectics,27 hectics28 of the spirit […]; these last idealists of knowledge in whom alone the intellectual 
conscience dwells and is incarnate today—they certainly believe they are as completely liberated 
from the ascetic ideal as possible, these “free, very free spirits”; and yet, to disclose to themselves 
what they themselves cannot see […]: this ideal is precisely their ideal, too […] They are far from 
being free spirits: for they still have faith in truth.  (GM III, 24) 
 
The first thing to notice about this passage (other than the forcefulness of its rhetoric) is 
Nietzsche’s rather favorable characterization of “these last idealists of knowledge” (GM III, 24). 
Although he does not explicitly identify himself as one of them, he leaves some clues. First, he 
refers to them as “Antichristen”—which is most naturally understood to mean “anti-Christians” 
in this context, but could also be interpreted as “Antichrists”—perhaps in anticipation of his 
forthcoming book Der Antichrist (published the following year, 1888), which makes clear that he 
is the titular “Antichrist.”29 Second, he calls them “immoralists,” a word he had already applied 
to himself in Beyond Good and Evil (section 32) and the preface to the new 1886 edition of 
Daybreak (Pref. 4), and which he would emphatically claim in Ecce Homo (1888; IV, 2–6).30 His 
references to “intellectual cleanliness” and “the intellectual conscience” are also telling. In The 
Gay Science he confesses, “I do not want to believe it although it is palpable: the great majority 
                                                          
27 Ones who practice ephexis, or suspension of judgment (related to the Greek term epochē, used by the Pyrrhonian 
skeptics for their practice of suspending judgment; see Berry 2014: 131). 
28 Fevered consumptives. 
29 In an editorial footnote (GM III, 24, p. 149, n. 8), Walter Kaufmann also refers the reader to the preface Nietzsche 
wrote for the new edition of The Birth of Tragedy published in 1886, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” in which he 
plays on the ambiguity of the German word Antichrist and identifies the Antichrist as Dionysus (BT Pref. 5). 




of people lacks an intellectual conscience,” implying that he is one of the very few exceptions 
(GS 2). In Beyond Good and Evil, he says that the “philosophers of the future” will be “skeptics,” 
in the sense of being ruthlessly critical of every doctrine they are presented with: “Critical 
discipline and every habit that is conducive to cleanliness and severity in matters of the spirit 
will be demanded by these philosophers not only of themselves” (BGE 210, emphasis added). 
Finally, the phrase in quotation marks, “free, very free spirits,” is a reference to BGE 230, where 
the full phrase is “we free, very free spirits” (italics original, bold emphasis mine), and Nietzsche 
is very clearly referring to himself and people of a similar cast of mind (as I will discuss in 
section 3 below). 
Nietzsche’s (at least partial) self-identification with the targets of his critique is 
confirmed when he goes on to quote from the conclusion of GS 344: 
those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science 
thereby affirm another world than that of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this 
“other world”—look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world? 
… It is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—even we seekers after 
knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, we, too, take our fire from the flame lit by a faith 
that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God is truth, that truth 
is divine.  (GS 344, quoted GM III, 24; ellipsis and italics original, bold emphasis mine) 
 
Nietzsche here brings down upon the “idealists of knowledge” like himself the critique explained 
above in section 1: that their “faith in truth” (GM III, 24)—by which he means their faith in the 
absolute value of truth, as made clear in GS 344—negates “our world,” the world “of life, nature, 
and history,” in favor of “another world,” a “metaphysical” world (GS 344). And this is precisely 
the structure of the ascetic ideal, as described previously. The ascetic priest “juxtaposes [our life] 
(along with what pertains to it: ‘nature,’ ‘world,’ the whole sphere of becoming and 
transitoriness) with a quite different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes,” and 
devalues it in comparison with that other world (GM III, 11). In just the same way, the idealists 




metaphysical world that unconditionally demands of us, regardless of what our earthly needs 
may be, that we believe only truth, and as much truth as possible. 
True, Nietzsche acknowledges, these “godless anti-metaphysicians” (GS 344) have done 
away with most of the characteristics of the “other world” as the ascetic priest posits it. A stern 
but benevolent, incorporeal God no longer dwells there, promising eternal bliss in his world if 
we “turn against” and “deny” everything pertaining to our own world (GM III, 11) (i.e., by 
humiliating the body and its desires), or threatening eternal punishment if we fail to do so. But, 
as Nietzsche points out, these details are hardly essential to the spirit of the ascetic ideal, and in 
fact, any promises of bliss or claims about a God who cares about the fate of human beings run 
positively counter to it, self-indulgent as they are. Truly obeying the self-denying spirit of the 
ascetic ideal requires stripping the ideal of these ornaments. In its purest form, 
it does without ideals of any kind—the popular expression for this abstinence is “atheism”—except 
for its will to truth. But this will, this remnant of an ideal, is, if you will believe me, this ideal itself in 
its strictest, most spiritual formulation, esoteric through and through, with all external additions 
abolished, and thus not so much its remnant as its kernel. (GM III, 27) 
 
The unconditional will to truth recognizes a demand from the “other world,” one that takes no 
account of the needs or circumstances of beings in our world, but does away with the promise of 
a reward from that other world if we satisfy its demands. Even doing away with the threat of 
punishment for disobeying is self-denying in a certain way. Kant insists, with his typical 
austerity, that an action has moral worth only if it is performed from the rational motive of duty, 
not from the basely sensuous desire to gain reward or avoid punishment—even of the divine sort 




for obeying it; such ordinary, selfish human motivations as reward and punishment are not even 
in the offing.31 
2.2 The asceticism of science made concrete 
 So far Nietzsche’s argument has been very abstract: he has argued that in principle 
science is ascetic, assuming the institution of science is grounded in the unconditional will to 
truth. What evidence does he have that science as it is practiced is beholden to the ascetic ideal? 
Nietzsche gives some concrete examples of the asceticism of modern science in the last few 
sections of GM III. First, he claims that for many of those who “work[ ] rigorously in the 
sciences,” “science […] is a hiding place for every kind of discontent, disbelief, gnawing worm, 
despectio sui, bad conscience—it is the unrest of the lack of ideals, the suffering from the lack of 
any great love” (GM III, 23). The “heedless industry” of “our finest scholars,” “their heads 
smoking day and night,” enables those same scholars to hide from themselves their own sense of 
the meaninglessness of their lives, and science thus functions for them “as a means of self-
narcosis” (III, 23). In this way, the activity of science resembles one of the remedies the ascetic 
priest prescribes to distract his sick, self-loathing flock (“the majority of mortals,” per III, 1) 
from their suffering: “mechanical activity […] today called, somewhat dishonestly, ‘the 
blessings of work’” (III, 18). Along similar lines, Nietzsche points out that “[p]hysiologically 
[…], science rests on the same foundation as the ascetic ideal: a certain impoverishment of life is 
a presupposition of both of them—the affects grown cool, the tempo of life slowed down” (III, 
25). This resembles Nietzsche’s characterization of the saint’s efforts to dull his unhappiness “by 
means that reduce the feeling of life in general to its lowest point” (III, 17). Nietzsche describes 
                                                          
31 Lest it be objected that the reward for believing truths is greater success in one’s earthly projects and the 
punishment for believing falsehoods is frustration and failure, recall that Nietzsche already ruled out the prudential 
explanation for the unconditional will to truth in GS 344. We are talking about seeking to attain truth and root out 




“the ideal scholar in whom the scientific instinct […] blossoms and blooms to the end” as 
achieving (like the ascetic saint) a complete “‘unselfing’ and depersonalization of the spirit,” and 
even something like an unio mystica with the object of knowledge: he becomes no more than “a 
mirror”; “he is accustomed to submit before whatever wants to be known, without any other 
pleasure than that found in knowing and ‘mirroring’” (BGE 207). 
 But these are relatively superficial matters; it is in the knowledge which science uncovers 
that its deepest connection to the ascetic ideal can be found. “Has the self-belittlement of man, 
his will to self-belittlement, not progressed irresistibly since Copernicus?” Nietzsche asks (GM 
III, 25). Thanks to the discoveries of science, humankind has been displaced from the center of 
the universe and from the top of the pyramid of creation, and human “existence appears […] 
arbitrary, beggarly, and dispensable in the visible order of things” (III, 25). Since Darwin 
especially, “the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in the great 
chain of being, is a thing of the past—he has become an animal, literally and without reservation 
or qualification, he who was, according to his old faith, almost God.” “All science,” Nietzsche 
declares, “has at present the object of dissuading man from his former respect for himself […] 
One might even say that […] its own austere form of stoical ataraxy, consists in sustaining this 
hard-won self-contempt of man” (GM III, 25). This declaration encompasses not only “natural” 
but also “unnatural” science,32 namely, “the self-critique of knowledge” (III, 25) conducted by 
“philosophical laborers” like Kant (BGE 211) and the neo-Kantians (alluded to scathingly in 
BGE 204: “Philosophy reduced to ‘theory of knowledge’ [Erkenntnisstheorie], in fact no more 
than a timid epochism33 and doctrine of abstinence”). Historiography too, in its effort to become 
                                                          
32 Here one must bear in mind that the German Wissenschaft has a broader meaning than the English science; 
sometimes better translated as “scholarship,” it includes all systematic pursuit of knowledge, including the 
professional study of the humanities, philosophy among them. 




“scientific,” is complicit: historians pride themselves on denying themselves the right to interpret 
or make judgments about the past, or to find purposes in history.34 “All this is to a high degree 
ascetic,” Nietzsche concludes, but “to an even higher degree nihilistic,” in that it portrays all of 
human history as aimless, for naught, “in vain!” (GM III, 26). 
 Science constitutes the spiritualization of the ascetic ideal (see III, 24, 27) in that it 
translates ascetic self-denial and contempt for human existence into the intellectual rather than 
the physical realm. Science denies us any comforting “convictions” (as we saw in GS 344), any 
faith in a purpose to human existence, any illusions about our privileged place in the universe. 
GS 357 (which Nietzsche quotes at length in GM III, 27) draws the connection to the Christian 
form of the ascetic ideal even tighter: 
[U]nconditional and honest atheism [… is] a triumph achieved finally and with great difficulty by the 
European conscience, […] the most fateful act of two thousand years of discipline for truth that in the 
end forbids itself the lie in faith in God. 
 You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the 
concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more rigorously, the father confessor’s refinement of 
the Christian conscience,35 translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual 
cleanliness at any price. Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness and governance of a 
god; interpreting history in honor of some divine reason, as a continual testimony of a moral world 
order […]; interpreting one’s own experiences […] as if everything were providential […] is 
considered indecent and dishonest by every more refined conscience […] (GS 357) 
 
 In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche brings out the religious character of scientific 
asceticism still more sharply. “There is a great ladder of religious cruelty, with many rungs,” he 
says, including the sacrifice of human life, and the ascetic sacrifice of “one’s own strongest 
instincts” (BGE 55). 
Finally—what remained to be sacrificed? At long last, did one not have to sacrifice for once whatever 
is comforting, holy, healing; all hope, all faith in hidden harmony, in future blisses and justices? 
didn’t one have to sacrifice God himself and, from cruelty against oneself, worship the stone, 
                                                          
34 Ken Gemes, in “Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth” (1992), emphasizes a related problem Nietzsche sees with the way 
the concept of truth is used: that people who claim to believe the objective truth deny that that they are always 
imposing some interpretation on things, and thus abdicate responsibility for their own views and values (see esp. pp. 
50ff.). The historians criticized in GM III, 26 are at least honest about their desire to evade this kind of 
responsibility, though not about the impossibility of abstaining from interpretation. 




stupidity, gravity, fate, the nothing? To sacrifice God for the nothing— […] all of us already know 
something of this.— (BGE 55, emphasis added) 
 
The modern partisans of science have sacrificed God, Nietzsche says, from cruelty to 
themselves; but to what? To truth and the imperative of truthfulness, as GS 357 suggests, on 
which the scientific enterprise places the highest (indeed, unconditional) value. This, I think, 
sheds some light on what Nietzsche means when he says, at the end of GS 344, that “even we 
seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from […] 
that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.” 
Truth is treated as a surrogate for God, but, as I suggested in section 2.1 above, in my discussion 
of atheism as “abstinence” from comforting or accessible ideals (GM III, 27), it is a cold, 
unresponsive surrogate—and thus all the more in keeping with the self-denial demanded by the 
ascetic ideal. 
 This is a stark example of the willingness of the believers in the unconditional value of 
truth to sacrifice the interests of life to the demands of truth, which they have set in a position of 
primacy above the world we live in. Human beings need ideals in order to live—that is crucial to 
the argument of GM III; they need to be shown a “meaning” or a “purpose” for their suffering 
(GM III, 28), and even a reason for their very existence (see GS 1). But science will never find 
one in things, and it cannot create one itself, as Nietzsche asserts outright: “Science […] first 
requires in every respect an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it 
could believe in itself—it never creates values” (GM III, 25).36 It can only destroy the basis of 
the old ideals that gave meaning to people’s lives, replacing them with nothing, and raising the 
threat that people will fall into what Reginster calls “nihilism as disorientation”: they will come 
                                                          





to the conclusion that “nothing has value, nothing really matters […] there really is no good life 
to be had” (2006: 26–7). This is the kind of nihilism that Nietzsche characterizes in an 1887 note 
(KSA 12:9[35], published as WP 2) as follows: “That the highest values devaluate themselves. 
The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer.” 
 There are other respects, too, in which the unconditional pursuit of truth can be harmful, 
especially to its pursuers themselves. There are ugly truths about the world, human nature, and 
the ultimate aimlessness of the world from which an inquirer’s mental well-being may require 
her to look away, but an unconditional will to truth will not permit her to do so. Nietzsche no 
longer holds, as he did in The Birth of Tragedy, that the deep metaphysical nature of the world is 
nothing but suffering and horror. But he does still hold that there are “plain, harsh, ugly, repellent 
[…], immoral truth[s]” (GM I, 1) that it hurts to know. He also still thinks it is possible to look 
too deeply into things, as he suggests in BGE 59 when he says that “whoever stands […] much in 
need of the cult of surfaces must at some time have reached beneath them with disastrous 
results.” One possible example of an underlying truth that might “burn” a knowledge-seeker who 
reached down to it, as described in BGE 59, is the one Nietzsche articulates in GS 109: “The total 
character of the world […] is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a 
lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our 
aesthetic anthropomorphisms.” He even says that there are some truths about which “[h]onesty 
would lead to nausea and suicide.”  
 The specific truth he is referring to when he makes that claim is “the realization of 
general untruth and mendaciousness that now comes to us through science—the realization that 
delusion and error are a condition of knowing and sensing existence” (GS 107).37 In keeping with 
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the claim that this truth “comes to us through science,” in GS 110 Nietzsche explains in 
evolutionary terms how false conceptions were so crucial to survival as to become ingrained, 
instinctive, almost inescapable in our thinking (also see GS 111 on a similar theme): 
Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be 
useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or inherited these had better luck in 
their struggle for themselves and their progeny. Such erroneous articles of faith, which were 
continually inherited, until they became almost part of the basic endowment of the species, include 
the following: that there are enduring things; that there are equal things; that there are things, 
substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free […] (GS 110) 
 
It is debatable whether by this Nietzsche means that human beings are biologically incapable of 
apprehending truth, that our beliefs are always necessarily distorted by the limits of our cognitive 
apparatus (the so-called “falsification thesis”).38 Even if he is only making the weaker claim 
“that finite beings like us could never have only true beliefs and survive” (Nehamas 2017: 326, 
emphasis added), this truth is still potentially devastating for an adherent of the unconditional 
will to truth because it suggests that what she takes to be her highest aim in life is unattainable—
if not because of the limits of her cognitive capacities, then because of her limits as an embodied 
finite creature with physical and psychological needs. It is likewise relevant, and ironic, that this 
truth about the limits of our ability to apprehend or live with truth “comes to us through science”: 
the conclusion we must draw from the results of science is that the goal of science, at least as 
understood by those with the “faith in science” described in GS 344—attaining a wholly true 
picture of the world, free of any error or distortion—may well be unattainable for beings like us. 
                                                          
[…].” Kaufmann translates the last phrase as “the realization that delusion and error are conditions of human 
knowledge and sensation.” 
38 Whether and for how long Nietzsche held this falsification thesis has occasioned much recent controversy. Clark 
(1990) and, following her, Leiter (2002), believe that Nietzsche espoused such a thesis in his earlier works 
(including the first edition of The Gay Science) but gave it up while writing Beyond Good and Evil; Anderson (2002, 
2005) takes Nietzsche to have held some version of it all his life; Nehamas (2017) argues that Nietzsche never 
endorsed a falsification thesis at all. It is not my goal here to stake out and defend a position on the issue; what I say 




 Nietzsche continues to express similar doubts about “the extent to which truth can endure 
incorporation” into human life (to paraphrase the end of GS 110) in later works. In Beyond Good 
and Evil, he contends that “the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic judgments a priori) 
are the most indispensable for us,” and that “without accepting the fictions of logic, […] without 
a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live” (BGE 4). 
Especially relevant in this case is that without the “fictions” and “falsification” of logic and 
mathematics, we could not do modern science—which is why Nietzsche declares in BGE 24, 
“only on this now solid, granite foundation of ignorance could knowledge rise so far […]!”, and 
affirms that “precisely science at its best seeks most to keep us in this simplified, thoroughly 
artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world.” In GS 354 he casts doubt on the 
ability of conscious thought—which surely includes scientific “knowledge”—to capture the true 
complexity of reality: because (Nietzsche contends) consciousness developed only for the 
purpose of communicating our needs and feelings to others, “whatever becomes conscious 
becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all 
becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to 
superficialities, and generalization.” 
 The problem is that a scientist with an unconditional will to truth would not be able to 
evade these facts about the limits of our ability to live with truth. And they would be devastating 
to her, because they would entail that she was permanently incapable of satisfying the demand to 
believe nothing but truth. This would lead her into the other type of nihilism that Reginster 
distinguishes, “nihilism as despair”: “the conviction that our existence in this world cannot 
realize our ‘highest values and ideals’” (2006: 31). In a note from 1887 (KSA 12:9[60], p. 366, 




that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist.” We have seen that 
the unconditional will to truth has abolished “the world as it ought to be,” according to any value 
system that modern Europeans might recognize. The will to truth has dismissed the world of 
“future blisses and justices” (BGE 55) promised by Christianity (i.e., the theistic version of the 
ascetic ideal). As we have seen, it also appears to be on its way to concluding that a world in 
which human beings successfully obey its own imperative to believe only truth cannot exist 
either. If that is not possible in the only world there is, then without a change in our values, all 
that is left is to judge that it ought not to be. 
3. Pursuing a conditional will to truth: “gay science” 
 Should we conclude from this revelation of the ascetic, life-denying character of the 
unconditional will to truth, and of science insofar as it is animated by that will, that we should 
give up science and the search for truth? Nietzsche’s self-identification as one of the “idealists of 
knowledge” at whom his critique is leveled suggests that the answer is “no”—but might 
Nietzsche be exposing his own hypocritical asceticism in order to publicly force himself to cast it 
away? That would be yet another instance of the asceticism Nietzsche has described: sacrificing 
one more ideal because the unconditional will to truth revealed that the belief in the overriding 
value of the ideal was unjustified, and therefore the idealist had no right to it. And Nietzsche is 
perfectly explicit in admitting that it is, in fact, the will to truth that drives the investigation into 
the origins, motivations, and value of the will to truth itself: 
The will to truth which will still tempt us to many a venture […]—what questions has this will to 
truth not laid before us! What strange, wicked, questionable questions! […] Is it any wonder that we 
should finally become suspicious […]? that we should finally learn from this Sphinx to ask questions, 
too? Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What in us really wants “truth”? 
 Indeed we came to a long halt at the question about the cause of this will—until we finally came 
to a complete stop before a still more basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose 





In the penultimate section of GM III, Nietzsche underlines this irony still more emphatically: 
All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming: thus the law of 
life will have it […] the lawgiver himself eventually receives the call: “patere legem, quam ipse 
tulisti” [“submit to the law you yourself proposed”]. In this way Christianity as a dogma was 
destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now perish, too: we 
stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after 
another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself; this will 
happen, however, when it poses the question “what is the meaning of all will to truth?”   (GM III, 27) 
 
If, as Nietzsche predicts, “morality will gradually perish now,” does that not mean that Nietzsche 
is recommending that we give up the will to truth? For Nietzsche, this would mean sacrificing 
his own ideal—but might he regard it as necessary to climb that last rung of “the great ladder of 
religious cruelty” (BGE 55) in order to kick it away and become entirely free of morality? 
Some of Nietzsche’s remarks about his own will to truth suggest that this solution may 
not be possible for him, since it is such a deep-rooted, intractable part of his character. This 
emerges especially in Part VII of Beyond Good and Evil, “Our Virtues,” in which he speaks of 
“honesty” as something he simply finds himself stuck with: “Honesty, supposing that this is our 
virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits—well, let us work on it with all our 
malice and love and not weary of ‘perfecting’ ourselves in our virtue, the only one left us” (BGE 
227). He reinforces this suggestion obliquely a few sections later with a rather peculiar transition. 
BGE 230 closes with a characterization of Nietzsche’s fellow “free spirits” and the task to which 
they feel they are bound: 
Every courageous thinker will recognize this in himself, assuming only that, as fit, he has hardened 
and sharpened his eye for himself long enough […] He will say: “there is something cruel in the 
inclination of my spirit”; let the virtuous and kindly try to talk him out of that! 
 Indeed, it would sound nicer if we were […] reputed to be distinguished not by cruelty but by 
“extravagant honesty,” we free, very free spirits […] But we hermits and marmots have long 
persuaded ourselves […] that this worthy verbal pomp, too, belongs to the old mendacious pomp, 
junk, and gold dust of unconscious human vanity […] 
 To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and overly enthusiastic 
interpretations […] that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo 
natura; to see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of 
science, he stands before the rest of nature, […] deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird 




different origin!”—that may be a strange and insane task, but it is a task—who would deny that? Why 
did we choose this insane task? Or, putting it differently: “why have knowledge at all?” 
 Everybody will ask us that. And we, pressed this way, we who have put the same question to 
ourselves a hundred times, we have found and find no better answer— (BGE 230) 
 
Nietzsche appears to leave the question unanswered and moves on to seemingly unrelated 
musings in BGE 231: “Learning changes us […] But at the bottom of us, really ‘deep down,’ 
there is, of course, something unteachable, some granite of spiritual fatum […]” I read this 
apparently abrupt transition not as a complete change of subject, but as an answer to the question 
posed at the end of BGE 230. 
 Nietzsche and his free spirits are committed to the “strange and insane task” of unveiling 
the painful truth about humanity: we are just another species of animal, not “higher,” “of a 
different origin,” uniquely endowed with a rational soul, or made in God’s image. This is 
precisely the kind of painful scientific revelation that Nietzsche identified as evidence of the 
asceticism of science.39 The question “Why did we choose this insane task?”, Nietzsche says, is 
equivalent to the question “why have knowledge at all?” (BGE 230). In GS 344 and GM III, 
Nietzsche answers this question in terms of the world-negating morality of the ascetic ideal: 
“[T]he question ‘Why science?’ leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality at all when 
life, nature, and history are ‘not moral’?” (GS 344). 
 But when he poses the question in BGE 230 about his own will to truth (“Why did we 
choose this insane task?”), he replies, “we who have put the same question to ourselves a 
hundred times, we have found and find no better answer”—no better answer, apparently, than 
that “at the bottom of us, really ‘deep down,’ there is […] something unteachable, some granite 
of spiritual fatum […]” (BGE 231). But he does not answer that question directly because it is 
                                                          
39 Recall: “Has the self-belittlement of man […] not progressed irresistibly since Copernicus? Alas, the faith in the 
dignity and uniqueness of man […] is a thing of that past—he has become an animal, literally and without 




not the kind of answer the questioner is looking for: it is a cause of his commitment to the 
pursuit of truth, not a reason or justification for it. Nietzsche argues in GS 344 and GM III that 
the only possible justification for the unconditional will to truth, the moral one, not only rests on 
false presuppositions but also involves a positively harmful attitude toward life: there is no good 
reason to be committed to the pursuit of truth at any price. But when a will to truth is part of the 
“granite of spiritual fatum” (BGE 231), reasons cannot budge it. In fact, Nietzsche is at pains to 
point out that the “extravagant honesty” he might like to be credited with would be more 
accurately identified as “cruelty” (BGE 230); and cruelty, Nietzsche remarks repeatedly, is a 
thoroughly natural, ultimately ineradicable human inclination (see, e.g., GM II, 5–7, 16–18).40 
And as noted before, it smacks of the ascetic ideal to try to eradicate one’s deepest animal nature 
because its behavior runs contrary to reason. 
 Nietzsche’s way out of this conundrum hinges on the “unconditional” part of the 
“unconditional will to truth.” He argued in GS 344 that the unconditional will to truth is a moral 
imperative, and thus “negate[s] this world, our world.” But the possibility that the will to truth 
might be a prudential rule implies that truth is sometimes, though not always, beneficial for life 
(“both truth and untruth constantly proved to be useful,” GS 344). This suggests that a 
conditional will to truth, at least in the sense of being restricted to the cases in which truth is 
useful for life, might not fall prey to the charge of asceticism. Nietzsche almost explicitly 
answers the question of where to draw the line around this restricted will to truth when he writes, 
“The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection […] The question is to what 
extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating” 
(BGE 4). In fact, this appears to state his criterion for the value of any impulse or institution, 
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from altruistic morality (see GM Pref. 6) to hierarchical social structures (BGE 257), so it is 
hardly surprising that he holds the will to truth to the same standard. But what would it mean to 
exercise the will to truth only so far as it is “life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, 
perhaps even species-cultivating” (BGE 4)? 
 I believe that Nietzsche has already given a sketch, albeit unsystematic and allusive, of 
such a will to truth in The Gay Science. He points to the distinctive role of art in saving the 
pursuit of truth from asceticism with his choice of the expression “la gaya scienza” (the subtitle 
of Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft), the Provençal term for the art of the medieval troubadours—
“that unity of singer, knight, and free spirit which distinguishes the wonderful early culture of 
the Provençals from all equivocal cultures” (EH III, “Gay Science”). The “gay science” 
Nietzsche describes is a mode of pursuing truth that enables the pursuer—who, like Nietzsche, 
may be ineluctably committed to seeking truth by “some granite of spiritual fatum” (BGE 231)—
to remain cheerful and life-affirming, despite the ever-present risk that too much knowledge, or 
some particular ugly truth, will depress or crush her.  
The key attributes of gay science are these: (1) The inquirer uses artistry to interpret the 
knowledge she acquires in a way that enables her to love and affirm life, rather than condemn it 
for its horror and meaninglessness. Sometimes this is a matter of artistically interpreting her own 
life of inquiry so that she can affirm it, despite the horrible truths she may have encountered. A 
primary way of doing this that Nietzsche emphasizes is (2) using experimentation as an 
opportunity for courage and adventure—thus reintroducing the “knight” aspect of the early 
Provençal practitioners of la gaya scienza into his own version. Thus it is a gay science because 
modern science is the mode of knowledge-seeking that distinctively prioritizes experimentation 




spirit of play is maintained. In the remainder of this section, I will explicate these components 
and show how Nietzsche’s conception of gay science involves a will to truth that is conditional 
in both senses: instrumental to life-affirming values as well as restricted to circumstances in 
which it promotes them. 
3.1 Honesty and artistry 
R. Lanier Anderson (2005) presents a reading of the eternal recurrence as a test of the 
goodness of a life and as a tool for helping us to endorse our own lives by “redeeming” past 
events of questionable value. Anderson argues that in order to be able to affirm her life as the 
eternal recurrence demands, an agent must balance two competing criteria: honesty and artistry. 
Honesty ensures that it is really her own life she is affirming, not something fictionalized beyond 
recognition. Artistry, meanwhile, enables her to “tell her life to herself” (cf. EH, epigraph) in a 
way that is narratively satisfying, and shows that questionable elements are necessary either to 
other elements that she would not want her life to be without or simply to the aesthetic integrity 
of the whole. Anderson also suggests that this “thought of an ideal somehow based on the 
mutually limiting combination of virtues drawn from art and science […] informs [Nietzsche’s] 
idea of a ‘gay science’” (2005: 220, n. 47)—i.e., that gay science is the practice of balancing 
honesty and artistry. And Nietzsche in fact asserts that an artistic attitude can help us evade the 
risk of becoming beholden to the ascetic ideal: “Art […], in which precisely the lie is sanctified 
and the will to deception has a good conscience, is much more fundamentally opposed to the 
ascetic ideal than is science” (GM III, 25). 
The idea that artistic techniques can be used to shape one’s life occurs repeatedly 
throughout The Gay Science. In GS 290, for example, Nietzsche extols the “great and rare art” of 




nature and then fit[ting] them into an artistic plan”; in GS 299, he recommends that we “learn 
from artists” how to “make things beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us when they are not,” 
in order to “be the poets of our life.” He brings the idea to bear specifically on the problem of 
potentially harmful knowledge in GS 107: 
Our ultimate gratitude to art.— If we had not welcomed the arts and invented this kind of cult of the 
untrue, then the realization of general untruth and mendaciousness that now comes to us through 
science—the realization that delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation—
would be utterly unbearable. Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But now there is a 
counterforce against our honesty that helps us to avoid such consequences: art as the good will to 
appearance. We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off something and, as it were, finishing 
the poem […] As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes us with 
eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves into such a 
phenomenon. 
 
This passage alludes to four separate ways in which we can improve our lives using the tools of 
art: (1) we can accept that we perceive the world through a screen of “delusion and error,” i.e., 
through the potentially distorting structures of our cognitive apparatus, because we can regard 
ourselves as doing artistic shaping of the world around us; (2) we can deliberately view things in 
the world with artists’ eyes, “rounding [them] off” with a neatness and symmetry they do not 
possess; (3) we can regard life as “an aesthetic phenomenon” and appreciate it for the beauty that 
can be found in spite of its suffering and moral disorder; and (4) we can regard ourselves as 
aesthetic phenomena, and carry out the kind of artistic fashioning of our character described in 
GS 290 and 299. 
As Nietzsche suggests in the Preface to the second edition of The Gay Science, this 
artistic license that the practitioner of gay science permits herself in interpreting the world is 
sometimes simply a matter of knowing when to look away or forget what she has seen: 
There are a few things we now know too well, we knowing ones: oh, how we now learn to forget 
well, and to be good at not knowing, as artists! 
 And as for our future, one will hardly find us again on the paths of those Egyptian youths who 
endanger temples by night, embrace statues, and want by all means to unveil, uncover, and put into a 




“truth at any price,” this youthful madness in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us: for that 
we are too experienced, too serious, too merry, too burned, too profound. […] 
 Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the 
surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance […]  (GS Preface 4; bold emphasis added) 
 
The phrase I have highlighted in this quotation, “this will to truth, to ‘truth at any price,’” has 
special resonance with a very similar locution in GS 344—“the disutility and dangerousness of 
‘the will to truth,’ of ‘truth at any price’ is proved […] constantly”—in light of the fact that this 
preface and Book V, which includes GS 344, were both added for the second edition published in 
1887. This passage in the Preface, then, might constitute Nietzsche’s response to the criticism he 
aims at himself in GS 344. Yes, he admits in the Preface, he used to be a devotee of the 
unconditional will “to ‘truth at any price.’” But “one will hardly find us again on the path” of 
those who want to “unveil” everything; such “youthful madness” and “bad taste,” as he calls it—
framing the problem of the will to truth, tellingly, in aesthetic terms—“have lost their charm for 
us” (GS Pref. 4, emphasis added). He and other gay scientists exercise their good taste in 
choosing what not to look into, or what to ignore. 
Nietzsche certainly does not disavow the will to truth entirely here; rather, he ties it even 
more tightly to his individual character, as seen in BGE Part VII: 
We philosophers are not free to divide body from soul as the people do […] We are not thinking 
frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms with their innards removed: constantly, we have to 
give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all we have of blood, 
heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe. […] Only great pain is the 
ultimate liberator of the spirit, being the teacher of the great suspicion that turns every U into an X 41 
[…] 
 The attraction of everything problematic, the delight in an x, however, is so great in such more 
spiritual, more spiritualized men that this delight flares up again and again like a bright blaze over the 
distress of what is problematic […] We know a new happiness. (GS Preface 3) 
 
                                                          
41 As Walter Kaufmann clarifies in an editorial footnote, Nietzsche means that “the great suspicion” casts doubt on 
apparently familiar things, thus turning supposedly known quantities into unknown quantities, as symbolized by the 




The drive to investigate “what is problematic,” or to solve for x, is here understood not as the 
fulfillment of a duty, but as the pursuit of a “delight” available only to the “more spiritual.” This 
view of the relationship of philosophers to their thoughts is reaffirmed in the Preface to the 
Genealogy: “we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our 
values, our yeas and nays […] grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit—
related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun” 
(GM Pref. 2). 
The idea that a philosopher’s ideas grow not out of an indifferent will to truth but out of 
the needs, strengths, and weaknesses of her individual character is thoroughly in keeping with 
Nietzsche’s characterization of philosophers past and future in Beyond Good and Evil. While he 
criticizes past philosophers for their hypocrisy and timidity in denying this fact (see, e.g., BGE 5, 
6, 9, 187), he declares it approvingly in the case of the “philosopher of the future” who will avow 
openly, “‘My judgment is my judgment’: no one else is easily entitled to it” (BGE 43). This kind 
of individuality seems, on the face of it, less suited to truth—which is generally understood to be 
universal, true for everyone if it is true for anyone42—than to taste; Nietzsche’s tree metaphor in 
GM Pref. 2 could as well describe an aesthetic unity among a philosopher’s thoughts as a logical 
unity. Nietzsche indicates the importance of such aesthetic unity in his advice on how to “‘give 
style’ to one’s character”: “when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a 
single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad 
is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!” (GS 290). 
These characterizations of the gay scientist and the new philosopher point to ways in 
which their will to truth is both instrumental to other values and restricted accordingly. Gay 
                                                          
42 Nietzsche’s perspectivism may complicate this generalization slightly, but does not invalidate it: perspectivism is 




scientists do not pursue truth out of a sense of moral obligation but for the pleasure it brings 
them: “The attraction of everything problematic, the delight in an x [… that] flares up again and 
again like a bright blaze over the distress of what is problematic” (GS Pref. 3). True philosophers 
do not pursue truth in general, but their own truths, the truths that express their distinctive 
temperament, worldview, and vision for the world (GM Pref., BGE 43). Their pursuit of truth is 
at the same time a process of self-creation: as the philosopher’s ideas develop from her character 
like fruit from a tree (GM Pref. 2), she simultaneously discovers and shapes who she is. And for 
a Nietzschean philosopher, truth-seeking is not only a matter of self-shaping, but of shaping the 
world as a whole: 
Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, “thus it shall be!” They 
first determine the Whither and For What of man […] With a creative hand they reach for the future, 
and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their “knowing” is 
creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power. (BGE 211) 
 
Gay scientists and philosophers, then, pursue truth with aesthetic and creative as well as 
epistemic considerations in mind, following certain avenues of inquiry rather than others because 
of how well they fit with their personal concerns or their life history—or because of how the 
answers might contribute to a project of reshaping the world around them. 
3.2 Experimentation and courage 
 In a few apparently confessional sections of The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes the 
weariness and disillusionment that attend the life of the seeker of knowledge. Here is one 
example:  
Excelsior.— “You will never pray again, never adore again, never again rest in endless trust; you do 
not permit yourself to stop before any ultimate wisdom, ultimate goodness, ultimate power, while 
unharnessing your thoughts; you have no perpetual guardian and friend for your seven solitudes […]; 
there is no longer any reason in what happens, no love in what happens to you; no resting place is 
open any longer to your heart […]; you resist any ultimate peace; you will the eternal recurrence of 
war and peace: man of renunciation, all this you wish to renounce? Who will give you the strength for 
that? Nobody yet has had this strength!”  (GS 285) 43 
                                                          




In short, a knowledge-seeker cannot be simply comforted or enchanted by any ideals or heroes of 
the past or present: she too often feels compelled to look beneath, behind, or through them; she 
sees their flaws and limitations, and this inevitably breaks the enchantment. 
 Besides resisting the urge “to unveil […] whatever is kept concealed for good reasons” 
(GS Pref. 4), the seeker of knowledge can also regard her disappointments, disillusionments, and 
renunciations—with some exercise of the artistic license discussed in section 3.1—as tests of her 
courage and strength: she can regard herself as a warrior in the service of truth.44 Nietzsche 
clearly thinks strength and courage (intellectual as well as physical) are thoroughly life-affirming 
primary values, and his outlook makes the pursuit of truth instrumental to them. Paradoxically, 
this way of treating the will to truth as instrumental can serve as a counterweight to the artistic 
tendency to embellish or elide the truth, and thus push the will to truth closer to being 
unrestricted. Nietzsche suggests that he believes “the strength of a spirit should be measured 
according to how much of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to 
what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified” 
(BGE 39). Therefore, someone who pursues truth as a means to prove or cultivate her strength 
would be motivated to take in more of it in unedited, unembellished form, for that reason, not 
from an ascetic moral commitment to truth. In fact, Nietzsche may regard it as a regulative ideal 
to be able to take in all of the truth that one comes across in a life spent seeking truth; but the 
value of such an accomplishment lies in the spiritual strength one must build in order to be 
capable of it, not in the commitment to truth as such. 
                                                          
44 Nietzsche seems to think this would make the gay scientist a more effective as well as a healthier seeker of truth, 
as he indicates in the epigraph to the Third Essay of the Genealogy: “Unconcerned, mocking, violent—thus wisdom 




 Elsewhere Nietzsche connects the “heroic” aspects of the search for knowledge 
specifically with its experimental character: “I favor any skepsis to which I may reply: ‘Let us try 
it!’ But I no longer wish to hear anything of […] questions that do not permit any experiment. 
This is the limit of my ‘truthfulness’; for there courage has lost its right” (GS 51). This maxim 
explicitly restricts the search for truth to questions that require courage in experimentation 
(meaning, presumably, experimentation in living according to different rules and values, not 
laboratory experiments). And the implied rationale for this restriction is that inquiry is valuable 
only as a means to exercising one’s courage, which would make the gay scientist’s will to truth 
conditional in both senses laid out in section 1. This restriction would mean, furthermore, that 
interpreting the life of inquiry as one of heroism would end up being quite natural. 
 Nietzsche uses the appeal to courage and experimentation to address a very serious 
problem posed by the search for knowledge. He observes that a thorough study of the moral 
customs of humankind would raise “the most insidious question of all”: 
whether science can furnish goals of action after it has proved that it can take such goals away and 
annihilate them; and then experimentation would be in order that would allow every kind of heroism 
to find satisfaction—centuries of experimentation that might eclipse all the great projects and 
sacrifices of history to date.  (GS 7) 
 
Later Nietzsche determines that science cannot “furnish goals of action”: he states that science 
“never creates values” (GM III 25) and confirms in a note from the same year (1887) that “the 
ascertaining of facts […] is fundamentally different from creative positing” (KSA 12:9[48], 
published as WP 605). But this last paragraph of GS 7 reveals a sense in which “science” can 
furnish goals of action: the activity of gay science, which crucially involves experimentation, 
provides occasions for acts of heroism. Of course, science cannot tell us that courage is valuable, 




these values already. But since (as Nietzsche supposes) we generally do, this way of conducting 
science can offer a satisfying and meaningful life. 
3.3 The child at play 
 Christa Davis Acampora (2004) points to Nietzsche’s admiring remarks, in his lectures 
on the pre-Platonic philosophers, about Heraclitus’s understanding of the strife of the world in 
terms of the image of “a child playing a game” (Acampora 2004: 176). The child’s game is a 
fruitful image for processes in the world; as Acampora argues, it steers between the 
shortcomings of a teleological picture, in which purposes are imposed on the world from a 
transcendent source, and a mechanistic one, which is entirely purposeless (and also, implicitly, 
follows laws imposed from outside) (172–3). “The play of the child,” by contrast, “has immanent 
purposes, directed by the particularities of the play at any given moment, but its shape unfolds 
without an orchestrating will or design” (177, emphasis added). Acampora suggests that the 
image of Heraclitus’s “cosmic child” [Weltkind], setting the game-pieces of the world into such 
internally rule-governed conflict, provides Nietzsche with a model not only for conceptualizing 
natural processes, but for shaping the future of humanity. “What I am endeavoring to identify as 
‘gay science,’” she says, “is tied up with Nietzsche’s anticipation of a kind of selection that 
adapts Heraclitus’ model of the playful child, but in which human beings take it upon themselves 
to create the conditions under which contests over the meaning of humanity can arise” (180). GS 
7 might even be read as calling for a kind of organized “contest” in which each contestant 
attempts to demonstrate that his proposed new ideal for human life is the best, by means of 
exemplifying a life lived according to this ideal. 
 Acampora’s specific interpretation of the phrase “gay science” strikes me as a bit far-




understanding Nietzsche’s conception of a gay science. The most famous occurrence of the 
image of the playing child in Nietzsche’s published writings is in the section of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra called “The Three Metamorphoses” (1883). In this “speech,” Zarathustra explains 
how the human spirit must become a camel, who obeys difficult commandments; a lion, who 
tears down old commandments—not in order to create new values, which he cannot do, but to 
create “freedom […] for new creation”; and finally a child. The child can create new values 
because “[t]he child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled 
wheel, a first movement, a sacred ‘Yes’” (Z I, 1). The child is not weighed down by the memory 
of the old ideals, because he simply “forgets”; it is all a game to him, and each game—the reign 
of each value-ideal—has its own rules, but he knocks it all down from time to time, tired of the 
old game, and starts a new game with new rules, the old one over and forgotten (see Acampora 
2004: 177). 
 Nietzsche returns to this image in the last substantive section of Book V of The Gay 
Science: 
Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal […]: the ideal of a spirit who 
plays naively—that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance—with all that was 
hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; […] the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and 
benevolence that will often appear inhuman—for example, when it confronts all earthly seriousness 
so far […] as if it were [the] most incarnate and involuntary parody—and in spite of all of this, it is 
perhaps only with him that great seriousness really begins, that the real question mark is posed for the 
first time, that the destiny of the soul changes, […] the tragedy begins. (GS 382) 
 
This section connects itself with both the first and the last sections of the original 1882 edition of 
The Gay Science, reinforcing the idea that the whole book is intended as a unity—that the newly 
added portions are still invested in the original project of establishing a practice of “gay science.” 
The final phrase of GS 382, “the tragedy begins,” translates “Incipit tragoedia,” the title of the 




Zarathustra, potentially strengthening the connection with the child in “The Three 
Metamorphoses”). 
 The quoted passage also returns to a central idea of GS 1: the juxtaposition and eventual 
synthesis of comedy and tragedy. In GS 1, Nietzsche contrasted the viewpoint of “the age of 
tragedy, the age of moralities and religions”—which teach that all of life, and every individual 
life, has a “purpose”—with that of “the eternal comedy of existence,” which reveals that each 
individual is a laughably insignificant tool for the perpetuation of the species. At the end of the 
section, “the most cautious friend of man” concludes: “Not only laughter and gay wisdom but the 
tragic, too, with all its sublime unreason, belongs among the means and necessities of the 
preservation of the species.” In light of “this new law of ebb and flood,” Nietzsche appears to be 
seeking a perspective that could merge the seemingly opposed viewpoints of comedy and 
tragedy. The figure presented as an “ideal” in GS 382 can meet this demand, since he “confronts 
all earthly seriousness so far […] as if it were [the] most incarnate and involuntary parody—and 
in spite of all of this, it is perhaps only with him that great seriousness really begins.” The 
depiction of this ideal figure as one who “plays naively” with the ideals of the past raises the 
question whether this “great seriousness” is the same one that Nietzsche identifies with true 
“maturity” in BGE 94: “the seriousness one had as a child, at play.” 
 This closing image of GS 382 also calls our attention to the various occurrences of the 
notion of “play” in The Gay Science. GS 110—which points out the inherent limitations on the 
human capacity for knowledge that, Nietzsche worried in GS 107, would “lead to nausea and 





This subtler honesty and skepticism came into being wherever two contradictory sentences appeared 
to be applicable to life because both were compatible with the basic errors,45 and it was therefore 
possible to argue about the higher or lower degree of utility for life; also wherever new propositions, 
though not useful for life, were also evidently not harmful to life: in such cases there was room for the 
expression of an intellectual play impulse [Spieltrieb], and honesty and skepticism were innocent and 
happy like all play [Spiele].        (GS 110) 
 
The pursuit of truth became a serious matter when “[n]ot only utility and delight but every kind 
of impulse took sides in [the] fight about ‘truths,’” and “eventually knowledge and the striving 
for the truth found their place as a need among other needs.” But I think that Nietzsche posits for 
it an origin in play in order to emphasize the possibilities for playfulness in the search for truth, 
especially in the kind of experimentation, the spirit of “Let us try it!”, adverted to in GS 51. This 
proposed origin story also drives home that the will to truth has only incidentally acquired a 
moral valence: it can still be pursued for the sheer pleasure of contrariness and curiosity, and 
pursued only as long as it is “not harmful to life” (GS 110), rather than unconditionally, “at any 
price.” 
 But it is not only the search for truth that Nietzsche describes as presenting possibilities 
for play. In GS 107, he describes the artistic reinterpretation of oneself and the world in terms of 
childhood, play, and heroism: 
We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off something and, as it were, finishing the poem; and 
then it is no longer eternal imperfection that we carry across the river of becoming—then we have the 
sense of carrying a goddess, and feel proud and childlike [kindlich] as we perform this service. […] 
At times we need a rest from ourselves by looking upon, by looking down upon, ourselves and, from 
an artistic distance, laughing over ourselves or weeping over ourselves. We must discover the hero no 
less than the fool in our passion for knowledge […] Precisely because we are at bottom grave and 
serious human beings […] nothing does us as much good as a fool’s cap: we need it in relation to 
ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish [kindische] and blissful art 
lest we lose the freedom above things that our ideal demands of us. […] We should be able also to 
stand above morality—and not only to stand with the anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of 
slipping and falling any moment, but also to float above it and play.  (GS 107) 
 
                                                          
45 I.e., the ones that “proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species,” in that “those who hit upon or inherited 
these had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their progeny,” and were therefore “continually inherited 




Here the child represents both the “childlike” reverence toward the “goddess” that life becomes 
under our artist’s gaze and the “childish” irreverence we direct toward ourselves when we picture 
a “fool’s cap” on our own head: as suggested by GS 382, the child is the figure in whom tragedy 
and comedy come together.46 The artistic impulse that enables us to feel thus both “childlike” 
and “childish” also enables us to view ourselves as a “hero […] in our passion for knowledge,” 
not only as a fool (GS 107). Paradoxically, Nietzsche suggests that the attitude of “floating 
above” that we adopt when we look at ourselves and the world through artists’ eyes helps us to 
practice and maintain “the freedom above things that our ideal”—i.e., the ideal of the pursuit of 
truth—“demands of us,” including the ability to “float above” morality and view it clearly and 
without prejudice or attachment. The knower and the artist are not so different in the masterly, 
proprietary, sometimes playful attitudes they direct at their objects. To practice gay science, then, 
is to seamlessly blend the attitudes of artist and knower, to view things with keen eyes from 
above, but also with a “good conscience” to be able to reshape them creatively when necessary 
(GS 107); to blend the viewpoints of comedy and tragedy, treating the world with “the 
seriousness one had as a child, at play” (BGE 94); and to approach the objects of inquiry with a 
spirit of courageous and playful experimentation. 
4. Conclusion 
“Gay science” as I have described it accommodates Nietzsche’s own stubborn drive to 
seek truth without falling afoul of his powerful critique of the unconditional will to truth that 
propels modern science, because it is conditional in both senses in which the attitude he criticizes 
is unconditional. Gay scientists regard the value of pursuing truth as instrumental to aims that 
                                                          
46 GS 382 does not actually mention the word “child,” but the image of a “human, superhuman” but also “inhuman” 





Nietzsche considers life-affirming: the delight of discovery, the cultivation of strength and 
courage, and (if they are philosophers) the advancement of their own aesthetic and ethical vision 
for the world. They also restrict their pursuit of truth to circumstances in which it promotes those 
aims; they know to look away from truth when it causes pain that weakens rather than 
strengthens them, and to shape their picture of the world, with artists’ eyes, so that they can love 
and affirm life in spite of the pain and disappointment it presents. The stance that gay scientists 
take toward truth is wholly different from that of adherents to the unconditional will to truth: 
practitioners of gay science regard the pursuit of truth as a game rather than a solemn duty. At 
times they can be wholly engrossed in it, so that it can produce the “passion, love, ardor, and” 
(yes) “suffering” that Nietzsche admires in the “last idealists of knowledge” (GM III, 24). But 
they can also step back from their pursuit of truth and assess whether it is fulfilling the purposes 





James’s Epistemic Anti-Asceticism 
1. The opponent: the “idol” of “Scientific Truth” 
 James, of course, never uses the expression “the unconditional will to truth,” but one of 
the primary targets of biting critique throughout his oeuvre could easily be identified with the 
unconditional will to truth as Nietzsche understands it. One of James’s most passionate and 
pointed denunciations of this attitude (from which I took the title of this section) comes in a 
relatively early essay, “Reflex Action and Theism,” which he delivered in 1881 as an address to 
the Unitarian Ministers’ Institute, in his capacity as a former physiology professor, on the 
consequences of current physiological discoveries for religious thought and belief (see WB 90–
1). James’s tone approaches Nietzschean polemic: “Certain of our positivists keep chiming to us, 
that, amid the wreck of every other god and idol, one divinity still stands upright,—that his name 
is Scientific Truth […]” (WB 104). In a footnote he continues: 
As our ancestors said, Fiat justitia, pereat mundus, so we, who do not believe in justice or any 
absolute good, must according to these prophets, be willing to see the world perish, in order that 
scientia fiat. Was there ever a more exquisite idol of the den, or rather of the shop? In the clean sweep 
to be made of superstitions, let the idol of stern obligation to be scientific go with the rest […] 
  (WB 104, note 1) 
 
The resonances with Nietzsche are remarkable.47 Here James charges, much as Nietzsche did in 
GS 344 and GM III, that the “prophets” of science, while claiming to have done away with all 
“superstitions,” with “every […] god and idol,” have nonetheless illicitly kept one for themselves 
                                                          
47 It is an amusing coincidence that both Nietzsche and James adapt the expression Fiat justitia, pereat mundus to 
satirize certain professional thinkers. While James accuses the prophets of science of being “willing to see the world 
perish” for the sake of science, Nietzsche says of the philosopher that “he […] affirms his existence and only his 
existence, and this perhaps to the point at which he is not far from harboring the impious wish: pereat mundus, fiat 
philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam! [though the world perish, let there be philosophy, let there be the philosopher, 




to worship, namely, “Scientific Truth.” He is saying, effectively—six years before Nietzsche—
that despite having “offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar” (GS 344), these 
“idealists of knowledge” are “far from being free spirits: for they still have faith in truth” (GM 
III, 24). In The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), James remarks again on the ironically 
religious manner in which the resolutely scientific-minded refuse traditional religion: “‘He 
believes in No-God, and he worships him,’ said a colleague of mine of a student who was 
manifesting a fine atheistic ardor; and the more fervent opponents of Christian doctrine have 
often enough shown a temper which, psychologically considered, is indistinguishable from 
religious zeal” (VRE 37). 
 But while both James and Nietzsche blast the hypocrisy of the fervently anti-religious 
apostles of science (“these pale atheists [and] anti-Christians,” GM III, 24) who maintain a 
religious attitude toward truth, the significance of their criticism is quite different. Nietzsche 
counts himself among the “godless anti-metaphysicians” (GS 344), and plainly is as opposed to 
theistic interpretations of the world as the positivists that both he and James lampoon, albeit for 
different reasons.48 For Nietzsche, pointing out the religious character of their devotion to 
science and its connections, more specifically, to the ascetic ideal and to Christianity in 
particular, is not only an accusation of hypocrisy, but a criticism in itself. James, however, is 
interested in defending the right to believe in God, or at least a providential moral order, with a 
good intellectual conscience. So when he remarks on what practitioners of science and its most 
zealous admirers have in common with religious believers (such as the influence of personal 
                                                          
48 Although Nietzsche has both epistemic and ethical reasons for his opposition to Christianity, he makes clear 
throughout the Genealogy that the ethical reasons are foremost. Meanwhile, the so-called “free spirits” or 
“freethinkers” of the nineteenth century, the “goodly advocates of ‘modern ideas’” like democracy and “equality of 
rights” (BGE 44), are still devoted followers of the Christian ethics of altruism and compassion, despite their 
rejection of Christian theology— as Clifford amply demonstrates with his (rather flimsy) justification of morality in 
“The Ethics of Belief” (1999 [1877]: 89). As Nietzsche imagines one of them saying: “Apart from the church, we, 




interests and preferences on belief-formation, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4), 
he is, in addition to exposing their hypocrisy, hoping to legitimate certain characteristics of 
religious belief in the eyes of an audience with great respect for science, by showing that the 
methods by which people arrive at scientific and religious conclusions are not so different after 
all. 
One of James’s most sustained attacks on the unconditional will to truth is in his famous 
essay “The Will to Believe,” which was delivered as an address to the Philosophical Clubs of 
Yale and Brown Universities before being published in 1896. The figure James sets up as his 
primary opponent in this essay is W.K. Clifford, an English mathematician and public 
intellectual. In particular, James has in mind Clifford’s essay “The Ethics of Belief,” whose 
central message James quotes as follows: 
“Belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private 
pleasure of the believer. … Whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the 
purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an 
unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away. … If [a] belief has been accepted 
on insufficient evidence [even though the belief be true, as Clifford on the same page explains] the 
pleasure is a stolen one. … It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That 
duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly master our own 
body and then spread to the rest of the town. … It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”       
 (WB 17–8, quoting Clifford 1999 [1877]: 74–7; ellipses and bracketed remarks are James’s) 
 
The final sentence of this quotation is, I take it, the central thesis of “The Ethics of Belief.” 
Richard Gale (1980: 1) calls it the “Scientific Credo” (a name that strikes me as almost too 
friendly to my project); following the convention in more recent literature on the ethics of belief, 
I will refer to it simply as “Clifford’s Principle.” 
The portions of Clifford’s essay that James cites could be a manifesto for the 
unconditional will to truth as Nietzsche characterizes it: his principle forbids any convictions, in 




certain reasons pro and con” (GS 2), not only in science but in the whole of life. Clifford’s 
language, which goes beyond the moralistic into the religious, is telling: “Belief is desecrated” 
when given to an unjustified proposition; we must guard the “purity” of our belief with 
“fanaticism,” lest it “catch a stain which can never be wiped away”; believing on insufficient 
evidence is “sinful” (my emphases). One is tempted to think that if Nietzsche had read Clifford’s 
essay, he wouldn’t have needed to make the elaborate disjunctive argument in GS 344 
(reconstructed in Chapter 1, section 1) for the thesis that the unconditional will to truth has a 
moral basis; he could have just quoted from Clifford. 
As several commentators have noted (see Hollinger 1997: 71–2 and Klein 2015: 76 n. 6), 
James represents Clifford’s thesis as being more extreme than it in fact is. James implies that by 
“sufficient evidence” Clifford means “coercive evidence” (WB 28), evidence that compels the 
assent of all thinkers, and insists that we must “keep [our] mind in suspense forever” (WB 24)—
which, for James, also means refraining from acting—until such evidence becomes available. 
But Clifford himself denies this; less than two pages after the famous statement of his principle, 
he acknowledges that “there are many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, 
although the evidence is not such as to justify present belief; because it is precisely by such 
action, and by observation of its fruits, that evidence is got which may justify future belief” 
(Clifford 1999: 79). This statement, however, threatens to render his principle trivial, if its 
wording did not do so already. Of course it is wrong to believe on “insufficient” evidence, 
because it is wrong to act on or testify to unjustified belief; but how much evidence is sufficient 




more specific guidelines Clifford offers reflect a feebly defended prejudice in favor of science 
and against religion.49 
As Hollinger also stresses (1997: 76–8), James understates the extent to which Clifford’s 
argument rests on the harm that can be done to others, and to society at large, when people act on 
or disseminate false beliefs. But, as Susan Haack (2001) points out, Clifford overstates how 
dangerous unjustified belief actually is in most cases. First, his central example, of a ship-owner 
who convinces himself that his aging ship is sound and lets it set sail with a full load of 
passengers (Clifford 1999: 70–1), is hardly representative of belief-forming situations. Since the 
ship-owner is personally and directly responsible for the safety of a large number of people, it 
makes sense that the beliefs on which their safety depends should be held to a stricter standard of 
evidence; but most individuals when they form beliefs do not bear this kind of responsibility 
(Haack 2001: 26). Second, Clifford’s effort to bring beliefs that do not pose an immediate risk of 
harm under his principle—warning that “[e]very time we let ourselves believe for unworthy 
reasons, we weaken our powers of self-control” and thus cultivate in ourselves a “credulous 
character” that will encourage others to take advantage of us (Clifford 1999: 76–7)—places too 
much weight on “a risk of risk of harm” (Haack 2001: 27). As Haack remarks, if such a remote 
risk were sufficient for moral culpability, “not only drunken driving, but owning a car, would be 
morally culpable” (27). 
It might be suggested that the genuine risk involved in the habit of forming beliefs on the 
basis of doubtful evidence is the risk of “infection”: the risk that the unjustified belief, the lax 
standard of evidence, or both will spread to other epistemic agents, and thus undermine the 
whole societal project of gathering knowledge, and the practice of giving and demanding reasons 
                                                          




for our assertions. Clifford does seem to have this concern in view in the passage James quotes 
from “The Ethics of Belief,” when he says we have the duty “to guard ourselves from such 
beliefs [i.e., those accepted on insufficient evidence] as from a pestilence which may shortly 
master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town” (Clifford 1999: 75–6). However, as 
James argues in “The Will to Believe” (which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4), one 
can quarantine the tendency to believe on the basis of desire by restricting it to a certain class of 
propositions whose truth or falsity (1) cannot, in principle, be decided by the evidence and/or (2) 
depends at least in part on whether or not the subject believes them. 
In short, the prudential argument for Clifford’s Principle fails—which we might have 
predicted, considering Nietzsche’s argument in GS 344 that prudential considerations could not 
justify an unconditional will to truth, but only a strategically restricted one. It may be that James 
passes over Clifford’s prudential arguments in silence because they are weak enough that he 
recognizes they are not the real challenge: Clifford’s true motivation is a moral impulse, and 
James surely knows that Clifford is not the only one to whom it appeals. He anticipates the 
reaction of the admirers of science (and he probably expects there will be many of these in his 
college-age audience, considering, as he remarks in Pragmatism, that “[o]ur children […] are 
almost born scientific; P 492) to the idea of “believing by our volition”: that it is “vile” (WB 17). 
When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and sees how it was reared; what 
thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations; what patience and 
postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are 
wrought into its very stones and mortar; how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness,—
then how besotted and contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his 
voluntary smoke-wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream! Can we 
wonder if those bred in the rugged and manly school of science should feel like spewing such 
subjectivism out of their mouths? The whole system of loyalties which grow up in the schools of 
science go dead against its toleration; so that it is only natural that those who have caught the 
scientific fever should pass over to the opposite extreme, and write sometimes as if the incorruptibly 
truthful intellect ought positively to prefer bitterness and unacceptableness to the heart in its cup. 





Clearly, James, like Nietzsche, perceives a strong strand of ascetic self-denial in the cult of 
science,  as evidenced especially by the passages I have emphasized. The last lines in particular 
call to mind Nietzsche’s remark that not only “the self-belittlement of man” but “his will to self-
belittlement” has “progressed irresistibly since Copernicus” (GM III, 25). His description in 
Pragmatism of the bleak worldview with which science seems to leave us likewise has strong 
resonances with Nietzsche’s: 
For a hundred and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to mean the enlargement of the 
material universe and the diminution of man’s importance. […] Man is no lawgiver to nature, he is an 
absorber. She it is who stands firm; he it is who must accommodate himself. Let him record truth, 
inhuman though it be, and submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone, the vision is 
materialistic and depressing. Ideals appear as inert by-products of physiology; what is higher is 
explained by what is lower and treated forever as a case of ‘nothing but’—nothing but something else 
of a quite inferior sort. You get, in short, a materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded 
find themselves congenially at home. (P 15) 
 
Despite the tone of ironic hyperbole with which James describes the Cliffordian 
moralistic attitude toward scientific truth, it probably holds some appeal for James himself; 
Hollinger contends that in “The Will to Believe,” “James was lashing out against a scientific 
conscience that held enormous power over him” (1997: 70–1), and that “haunted” him 
“throughout his career-long effort to vindicate religion” (73). James’s early career in physiology 
and empirical psychology, as well as the familiarity with the latest theories and results of the 
sciences that he continues to show throughout his philosophical writings, certainly attest to the 
high regard he himself has for the scientific enterprise; and as Hollinger suggests (1997: 73–4), 
the vagueness in James’s statements of the religious beliefs he hopes to defend reflects a concern 
not to run afoul of any of the advances of science. If Hollinger’s diagnosis is correct, James may 
find himself in a dialectical position similar to Nietzsche’s: critical of the unconditional will to 





2. “Believe truth” and “shun error”: “two materially different laws” 
 One respect in which James’s critique of the unconditional will to truth differs from 
Nietzsche’s is that James recognizes that it consists of two separate and practically separable 
imperatives: to attain as much true belief as possible, and to avoid error and false belief to the 
greatest extent possible. Nietzsche usually talks about the two imperatives together, under the 
heading of “the unconditional will to truth,” without discussing the distinction between them. 
Both components can express the asceticism involved in the unconditional will to truth. The 
imperative to attain truth can be ascetic when it requires the subject to acknowledge 
disappointing or painful truths about herself, her society, her religion, human nature, or the world 
as a whole (for examples of this, see GS 107, 109; BGE 59; GM I, 1 and III, 25, as quoted in 
Chapter 1, esp. subsection 2.2). The imperative to avoid error can be ascetic when it forces the 
subject to give up comforting illusions about herself, God, or the place of humankind in the 
universe (see GS 1, 357; BGE 55; GM III, 25 and 27, again as quoted in Chapter 1). 
 In “The Will to Believe,” James points out the difference between the two parts of the 
will to truth, and explains how they can come apart: how obedience to one may not entail 
obedience to the other, and how privileging one or the other prescribes different courses of 
action. 
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion,—ways entirely different, and yet 
ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little 
concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error—these are our first and great 
commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical 
commandment, they are two separable laws. Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the 
truth A, we escape as an incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hardly ever 
happens that by merely disbelieving B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping B fall into 
believing other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing anything at 
all, not even A. 
 Believe truth! Shun error!—these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing 
between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the 
chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, 




instructive passage which I have quoted, exhorts us on the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, 
keep your mind in suspense forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful 
risk of believing lies. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk of being in error is a very small 
matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in 
your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true. (WB 24–5) 
 
Logically, it should be noted, there will always be a gap between James’s two 
imperatives. If a subject has insufficient evidence for proposition p and declines to believe it in 
order not to risk believing a falsehood, she is not thereby committed to believing not-p. 
Similarly, if a subject finds that theory A, which purports to explain some body of experimental 
data, is insufficiently confirmed by the evidence and withholds belief, she is not committed to 
believing either that A is false, or that some incompatible alternative theory B is true (and let us 
suppose that B is the only viable alternative to A for explaining the data in question). In both 
cases, the subject can simply suspend judgment, which would be a way of privileging the 
imperative to avoid false beliefs over the imperative to believe truth: if the subject has no belief 
as to whether p obtains, or which theory is correct, she cannot have a false belief, but cannot 
believe truly, either. A subject who privileged the imperative to believe truth, on the other hand, 
would weigh the evidence for the available alternatives and give her belief to the one that seemed 
most likely to be true. While she incurs the risk of believing a falsehood by committing herself to 
a belief, she also leaves open the possibility of hitting upon the truth. 
However, it might be objected that the two commandments James distinguishes are so 
closely interconnected that the distinction is insignificant. In many cases, after all, giving up a 
comforting illusion entails—practically, if not logically—facing an uncomfortable truth. A 
couple of Nietzsche’s favorite examples can illustrate this point. Giving up the providential 
interpretation of the world, the belief that nature is “proof of the goodness and governance of a 
god” and history “a continual testimony of a moral world order” (GS 357) means, effectively, 




guidance from a powerful designer—perhaps even that “[t]he total character of the world […] is 
in all eternity chaos” (GS 109). Giving up the “the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in 
his irreplaceability in the great chain of being” (GM III, 25) means recognizing that human 
beings are simply another species of animal—a very unusual one, to be sure, perhaps even 
unique in its capacity for adaptation and innovation (see GM II, 16–18), but not categorically 
distinct from the other animals, and developed from them by no more than natural historical 
processes (see also BGE 230). And, to take an example from James himself, refusing to believe 
in any kind of eternal spiritual order—whatever conception of divinity, the afterlife, or the 
spiritual world may be involved—means accepting the fate foretold by “scientific materialism” 
(P 54): that 
the laws of redistribution of matter and motion, though they are certainly to thank for all the good 
hours which our organisms have ever yielded us and for all the ideals which our minds now frame, 
are yet fatally certain to undo their work again, and to redissolve everything that they have once 
evolved […] when these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely nothing remains, to 
represent those particular qualities, those elements of preciousness which they may have enshrined. 
  (P 54) 
 
The cases in which James’s two commandments fail to meaningfully come apart are 
those in which there are only two viable alternative candidates for belief—typically, a 
proposition and its negation—and the consequences for action are such that suspending judgment 
amounts to the same thing as opting for one of the alternatives (usually the negation). This comes 
very close to describing the situations in which, he argues in “The Will to Believe,” it is 
permissible to form a belief on the basis of desire or practical interests (I will discuss the “will-
to-believe” scenario in greater detail in Chapter 4). Curiously, it is in the very same essay that he 
insists on the distinctness of the two imperatives, “believe truth” and “shun error.” James’s point 
seems to be that in placing so much weight on the command to shun error at the expense of that 




favor of the negative proposition, even though they claim they are simply recommending 
suspension of judgment. The examples in the previous paragraph—the beliefs in divine 
providence, human uniqueness, or a spiritual order—are exactly the kinds of propositions that 
James argues we have a right to believe in the absence of compelling scientific evidence; the 
“religious hypothesis” he makes a point of defending the right to is basically the posit of an 
eternal moral order, guarded by a kind of providential power (WB 29–30). Even if science can 
make these propositions seem implausible, it cannot disprove any of them. While one could 
simply acknowledge that the evidence for them is insufficient for belief and suspend judgment, 
withholding belief certainly invites, perhaps forces the subject to confront the alternative she 
would have to affirm if she were to deny the hypothesis in question. And for some people, no 
longer believing in a moral order to the universe or a God to sustain it, even if they call 
themselves “agnostic,” can lead to the same kind of disorientation regarding what is genuinely 
valuable, or despair that anything is, as actively denying their existence. 
After laying out the distinction between the two commandments, James continues, “I 
myself find it impossible to go with Clifford” in privileging the imperative to avoid error over 
the one to attain truth (WB 25). James’s discussion hints that he considers it more ascetic, in 
Nietzsche’s terms, to regard “shun error” as the primary commandment and “believe truth” as 
only secondary—as Clifford apparently recommends in the passage from “The Ethics of Belief” 
that James quotes (WB 17–8)—than the other way around. Someone with these priorities would 
end up having very few beliefs, because she would suspend judgment on almost every 
proposition that came before her rather than, in James’s satiric phrase, “incur the awful risk of 
believing lies” (WB 24). James seems to regard this habit of doing without belief as a kind of 




“the blessings of real knowledge” (WB 24), as well as his remarks on “what patience and 
postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact” 
have gone into constructing “the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences” (WB 17). 
Curiously, however, although he seems to be circling around the idea, James does not 
pinpoint moral or quasi-religious asceticism as the motivating impulse behind Cliffordians’ 
emphasis on the avoidance of error. Instead, he attributes “these feelings of our duty about either 
truth or error” to quite a different aspect of “our passional life”: “he who says ‘Better go without 
belief forever than believe a lie!’ merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming 
a dupe” (WB 25). Nietzsche, meanwhile, attributes this extreme form of the unconditional will to 
truth to “puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain 
something to lie down on—and die” (BGE 10). Insofar as Nietzsche takes this attitude to involve 
a fear of being deceived, it is a deeper, more existential fear than what James calls the “private 
horror of becoming a dupe”—which has the ring of fearing the embarrassment of falling for a 
con artist’s scam. The “fanaticism” Nietzsche mentions in BGE 10 seems to be the same one he 
describes in GS 347 as “[t]he demand that one wants by all means that something should be 
firm,” and diagnoses as an “instinct of weakness,” “the need for a faith, a support, a backbone, 
something to fall back on.”50 For a fanatic of this kind, the fear of being deceived is the fear that 
the support for one’s entire life is hollow and bound to collapse. Most of the fanatics whom 
Nietzsche discusses in GS 347 have invested their belief in some religious, philosophical, or 
political creed that they rely on for support and refuse to question because they cannot afford to 
lose it (“An article of faith could be refuted before him a thousand times—if he needed it, he 
                                                          
50 Aside from Nietzsche’s use of related words—“Fanatiker” in BGE 10 and “Fanatismus” in GS 347—the fact that 
both sections discuss the conflict between metaphysics and positivist realism provides circumstantial evidence that 




would consider it ‘true’ again and again”). The fanatics mentioned in BGE 10 are an unusual 
type who are so afraid of seeing their support pulled out from under them that they do not trust 
anything to be firm enough to place their belief in—except for the proposition that nothing is 
firm enough to trust with their belief (they “prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain 
something”). 
Why might James consider it more ascetic to insist on avoiding error than on believing 
truth, when Nietzsche can demonstrate the self-denying character of both imperatives? In fact, 
there is a respect in which Nietzsche might consider the asceticism of the demand to believe truth 
to be more extreme: if giving up comforting illusions can be compared to the self-deprivation of 
fasting and taking vows of poverty, then forcing oneself to confront painful truths is analogous to 
the self-torment of hair shirts and flagellation (see GM III, 20–21). One explaining factor is 
simply the emphasis of “The Will to Believe”: James’s goal is to justify the belief in God, which 
both Clifford and Nietzsche would consider one of the comforting illusions that someone 
dedicated to avoiding error would be obligated to give up. The hypothesis that there is a 
benevolent God who will ensure the triumph of good—or, in the terms of James’s rather 
nebulous “religious hypothesis” in “The Will to Believe,” that “the best things are the more 
eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to 
speak, and say the final word” (WB 29)—is not supported by the kind of evidence that would be 
admitted in scientific practice, and that thinkers like Clifford would therefore consider 
legitimate; so Clifford’s Principle demands that we withhold assent from it. James’s project is to 
defend the right to indulge oneself, so to speak, in beliefs of this kind; he is less concerned with 




Besides the distinction between the two imperatives of truthfulness, James makes clear a 
further distinction that Nietzsche either ignores or leaves implicit: the distinction between the 
policy that is appropriate to science as a social practice or institution and the one appropriate to 
an individual believer’s life. James points out this distinction in a footnote to “The Sentiment of 
Rationality.” That essay was completed in 1880, considerably earlier than “The Will to Believe,” 
and James seems not to have fully articulated the distinction between the commands “believe 
truth” and “shun error” that he lays out in the latter essay, but he gestures toward it in the 
following: 
At most, the command laid on us by science to believe nothing not yet verified by the senses is a 
prudential rule intended to maximize our right thinking and minimize our errors in the long run. In 
the particular instance we must frequently lose truth by obeying it; but on the whole we are safer if we 
follow it consistently, for we are sure to cover our losses with our gains […] But this hedging 
philosophy requires that the long run should be there; and this makes it inapplicable to the question of 
religious faith as the latter comes home to the individual man. He plays the game of life not to escape 
losses, for he brings nothing with him to lose; he plays it for gains; and it is now or never with him, 
for the long run which exists indeed for humanity, is not there for him. Let him doubt, believe, or 
deny, he runs his risk, and has the natural right to choose which one it shall be.   
  (WB 79, n. 2, original emphasis) 
 
When James speaks here of “the command laid on us by science to believe nothing not yet 
verified by the senses” (WB 79, n. 2), Clifford’s Principle is part of what he has in mind; just two 
pages earlier, James mentioned “Professor Clifford’s article on the ‘Ethics of Belief,’” in which 
“[h]e calls it ‘guilt’ and ‘sin’ to believe even the truth without ‘scientific evidence’” (WB 92). In 
light of the distinction he draws in “The Will to Believe,” what James seems to be saying here is 
that while it may be correct to treat “shun error” as the more important commandment for 
science as a long-term social enterprise, the same rules do not apply to the individual believer. 
Clifford is right that society as a whole can be deeply harmed if institutional science makes a 
habit of accepting insufficiently supported theories, which are more likely to turn out to be false. 




compelling evidence before throwing itself behind a theory, and will make steadier progress if 
only a few eccentric researchers are permitted to go haring off after dubious theories. Individual 
believers, James suggests, have more to gain by believing a proposition that may be true than 
they have to lose by believing one that may be false, especially when it comes to propositions 
like “God exists.” James, as noted before, regards true beliefs as helpful tools, as nourishment, 
even as “blessings” (WB 18). And in the case of religious belief in particular, as he argues in 
“The Will to Believe,” subjects gain far more by believing if it is true than they lose if it is false. 
 This points to a more profound difference between Nietzsche and James: that James does 
not really acknowledge the possibility that some truths might be not only painful but harmful to 
the knower, going so far as to say that “the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the 
possession of invaluable instruments of action” (P 98, emphasis added). James focuses almost 
exclusively on the benefits to be gained from believing truths, whether or not they are supported 
by scientifically respectable evidence. In Pragmatism, he even credits the origin of the notion of 
truth as a value—indeed, the concept of “truth” itself—to its beneficial character: 
Surely you must admit this, that if there were no good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge of 
them were positively disadvantageous and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion 
that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown up or become a 
dogma. (P 42) 
 
True ideas would never have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a class-name, least 
of all a name suggesting value, unless they had been useful from the outset […] (P 98) 
 
James draws this tight connection between truth and usefulness in large part because he 
explicates the very meaning of truth in terms of usefulness, as I will discuss in the next section. 
But I suspect the explanation runs in the other direction as well: James was drawn to his 
pragmatic conception of truth, and sought to portray it not as a radical redefinition of the concept 
of truth but as a reasonable clarification of the folk understanding, because he did not see how 




3. James’s anti-ascetic conception of truth 
 The conception of truth that James outlines in Pragmatism, and then seeks to clarify and 
defend in The Meaning of Truth, is explicitly, self-consciously founded on a concern for the 
practical consequences for human life of holding certain beliefs. In this respect it is, as Nietzsche 
might put it, anti-ascetic; and James offers it as way to overturn or supplant conceptions of truth 
that he characterizes in terms Nietzsche would connect with the ascetic ideal. In this section, I 
will first sketch out James’s pragmatist conception of truth, emphasizing the respects in which it 
takes into account human aims and concrete experiences better than traditional conceptions. 
Then I will discuss James’s criticisms of the rival definitions of truth offered by the kind of 
philosophers he calls “rationalists.” Here I will focus on the ways in which James takes aim at 
the asceticism of the rationalists’ conceptions: their tendency to privilege the demands of an 
otherworldly ideal above the needs and well-being of living creatures. 
3.1 The pragmatist understanding of truth 
 James establishes a concern for the concrete effects of ideas on human life very early in 
Pragmatism, in Lecture II, “What Pragmatism Means,” when he introduces what he calls “the 
pragmatic method”: 
The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be 
interminable. […] What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that 
notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean 
practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle.  (P 28) 
 
There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere—no difference in 
abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent 
upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. The whole function of 
philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite 
instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one. (P 30) 
 
In the same lecture, James cites Peirce’s essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” as a precedent 




To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object. […] we need only consider what conceivable 
effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what 
reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for 
us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all. 
  (P 29) 
 
It should be noted that these statements can be read in two different ways. When James 
says, “If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the 
same thing, and all dispute is idle” (P 28), he might mean that the alternatives have exactly the 
same semantic content, and therefore the dispute is merely verbal: if we think that there is an 
opposition between genuinely distinct alternatives, it is because we are confused about the 
meaning of our terms. But he might mean instead that, even though there is a difference in 
semantic content between the alternatives, if the difference would never show up in anyone’s 
experience, then (1) the dispute can never be resolved, and (2) it simply doesn’t matter which 
one of them is true. In that case, while people can meaningfully argue about the alternatives, it is 
not a good use of their time.  While the practical upshot of these two claims—that philosophers 
should stop arguing about the issue in question—is the same, the rationale is quite different: in 
the one case, it is a logical or semantic claim about the formal equivalence of the supposed 
alternatives; in the other, it is a metaphilosophical or perhaps even ethical claim about what sorts 
of disputes are worth philosophers’ time. The former interpretation of the pragmatic method is 
closely tied to James’s pragmatist understanding of truth,51 while the latter is more easily 
separable from it, albeit related in spirit and anti-ascetic philosophical motivation.52 
 Also in Lecture II, James gives a fairly general statement of the understanding of truth 
espoused not only by himself, but by pragmatist thinkers more broadly, including, most notably, 
                                                          
51 This reading would also bring Jamesian pragmatism closer to logical positivism as laid out in, e.g., Carnap’s 
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1950). 
52 Hookway (2012) provides a helpful discussion of the differences between Peirce’s purely logical and semantic 




F.C.S. Schiller (an English philosopher in the pragmatist vein, who called his view 
“humanism”)53 and John Dewey. After a brief discussion of the rise of various brands of anti-
realism, conventionalism, and instrumentalism in the philosophy of science, James continues: 
Riding now on the front of this wave of scientific logic Messrs. Schiller and Dewey appear with their 
pragmatistic account of what truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere, these teachers say, ‘truth’ in 
our ideas and beliefs means […] nothing but this, that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our 
experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts 
of our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of 
following the interminable succession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so 
to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other 
part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so 
much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. This is the ‘instrumental’ view of truth taught so 
successfully at Chicago [i.e., by Dewey], the view that truth in our ideas means their power to ‘work,’ 
promulgated so brilliantly at Oxford [by Schiller]. (P 34; italics original, bracketed insertions mine) 
 
The important link between this instrumental view of truth and the pragmatic principle is that 
they both demand that the truth of a proposition have some sort of experienced effect on human 
life. We give a proposition the distinction of calling it true because it is good for something to us. 
It matters that some given claim is true because considering it true confers a noticeable benefit in 
our thinking or acting, by making the world easier to navigate either as investigators or as agents. 
To some extent James confuses the issue by adding the qualifiers “for just so much” and 
“in so far forth.” Does he mean to say that ideas that “carry us prosperously” between different 
parts of our experience, and never cease to do so, are not unqualifiedly true, but only true in this 
limited, specialized way: “instrumentally”? I suspect that James’s purpose in adding the 
qualifiers is to acknowledge that certain ideas may perform this function of “linking things 
satisfactorily” and “saving labor” for some purposes but not others, or up to some point in 
history but not afterward—an issue he will address explicitly in Lecture VI, “Pragmatism’s 
Conception of Truth.” 
                                                          
53 James discusses Schiller’s views at greatest length in Lecture VII of Pragmatism, “Pragmatism and Humanism,” 




 James begins Lecture VI by presenting an ordinary, commonsense (or “dictionary”) 
definition of truth: 
Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their ‘agreement,’ 
as falsity means their disagreement, with ‘reality.’ Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this 
definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may 
precisely be meant by the term ‘agreement,’ and what by the term ‘reality,’ when reality is taken as 
something for our ideas to agree with. (P 96) 
 
“The popular notion,” James notes, “is that a true idea must copy its reality” (P 96). But, as he 
points out, it is only clear what this means in the case of visual ideas, i.e., that the picture in 
one’s head should resemble the external object one is thinking about. Even with sensory ideas 
from other modalities, the “copy” metaphor becomes attenuated (what is it, exactly, that an idea 
of a smell or a sequence of sounds should resemble?), and it loses purchase altogether in the case 
of abstract ideas (what does one copy when one thinks of gravity, or justice, or the economy?)—
unless, like some neo-Hegelian idealists, we posit an infinite, all-encompassing mind and decide 
that “our ideas possess […] truth just in proportion as they approach to being copies of the 
Absolute’s eternal way of thinking” (P 96). 
 In outlining his own account of what “agreement with reality,” or truth, amounts to, 
James is careful always to keep it connected with concrete experience. To some extent this 
reflects his empiricist epistemological scruples, but it also follows the “pragmatic method” as 
described in the quotations from Lecture II above. In fact, early in Lecture VI, James presents the 
motivation behind the pragmatist conception of truth in the terms of this pragmatic method: 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. ‘Grant an idea or belief to be true,’ it says, 
‘what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be 
realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? 
What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?’ 
The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can 
assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the 
practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is 
all that truth is known-as. […] 
But what do the words verification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? […] They 




towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the while […] that the original ideas remain 
in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, 
harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea’s 
verification.     (P 97) 
 
James’s understanding of truth begins and ends with concrete experiences. As he says in his 
discussion of Dewey and Schiller’s instrumental view of truth in Lecture II, ideas “themselves 
are but parts of our experience” (P 34, italics original). Entertaining an idea is just the middle 
term in a sequence of experiences that begins with the sensory experiences that provoked it, and 
ends with the experience of acting on it and the further sensory experiences consequent upon that 
action, which may then start a new sequence of conception and action.54 Whether the idea was 
well formed from its inputs can only be determined by whether the experiences that follow from 
acting on the idea (i.e., on the assumption that it is true) conform to the believer’s expectations—
typically, by satisfying the desires that, in conjunction with the belief, motivated the action.  
 James goes on to give an appropriately concrete example of this “agreeable leading,” as 
well as an account of what has become an infamous formulation of the pragmatist conception of 
truth—“what’s true is what’s useful”: 
If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what looks like a cow-path, it is of the utmost 
importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save 
myself. The true thought is useful here because the house which is its object is useful. […] [S]ince 
almost any object may someday become temporarily important, the advantage of having a general 
stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious. […] 
Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from 
cold-storage to do work in the world and our belief in it grows active. You can say of it then either 
that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it is true because it is useful.’ Both of these phrases mean 
exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the 
name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in 
experience.  (P 98, emphasis added) 
 
                                                          
54 James was already gesturing at this idea as early as 1881, in “Reflex Action and Theism” (see WB 91–2 for the 
initial statement), though he was still speaking as if sensation, conception, and action were basically different in 




The cow-path example is a particularly blunt illustration of the “function of agreeable leading” 
and the connection between an idea’s truth and its usefulness, but it serves as a metaphor for the 
way the relationship works even in less obvious cases. The discovery of many scientific theories 
can be understood as having proceeded in a way analogous to James’s example—i.e., 
recognizing the cleared trail through the woods as a cow-path, and thinking of human agents as 
causally connected to it, leads the subject to follow the trail and find the house—though there are 
many more intermediate terms between the initial experience and the useful outcome, and often 
several separate experiences initiating chains of inference that later become connected. The 
discovery of the structure of DNA is a good example of this process: the idea of DNA as a 
double helix made of two strands of complementary nucleotide bases—inferred from chemical 
analyses in combination with photographs of crystalized fibers—led to the idea of how it both 
replicates and stores hereditary information, and thence to the very useful techniques of 
artificially replicating it and, eventually, editing and even constructing DNA sequences. 
 Eventually James offers the following gloss on the standard definition of truth as 
“agreeing with reality”: 
To ‘agree’ in the widest sense with a reality, can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or 
into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something 
connected with it better than if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or practically! And often 
agreement will only mean the negative fact that nothing contradictory from the quarter of that reality 
comes to interfere with the way in which our ideas guide us elsewhere. To copy a reality is, indeed, 
one very important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from being essential. The essential thing is the 
process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with 
either the reality or its belongings, that doesn’t entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, 
and adapts our life to the reality’s whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It 
will hold true of that reality. 
Thus, names are just as ‘true’ or ‘false’ as definite mental pictures are. They set up similar 
verification-processes, and lead to fully equivalent practical results.  (P 102) 
 
For James, the crucial sense in which an idea must agree with reality, if we are to count it as true, 




dealings with reality. What is truly radical about the pragmatic conception of truth James is 
outlining is that the idea’s ability to guide our dealings, its “fitting” harmoniously into the whole 
of our experience, do not simply provide the certification that the idea is true; they are not 
merely symptoms or fortunate consequences of its truth, understood, in the traditional way, as its 
mirroring or resembling reality. They provide the significance of the idea’s being true, in both 
senses of “significance”: not only are harmonious experiences the reason that it matters whether 
or not an idea is true; they are what the truth of an idea consists in. 
 This understanding overcomes two serious problems with a naïve “copy” or 
“resemblance” conception of truth. The first is the conceptual problem noted above, that we 
cannot always make sense of what it would mean for an idea to copy reality. The second is the 
epistemic and metaphysical problem that, at least much of the time, we can’t tell whether our 
ideas are copying reality, except through the supposedly indirect indication that we navigate it 
smoothly, running into no unexpected obstacles. This is certainly the case with abstractions like 
natural laws, since we can hardly check our conclusions against the list of natural laws that God 
imposed when creating the world, or with what James satirically calls “the infinite folio, or 
édition de luxe” of the universe, the “eternally complete” account of the way things are. But we 
might even consider it to be the case with the ideas that were the very prototype for the copy 
view of truth: if we consider our perceptual experiences to be ideas, then we still have no way to 
get outside our own heads and check whether our visual perceptions are accurate copies of the 
external objects. The notion that an idea’s truth really consists in its copying reality comes to 





 Indeed, James argues elsewhere that even in cases where the copy metaphor seems to be 
applicable, the idea’s copying or resembling a corresponding reality contributes little to the 
benefit that come from having true ideas. In the essay “A World of Pure Experience” (1904), 
James gives an example to illustrate the extraneousness of resemblance: 
 Suppose me to be sitting here in my library at Cambridge, at ten minutes’ walk from ‘Memorial 
Hall,’ and to be thinking truly of the latter object. My mind may have before it only the name, or it 
may have a clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such an intrinsic difference 
in the image makes no difference in its cognitive function. Certain extrinsic phenomena, special 
experiences of conjunction, are what impart to the image, be it what it may, its knowing office. 
 For instance, if you ask me what hall I mean by my image, and I can tell you nothing; or if I fail 
to point or lead you towards the Harvard Delta; or if, being led by you, I am uncertain whether the 
Hall I see be what I had in mind or not; you would rightly deny that I had ‘meant’ that particular hall 
at all, even tho [sic] my mental image might to some degree have resembled it. The resemblance 
would count in that case as coincidental merely, for all sorts of things of a kind resemble one another 
in this world without being held for that reason to take cognizance of one another. 
 On the other hand, if I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its history and present uses; if in its 
presence I feel my idea, however imperfect it may have been, to have led hither and to be now 
terminated; if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel, so that each term of the one 
context corresponds serially […] with an answering term of the other; why then […] my idea must be, 
and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality.       (ERE 28–9; bold emphasis added)55 
 
As James points out, resemblance between idea and object is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the truth of the idea. Even if the idea of the hall is very vague, or mistaken in some respects, or is 
merely a word that signifies it without resembling it, we consider it true if it succeeds in leading 
to the desired object. Conversely, a perfect imagistic copy that cannot guide its possessor to the 
object or help him identify it when confronted with it cannot be counted as a true idea. Whether 
or not the idea copies the object (or the present sensory experience of the object, at least) simply 
doesn’t matter: it makes no difference to our actions connected with the idea, and in many cases 
(possibly all, depending on one’s theory of perception) it makes no difference in our experience. 
                                                          
55 This argument rehearses, in condensed form, part of James’s argument against the copy theory of reference and 
truth in an earlier essay, “The Function of Cognition” (delivered as an address to the Aristotelian Society in 




 Here, at last, is James’s most explicit statement of the pragmatist conception of truth that 
Lecture VI is named for: 
‘The true,’ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is 
only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the 
long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won’t 
necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of 
boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas. 
 The ‘absolutely’ true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-
point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will someday converge. It runs on all 
fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideas are 
ever realized, they will all be realized together. Meanwhile we have to live today by what truth we 
can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood. (P 106–7) 
 
It may be helpful to note here what James does and does not mean by “expedient.” The Oxford 
English Dictionary contrasts two senses of the word which were both current in James’s time. 
The one that is more common now, and which probably springs first to a reader’s mind, is “In [a] 
depreciative sense, ‘useful’ or ‘politic’ as opposed to ‘just’ or ‘right.’” James’s statement that 
“‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving” (P 106) should suggest to any 
charitable reader that this is not the definition of “expedient” he has in mind (though an 
uncharitable reader could take this as an indication that philosophical pragmatism is, in fact, 
identical with pragmatism in the colloquial sense, and thus as further reason to reject it). Instead, 
what he appears to mean by “expedient” is “Conducive to advantage in general, or to a definite 
purpose; fit, proper, or suitable to the circumstances of the case.”56 
 The “true,” then, is what is advantageous to human beings, in the long run, to believe; it 
is what, on the whole, conduces to the achievement of human goals when believed. It is helpful 
to refer back to the passage from Lecture II (P 34) quoted above to get a more concrete 
understanding of what James means by an idea’s being “expedient” to believe. It means that the 
idea helps us to draw fruitful connections between distinct experiences. One way an idea might 
                                                          




do this is by grouping separate experiences into classes that allow us to generalize and accurately 
predict future experiences, as do concepts of natural and social kinds or event types. Or an idea 
might fruitfully link experiences by explaining one in terms of another in a way that we find 
satisfying, or that illuminates connections to even more experiences, and that enables us to plan 
by predicting the consequences of certain actions; this is the function of causal principles and 
natural laws. 
 It is important, of course, that James adds the qualification “in the long run and on the 
whole” to his explication of truth as “the expedient in the way of our thinking,” and points out 
that the “‘absolutely’ true,” being that which “no farther experience will ever alter,” will be 
attained contemporaneously with “the absolutely complete experience” (P 106–7). Truth is 
always beholden to the vagaries of experience, which, as he recognizes, “has ways of boiling 
over, and making us correct our present formulas” (P 106). I take it that what he means by 
experience “boiling over” is that it presents us with anomalies, in the Kuhnian sense—
phenomena that our current theories cannot explain, or can account for only in an unsatisfyingly 
ad hoc way57—because he goes on to list scientific theories that have been replaced: “Ptolemaic 
astronomy, Euclidean space, Aristotelian logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for 
centuries, but human experience has boiled over those limits, and we now call these things only 
relatively true, or true within those borders of experience” (P 107). This relative truth, or truth 
within certain “borders of experience,” seems to be what James had in mind in Lecture II when 
he described beliefs that satisfactorily link certain of our experiences as “true for just so much” 
or only “instrumentally” true (P 34). And this limitation need not be only a matter of outdated 
scientific theories being useful for summarizing human experience until the point in history 
                                                          




when an anomaly came to light. Euclidean geometry, while we no longer consider it true of the 
universe as a whole, or of space in general, is nonetheless still very useful for purposes of 
engineering on an earthly scale—it is very approximately true at that level, true for all practical 
purposes, “true for just so much.” 
 Until experience no longer has the capacity to surprise us, all of our theories must be 
considered only true for now, as James’s examples illustrate. And since we can never know when 
we have reached the point at which no further experience will falsify our theories (if we ever 
reach it), we can never know that we have attained absolute truth. While this may seem 
unsatisfying, it is simply a thoroughgoing fallibilism, which James characterizes in “The Will to 
Believe” as his “empiricism”: “The absolutists […] say that we not only can attain to knowing 
truth, but we can know when we have attained to knowing it; while the empiricists think that 
although we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know when” (WB 20).58 
 Critics of pragmatism, as James well knows, often fail to recognize the respect that it 
pays to the constraints imposed on our beliefs by experience, past and present. “A favorite 
formula for describing Mr. Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by 
saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfill every pragmatistic 
requirement,” James complains. But, he counters, 
Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole body of 
funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well 
as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their 
operations? If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says 
Emerson. (P 111–2) 
 
                                                          
58 This is, to be sure, an unusual use of the word “empiricism,” and James uses and defines the word in a number of 
different ways across his oeuvre. I suspect that here he’s trading on a couple of different associations with the word: 
(1) the absence, in most empiricist philosophies, of any kind of criterion of knowledge like Descartes’ “clear and 
distinct perception”; and (2) the connotation of epistemic humility, of depending on experience for all our 




“We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful,” as James 
pointed out; “[i]deas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas” (P 98). It is 
certainly not in the best interest of any subject to set herself up to be blindsided by an experience 
that her theories did not enable her to anticipate; and this is no less true of collective epistemic 
agents than of individual ones, whether these are scientific research teams, governments, or 
humanity as a whole.59 
 In Lecture II, after proffering a tentative definition of truth as “What would be better for 
us to believe,” James makes a similar rebuttal to an anticipated objection—namely, the 
“suspicion that if we practically did believe everything that made for good in our personal lives, 
we should be found indulging in all kinds of fancies about this world’s affairs, and all kinds of 
sentimental superstitions about a world hereafter” (P 42–3). He counters this suspicion, which he 
admits to be “undoubtedly well founded,” as follows: 
I said just now that what is better for us to believe is true unless the belief incidentally clashes with 
some other vital benefit. Now in real life what vital benefits is any particular belief of ours most liable 
to clash with? What indeed except the vital benefits yielded by other beliefs when these prove 
incompatible with the first ones? In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be 
the rest of our truths. Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire 
to extinguish whatever contradicts them. My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, 
must run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs. […] (P 43) 
 
The concern that pragmatism licenses “saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it 
truth” (P 111) tends to arise where what is pleasant to believe conflicts with the observable 
evidence. James’s reply assumes, first of all, that believing in accordance with the observable 
evidence—with experience, past and future—comes with “vital benefits” (P 43). One is far more 
likely to have the experience that one’s beliefs are performing a “function of agreeable leading” 
(P 97) through the world if they take into account the observed evidence; the believer is less 
                                                          
59 In the next subsection, there will be some discussion (though hardly conclusive) about what it means for humanity 




likely to be surprised by subsequent experiences, or to come into disagreement with other 
believers. 
 But “sentimental superstitions about a world hereafter” cannot directly conflict with 
perceptual evidence; why, then, should Pragmatism not tolerate them, provided they do not 
interfere with the believer’s ability to navigate the world? We may infer an answer from James’s 
discussion of his refusal to believe in the Absolute of neo-Hegelian idealism, despite the 
practical value that he acknowledges such belief to have: namely, that “since in the Absolute 
finite evil is ‘overruled’ already,” believing in it assures us that “we have a right ever and anon to 
take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better 
hands than ours” (P 41). Because belief in the absolute “performs a concrete function” in 
providing this reassurance, James is willing to consider it “true ‘in so far forth’” (P 41). 
Nevertheless, as I conceive it, […] it clashes with other truths of mine whose benefits I hate to give 
up on its account. It happens to be associated with a kind of logic of which I am the enemy, I find that 
it entangles me in metaphysical paradoxes that are inacceptable, etc., etc. But as I have enough 
trouble in life already without adding the trouble of carrying these intellectual inconsistencies, I 
personally just give up the Absolute. I just take my moral holidays; or else as a professional 
philosopher, I try to justify them by some other principle. (P 43) 
 
As James remarks (again) in Lecture VI, logical and conceptual relations as well as sensory data 
constrain our beliefs: 
Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of 
our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with 
our sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the 
results. (P 101) 
 
We cannot, therefore, posit any unobservable order of things we like; it must be consistent with 
the most fruitful, predictively accurate, intellectually satisfying account we have of the observed 
order—that is, our best scientific theories. As we shall see in considering his defense of the 
religious attitude in Chapter 4, James is more permissive in regard to consistency with scientific 




allows an idea’s usefulness in action, regardless of what prior evidence there may be for it, to 
count not only as a reason in favor of believing it, but also, and by the same token, a 
consideration that points toward its truth. After all, the better it does in enabling human beings to 
accomplish their aims, the more likely it is to be included in the final set of theories that 
humanity converges on at the ideal end of inquiry. 
3.2 James’s critique of rationalist theories of truth 
 In Lecture VI of Pragmatism, James also singles out some attempts by non-pragmatist 
philosophers to define truth in order to point out the implausibility of their proposed definitions, 
and his discussion of these attempted definitions is complex and telling, both in what it perceives 
and in what it misses. Since it is a long passage, I will divide it into two parts and discuss one at 
a time. 
When […] you ask rationalists, instead of accusing pragmatism of desecrating the notion of truth, to 
define it themselves by saying exactly what they understand by it, the only positive attempts I can 
think of are these two: 
1. “Truth is the system of propositions which have an unconditional claim to be recognized as 
valid.”  
 2. Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find ourselves under obligation to make by a 
kind of imperative duty.60 
The first thing that strikes one in such definitions is their unutterable triviality. They are 
absolutely true, of course, but absolutely insignificant until you handle them pragmatically. What do 
you mean by ‘claim’ here, and what do you mean by ‘duty’? As summary names for the concrete 
reasons why thinking in true ways is overwhelmingly expedient and good for mortal men, it is all 
right to talk of claims on reality’s part to be agreed with, and of obligations on our part to agree. We 
feel both the claims and the obligations, and we feel them for just those reasons. (P 109) 
 
James is quite right that these definitions are uninformative in an important way, in that they 
neglect to say what feature it is of the “propositions” or “judgments” that count as true in virtue 
of which they “have an unconditional claim to be recognized as valid,” or impose an “imperative 
duty” on the thinker to assent to them. But as Nietzsche would be quick to point out, these 
                                                          
60 James attributes these definitions to “A.E. Taylor, Philosophical Review, vol. xiv, p. 288” and “H. Rickert, Der 




definitions are far from trivial; they are quite controversial, in that they build the unconditional 
will to truth into the very definition of truth. 
 James sometimes seems to be gesturing toward the point Nietzsche made in GS 344, that 
prudential reasons could never support an unconditional or categorical imperative. It may be “all 
right to talk of claims on reality’s part to be agreed with, and of obligations on our part to agree” 
as “summary names for the concrete reasons why thinking in true ways is overwhelmingly 
expedient and good for mortal men” (P 109), but it is certainly not all right to summarize such 
concrete reasons as an “unconditional claim,” as James suggests that Taylor is doing. James 
appears to recognize the merely conditional validity of a prudential imperative to believe truth 
when he says, “We feel both the claims and the obligations, and we feel them for just those 
reasons” (P 109, emphasis added)—i.e., we recognize an obligation to believe truth, but only as 
far as it is beneficial for our lives, and no farther. Just a bit later, he makes the point more 
explicitly: “Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health 
and wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the concrete benefits are what we mean by 
calling the pursuit a duty” (P 110, emphasis added). 
 James then expands as follows on his statement that the claims of truth are conditional: 
[U]ntrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially. Talking 
abstractly, the quality ‘true’ may thus be said to grow absolutely precious and the quality ‘untrue’ 
absolutely damnable: the one may be called good, the other bad, unconditionally. We ought to think 
the true, we ought to shun the false, imperatively. 
 But if we treat all this abstraction literally and oppose it to its mother soil in experience, see what 
a preposterous position we work ourselves into. 
 We cannot then take a step forward in our actual thinking. When shall I acknowledge this truth 
and when that? […] When may a truth go into cold-storage in the encyclopedia? when shall it come 
out for battle? Must I constantly be repeating the truth “twice two are four” because of its eternal 
claim on recognition? Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes, 
because I truly have them?—or may I sink and ignore them in order to be a decent social unit, and not 
a mass of morbid melancholy and apology? 
 It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from being unconditional, is 
tremendously conditional. Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, 
of course; but concrete truths in the plural need be recognized only when their recognition is 





The first thing to note about this passage is that it is the closest James ever comes to the idea that 
some truths may be painful or harmful to acknowledge. Nonetheless, he does not suggest, as 
Nietzsche seems to, that some truths should be ignored permanently for this reason, only that 
they should not be at the front of the knower’s mind at all times. 
 A second point to note is that it is not entirely clear whether James is already 
presupposing the pragmatist conception of truth when he makes these statements. When he says 
that “untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially,” is it 
merely a generalization? Or does he intend it as an analytic statement, considering the 
explication of truth he has just given? What does he mean by the claim that, “[t]alking abstractly, 
the quality ‘true’ may thus be said to grow absolutely precious and the quality ‘untrue’ 
absolutely damnable: the one may be called good, the other bad, unconditionally” (P 110, 
emphasis added)? 
 Here the two senses of “unconditional” that I disambiguated in the introduction to Part I 
should be kept distinct, although James himself seems to be conflating them. When he says (as 
quoted previously), “Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought 
than health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the concrete benefits are what we 
mean by calling the pursuit a duty” (P 110), what he means is that the value of truth, like the 
value of health and wealth, is instrumental rather than final. Truth is not valuable for its own 
sake, but for the sake of what we can do with it: predicting future experiences accurately enough 
to be able to make plans and achieve our practical aims. However, when James goes on to 
elaborate this statement in the next paragraph, he starts talking about the value of truth and the 
duty to believe truth being conditional in the other sense: restricted by circumstances, not in 




I introduction, the two kinds of conditionality often and non-accidentally coincide: if something 
is valuable only as a means to a further end, then it will make sense to pursue it only when and to 
the extent that it advances that further end. So if truth is valuable only as a means to achieving 
other goals, then believing a given truth—by which James seems to mean, in this context, 
entertaining it as an occurrent belief—is a duty only when that is helpful to achieving some other 
goal. 
 But there is a way in which James’s pragmatic characterization of truth makes its value 
and the imperative to believe it unconditional in the sense of being unrestricted by 
circumstances, although they are still instrumental rather than final. Sometimes, as in the long 
passage just quoted, James talks about belief as an occurrent mental state in an individual human 
being; in that case, as he explains, the duty to believe it is situationally restricted. But, he says, 
“untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially”; and 
therefore, “[t]alking abstractly […] the one may be called good, the other bad, unconditionally” 
(P 110, emphasis added). The way we might interpret this statement is that there can be no truths 
which it would be in the best interests of humanity as a whole to ignore permanently, or “in the 
long run,” and no false claims that it would be best for humanity as a whole to accept. And, if 
James is already assuming the pragmatic definition of truth, that would be an analytic claim, 
considering that truth simply is what is good, in the long run, for human beings to believe. 
 It is, as James puts it, “talking abstractly” to speak of humanity as a whole believing or 
ignoring a proposition, and it is more difficult to make explicit what it would mean for 
humankind, rather than an individual human being, to have an obligation to believe truth and 
avoid error. We have already seen, in the passage from “The Sentiment of Rationality” quoted in 




individual persons and those of “humanity.” In that passage—in which James is discussing “the 
command laid on us by science to believe nothing not yet verified by the senses” as “a prudential 
rule intended to maximize our right thinking and minimize our errors in the long run,” and 
remarks that “the long run which exists indeed for humanity, is not there for” the individual 
believer (WB 79, note 2)—what I interpreted him to mean by “humanity” was something like 
institutional science. When, in Pragmatism, he is speaking more generally about what humanity 
will converge on as the “absolute truth,” I suspect he means something broader than institutional 
science. He seems to mean the sum of the most advanced, evidentially supported, carefully 
examined and defended of human knowledge in all subject matters, at the (ideal) point at which 
it will never be contravened by further experience. And humanity, as a collective epistemic agent 
of some sort, has an unconditional, meaning unrestricted, obligation to believe (or accept, or 
arrive at) everything that is in this collection of final theories.61 
 However, neither humanity nor the individual believer has an unconditional, meaning 
final, obligation to believe truth, as the rationalists’ definitions of truth would have it. The merely 
instrumental value of truth, like its unrestricted value for humanity as a whole, is encoded in 
James’s pragmatist conception. Again, if we understand truth as what is ultimately beneficial or 
“expedient” for human beings to believe, that benefit or expediency must be understood with 
reference to values or ends other than truth. Of course, James’s formula leaves unspecified what 
those goods or ends might be, since different individuals have different aims, and the true ethical 
good might only be discovered through a long process of inquiry and social experimentation.62 
                                                          
61 I take it that spelling out what it means for humanity to be an epistemic agent, to believe something, and to be 
obligated to believe something is part of the task of social epistemology; unfortunately, it is not within the scope of 
this project to undertake a detailed exploration of these notions. James clearly has a socially oriented understanding 
of truth and knowledge, but does not always spell out the metaphysical details.  




Nonetheless, James is arguing that we cannot even specify what makes a belief true without 
adverting to the further ends to which it might be instrumental. If this is the case, it would seem 
odd to insist that we have a non-instrumental obligation to believe the propositions that are most 
helpful, in the long run, for the purpose of accomplishing other ends. According to this 
conception, “truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct 
from good, and co-ordinate with it” (P 42, original emphasis).  
 James offers the following explanation for other philosophers’ misapprehension of the 
merely conditional nature of truth’s claim on us: 
But the rationalists who talk of claim and obligation expressly say that they have nothing to do with 
our practical interests or personal reasons. [… Truth’s] claims antedate and exceed all personal 
motivations whatsoever. Though neither man nor God should ever ascertain truth, the word would 
still have to be defined as that which ought to be ascertained and recognized. 
 There was never a more exquisite example of an idea abstracted from the concretes of 
experience and then used to oppose and negate what it was abstracted from. 
 Philosophy and common life abound in similar instances. The ‘sentimentalist fallacy’ is to shed 
tears over abstract justice and generosity, beauty, etc., and never to know these qualities when you 
meet them in the street, because there the circumstances make them vulgar […] [I]n almost the last 
philosophic work I read, I find such passages as the following: “Justice is ideal, solely ideal. Reason 
conceives that it ought to exist, but experience shows that it cannot… Truth, which ought to be, 
cannot be. … Reason is deformed by experience. As soon as reason enters experience it becomes 
contrary to reason.” 
 The rationalist’s fallacy here is exactly like the sentimentalist’s. Both extract a quality from the 
muddy particulars of experience and find it so pure when extracted that they contrast it with 
each and all its muddy instances as an opposite and higher nature. 
 (P 109–110; bold emphasis and bracketed ellipses mine, italics and other ellipses original) 
 
The excerpts that I have highlighted in bold resonate powerfully with a very similar remark of 
Nietzsche’s: a critique of metaphysicians, very much in the same spirit as James’s parody of the 
kind of philosopher he calls “rationalists.” 
“How could anything originate out of its opposite? for example, truth out of error? or the will to truth 
out of the will to deception? or selfless deeds out of selfishness? […] Such origins are impossible […] 
the things of the highest value must have another, peculiar origin—they cannot be derived from 
this transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry world […] Rather from the lap of Being, the 
intransitory, the hidden god, the ‘thing in itself’—there must be their basis, and nowhere else.” 
 This way of judging constitutes the typical prejudgment and prejudice which give away the 
metaphysicians of all ages; this kind of valuation looms in the background of all their logical 
procedures; it is on account of this “faith” that they trouble themselves about “knowledge,” about 




metaphysicians is the faith in opposite values. It has not even occurred to the most cautious among 
them that one might have a doubt right here at the threshold where it was surely most necessary—
even if they vowed to themselves, “de omnibus dubitandum [All is to be doubted].”   
  (BGE 2; bold emphasis mine, italics original) 
 
James and Nietzsche are, in essence, accusing “rationalists” or “metaphysicians” of 
making the same mistake: they form a value concept, like truth, justice, or selflessness, by 
abstraction from concrete examples of those values in the world; they end up conceiving of the 
abstracted values as being so pure that the very concrete instances from which they were 
abstracted do not deserve the name of the value; they conclude that the value itself cannot 
originate in the imperfect world, in which every manifestation of the value is incomplete, sullied 
by compromises and impure motives. The value concept is “then used to oppose and negate what 
it was abstracted from” (P 109), as James puts it—to condemn the “transitory, seductive, 
deceptive, paltry world” (BGE 2) in which we live. James’s rationalists, in this respect, are 
thinking very much like Nietzsche’s ascetic priest, who devalues “our life […] along with what 
pertains to it: ‘nature,’ ‘world,’ the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness” in favor of “a 
quite different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, unless it turn against itself, 
deny itself” (GM III, 11). But while Nietzsche implies that the ascetic priest constructs his higher 
world by simply negating inevitable features of our world (corporeality, changeability, desire, 
struggle), the rationalists that James criticizes in Lecture VI of Pragmatism (or the 
metaphysicians that Nietzsche mocks in BGE 2) derive the very qualities that they hold up to 
condemn the inadequacies of our world from virtues that were originally observed in our world. 
 Finally, James’s argument (discussed in section 3.1) that copying or resembling a reality 
is inessential to the practical value of truth “scales up,” as it were: it applies not only to specific 
instances, like the idea of Memorial Hall, but to our beliefs about the world in general, where the 




luxe” of the universe posited by the rationalists (P 124) or perhaps, in the Hegelian vein, “the 
Absolute’s eternal way of thinking” (P 96). Discussing, again, the definitions of truth offered by 
the “rationalists” Taylor and Rickert, James writes: 
I have honestly tried to stretch my own imagination and to read the best possible meaning into the 
rationalist conception, but I have to confess that it still completely baffles me. The notion of a reality 
calling on us to ‘agree’ with it, and that for no reasons, but simply because its claim is ‘unconditional’ 
or ‘transcendent,’ is one that I can make neither head nor tail of. I try to imagine myself as the sole 
reality in the world, and then to imagine what more I would ‘claim’ if I were allowed to. If you 
suggest the possibility of my claiming that a mind should come into being from out of the void inane 
and stand and copy me, I can indeed imagine what the copying might mean, but I can conjure up no 
motive. What good it would do me to be copied, or what good it would do that mind to copy me, if 
farther consequences are expressly and in principle ruled out as motives for the claim (as they are by 
our rationalist authorities) I cannot fathom.  (P 112) 
 
James’s point here is not only that the copying is useless to the copying mind, but also that there 
seems to be no reason for reality itself to issue the “unconditional claim” (in Taylor’s words) or 
impose the “imperative duty” (per Rickert). 
 James’s personification of the reality that is to be copied or resembled—or else “agreed 
with” in some unspecified way that isn’t James’s harmonious action-guiding—may seem like an 
odd argumentative gambit, considering that his opponents surely do not think of reality as a 
sentient being that deliberately imposes the command that we conform our minds to it. But it 
seems to be James’s way of pointing to the same puzzle that Nietzsche did in GS 344: if the 
demand that we believe truth does not proceed from our own prudential interests (as indeed, no 
unconditional demand could), where does it come from? Nietzsche and James come, effectively, 
to the same conclusion: it must be a command from another world, a mind-independent 
metaphysical world, understood as the “true world” (as opposed to the merely “apparent” world 
of human experience). And then they ask the same question: why should we obey this command? 
In the absence of either a transcendent, basically anthropomorphic God or (as James imagines) a 




argument at the stage of a question: tell me, rationalists, why (and how) would reality issue this 
command? Nietzsche, instead, follows it to the damning conclusion that adherents to the 
unconditional will to truth implicitly commit themselves to the belief in something very much 
like a God, stripped of all personal attributes though it may be, giving only one commandment 
(or, as James would have it, only two): believe only truth, and as much truth as possible. 
4. Conclusion 
Throughout his writings, James evinces an attitude toward truth and the imperative to 
pursue truth that Nietzsche would characterize as anti-ascetic. He recognizes and challenges the 
quasi-religious asceticism implicit both in the devotion to scientific truth expressed by thinkers 
like Clifford, and in the conceptions of truth offered by “rationalist” philosophers in the Kantian 
and Hegelian traditions. 
James’s goal in Pragmatism is to bring our understanding of truth back down to earth, as 
it were, in two connected but distinguishable respects: one descriptive, one normative. On the 
descriptive level, James sets out to define truth not in terms of the purified abstraction of the 
metaphysician, but in terms of the concrete instances of successful believing that we find in the 
real world. How can we identify instances of successful believing, considering that we cannot get 
outside the world and compare our beliefs with “the infinite folio, or édition de luxe” of the 
universe (P 124)? As James indicated in the passages from Lecture II and early in Lecture VI 
quoted in subsection 3.1 above (P 34 and 97), a successful belief—and hence a true belief, 
according to Jamesian pragmatism—is one that leads the believer to accurately predict future 
experience, plan her actions accordingly, and ultimately, to fulfill her aims connected with the 
object of the belief. These further concrete experiences are what secure the truth of the belief, 




experience, or a commandment from it. Although these descriptions of verification and 
successful belief are phrased in terms that bring to mind an individual believer, the account can 
also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to collective “believers” like research teams, government 
agencies, and even institutional science itself. The individual or agency’s successful beliefs are 
provisionally true, true enough for the case, if acting on them enables relevant goals to be 
accomplished. The absolutely true beliefs are those that would enable any agent, individual or 
collective, to achieve their relevant goals, under any set of circumstances (assuming the goals are 
physically attainable—but the absolutely true beliefs would inform the agent if they were not). 
On the normative level, James emphasizes that whatever obligation we have to believe 
truth is not some sui generis, unconditional imperative imposed by the transcendent nature of 
truth itself, as rationalists like Taylor and Rickert would have it. Rather, we are obligated to 
believe truth only because and insofar as it is beneficial to the believer in helping her achieve her 
goals. The descriptive and normative points are, of course, interconnected: beliefs get to count as 
true only in virtue of their role in leading us successfully to fulfill our aims, and so the obligation 
to believe truth only amounts to an obligation to have beliefs that are helpful in this way. Thus 
understood, “our duty to gain truth, so far from being a blank command from out of the blue, or a 





Part II: Against the Hegemony of Science 
 
Recall again the two propositions of scientism that I laid out in the General Introduction: 
(1) the aims of science—discovering truth and eliminating false belief—are the most important 
human aims; and (2) the only appropriate way to pursue those aims is through the methods of 
modern science. In Part I, I discussed Nietzsche’s and James’s critiques of the first proposition, 
which Nietzsche calls “the unconditional will to truth.” Part II addresses their opposition to the 
second proposition, which I have labeled, again borrowing a phrase from Nietzsche, “the 
hegemony of science.” 
As I have emphasized throughout, neither Nietzsche nor James was opposed to science as 
such; in fact, they both gave high praise to the capacity of science to discover important and 
useful facts about how the world works. What they opposed was what I am calling “the 
hegemony of science”: the idea that science, and only science, can answer any question worth 
asking. As noted in the General Introduction, this view leaves open two possible positions on 
questions of ultimate value: either that these questions can be answered, and therefore can be 
answered by science; or that because science cannot answer such questions, they are not capable 
of an answer at all, and discussions of them are at best expressions of preference, at worst 
irrational effusions of emotion. The first option would mean that science can successfully replace 
religion and philosophy in their traditional functions of telling people what they should value and 
how they should lead their lives; the second would mean that, ideally, science could eliminate 
those functions, and the need for them, altogether. 
One of the most important themes in both Nietzsche’s and James’s attack on the 




type of event always follows some other type, which can be turned into hypothetical 
imperatives—prescriptions of a certain means to achieve an end that has already been chosen. 
But science cannot prescribe final ends or categorical imperatives: it cannot tell human beings 
what they should want. Another theme found in both philosophers’ writings is the idea that the 
language of science is not suited to express certain ideas about meaning and value: it can 
describe all of the physical interactions and historical processes involved in the production of, for 
example, a piece of art, but it cannot tell us why that art is beautiful, or the significance of art for 
human life. But this does not lead either of them to the conclusion that questions of meaning and 
value should be abandoned, or that there is no need for the practices of philosophy and 
humanistic inquiry that have traditionally investigated such questions. 
Following the model of Part I, I will lay out Nietzsche’s critique of the hegemony of 
science in Chapter 3, then in Chapter 4 I will explore James’s critique and how it both 
harmonizes with and diverges from Nietzsche’s. One of the most important differences between 
them, of course, is the role they think that traditional religion, or something like it, can still play 
in modern society. They both argue that science cannot replace religion; but whereas James 
thinks that theism is still a live option for modern educated believers, and can still provide the 
values that they need to guide their lives, Nietzsche regards theism as a dead option for such 
believers (this is part of the significance of the famous declaration in GS 125 that “God is dead”) 
and is trying to figure out what can take the place of religion in establishing values, given that 
science cannot. 
Ultimately, however, their concerns are quite similar. Nietzsche makes some sweeping 
declarations about the risk of “suicide” in the absence of values that can provide meaning for 




meaninglessness and thus “the door was closed to any kind of suicidal nihilism” (GM III, 28)—
and the reader might wonder whether this is only dramatic hyperbole. But James’s concern is, 
very concretely, the risk of suicide, as he declares in “Is Life Worth Living?” (1895): 
That life is not worth living the whole army of suicides declare—an army whose roll-call, like the 
famous evening gun of the British army, follows the sun round the world and never terminates. […] 
[W]hat I propose is to imagine ourselves reasoning with a fellow-mortal who is on such terms 
with life that the only comfort left him is to brood on the assurance “you may end it when you will.” 
[… M]y words are to deal only with that metaphysical tedium vitae which is peculiar to reflecting 
men. […] Too much questioning and too little active responsibility lead, almost as often as too much 
sensualism does, to the edge of the slope, at the bottom of which lie pessimism and the nightmare or 
suicidal view of life. (WB 38–40) 
 
More specifically, James is concerned that reverence for science and the bleak worldview it puts 
forth will lead educated, reflective people to deprive themselves of needed sources of meaning. 
Such people “feel a sort of intellectual loyalty to what they call ‘hard facts,’ which is positively 
shocked by the easy excursions into the unseen that other people make at the bare call of 
sentiment”; but they may nonetheless “be intensely religious,” in that they “desire atonement and 
reconciliation, and crave acquiescence and communion with the total soul of things” (WB 40). 
But the craving, when the mind is pent in to the hard facts, especially as science now reveals them, 
can breed pessimism, quite as easily as it breeds optimism when it inspires religious trust […] That is 
why I call pessimism an essentially religious disease. The nightmare view of life has plenty of organic 
sources; but its great reflective source has at all times been the contradiction between the phenomena 
of nature and the craving of the heart to believe that behind nature there is a spirit whose expression 
nature is. (WB 40–1) 
 
 That James seems to think the natural world requires a connection with a supernatural 
world to provide it with meaning is evidence of a strain of continued loyalty to the ascetic ideal, 
in spite of the anti-ascetic concern for the practical needs of earthly beings that we saw in 
Chapter 2. This, alongside their disagreement regarding the epistemic viability of theism, 
accounts for their different views on the value of traditional religion. Although James disavows 
ascetic truthfulness and self-denial for its own sake, he still holds that a belief in a supernatural 




inevitable end of the material world—is necessary for human beings to find the kind of meaning 
in their suffering that can stave off “suicidal nihilism” (again, see GM III, 28). Even though 
James’s posit of a supernatural realm does not precisely condemn the natural world or the animal 
instincts, it still serves to devalue the natural world by presuming that it cannot on its own 
provide sufficient justification for existence. Nietzsche, meanwhile, is determined to shake off 
the remnants of the ascetic ideal; even though (as he argues in GM III) it has been the only 
candidate to provide meaning for suffering so far, Nietzsche seems to think that it is possible to 






Nietzsche’s Protest Against the Hegemony of Science 
1. On science “playing the ‘master’” 
 Nietzsche opens Part VI of Beyond Good and Evil (1886), entitled “We Scholars,” with a 
complaint about the current state of relations between science and philosophy: 
[…] I venture to speak out against an unseemly and harmful shift in the respective ranks of science 
and philosophy, which is now threatening to become established, quite unnoticed and as if it were 
accompanied by a perfectly good conscience. [… Science] now aims with an excess of high spirits 
and a lack of understanding to lay down laws for philosophy and to play the “master” herself— what 
am I saying? the philosopher. […] 
 Finally: how could it really be otherwise? Science is flourishing today and her good conscience is 
written all over her face, while the level to which all modern philosophy has gradually sunk, this rest 
of philosophy today, invites mistrust and displeasure, if not mockery and pity. Philosophy reduced to 
“theory of knowledge,” in fact no more than a timid epochism63 and doctrine of abstinence […] How 
could such a philosophy—dominate!    (BGE 204) 
 
From this complaint we may gather that Nietzsche thinks philosophy is the rightful “master” of 
science, and is supposed to “dominate” science, not the other way around. In what, though, does 
this mastery or domination consist? And how far does it extend? 
 As ever, it is important to note that Nietzsche’s opposition to “the hegemony of 
science”—the view that science is and ought to be the sole source of authority in all areas of 
human life and inquiry—does not imply opposition to science. Many recent commentators, 
including Clark (1990), Cox (1999), Janaway (2007), and Schacht (2012), have been careful in 
acknowledging that despite Nietzsche’s trenchant critiques of some aspects of modern science, 
including the uncritical faith in the overriding value of truth that motivates some of its most 
enthusiastic defenders (as discussed in Chapter 1), he also frequently expresses respect and 
admiration for the virtues of science: its rigorous empiricist methodology, its spirit of 
                                                          




adventurousness, its intellectual integrity (see, e.g., TI III, 3; GS 293; A 47). The recent 
consensus is that Nietzsche has a qualifiedly positive regard for science. However, Nietzsche 
himself says that when considering the value of anything, “the problem ‘value for what?’ cannot 
be examined too subtly” (GM I, Note): the crucial question regarding the value of any institution, 
including science, is never whether it is good or bad simpliciter, but what it is good for.64 What 
has not been made explicit in the secondary literature is, first, what exactly Nietzsche thinks 
science is good for; and, second, what he takes to be the proper relationship between science and 
philosophy that, as he indicates in BGE 204, he believes is currently being violated. 
 In this chapter, I will flesh out Nietzsche’s views, especially as found in his mature 
writings of 1886–7 (Beyond Good and Evil, The Gay Science Book V, and On the Genealogy of 
Morality), on the limitations of science, its proper place in society, and in particular, what 
Nietzsche takes to be the appropriate relationship between science and philosophy. Nietzsche’s 
key objections to the view that science can answer any question worth asking are that science 
cannot create values—i.e., it cannot tell us what is ultimately valuable, what goals we should 
orient our lives around—and, relatedly, that science and those who practice it are ill-equipped 
and unqualified to interpret the value-related aspects of phenomena. And Nietzsche is certainly 
not willing to concede to a certain kind of scientistic thinker, those whom he calls “mechanists,” 
that phenomena lack any meaning beyond what fits into their mathematized causal models. 
 With regard to the relationship between philosophy and science, I argue that, according to 
Nietzsche, philosophy is supposed to play the role of setting goals for science. The distinctive 
task of philosophers is to “create values,” which can be understood as involving two steps: (1) 
                                                          
64 This point applies even to Christianity and its components, slave morality and the ascetic ideal: Nietzsche always 





envisioning the ideals that human society should realize, and (2) turning those ideals into 
prescriptions for behavior and the organization of society. Philosophers need the help of 
scientists in order to proceed from step (1) to step (2), because scientists—understood broadly to 
include certain humanistic scholars as well as social and natural scientists; historians, 
anthropologists, and psychologists as well as biologists, chemists, and physiologists—can tell 
them how various value systems (including legal and moral codes, family arrangements, 
economic organization, and even dietary customs) affect the psychology and cultural 
achievements of their adherents. With a certain ideal for human life in mind, philosophers should 
delegate scientists to investigate what sorts of ethical systems and social arrangements were in 
place when this ideal was most fully realized in the past, or to test hypotheses as to what ways of 
life might realize it in the future. 
2. Science “never creates values” 
 In Book V of The Gay Science, Nietzsche makes another complaint, in the same vein as 
BGE 204, about scientists who attempt to “play the philosopher”: 
It follows from the laws of the order of rank that scholars, insofar as they belong to the spiritual 
middle class, can never catch sight of the really great problems and question marks; moreover, their 
courage and their eyes simply do not reach that far—and above all, their needs […], their inmost 
assumptions and desires that things might be such and such, their fears and hopes all come to rest and 
are satisfied too soon. Take, for example, that pedantic Englishman, Herbert Spencer. What makes 
him “enthuse” in his way and then leads him to draw a line of hope, a horizon of desirability—that 
eventual reconciliation of “egoism and altruism” about which he raves—almost nauseates the likes of 
us; a human race that adopted such Spencerian perspectives as its ultimate perspectives would seem 
to us worthy of contempt, of annihilation!65 But the mere fact that he had to experience as his highest 
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creatures of such unexampled insipidity should succeed, and protract in saecula saeculorum their contented and 




hope something that to others appears and may appear only as a disgusting possibility poses a 
question mark that Spencer would have been incapable of foreseeing. (GS 373) 
 
What is the question mark that Spencer’s “highest hope” poses, and what is the limitation that 
makes him incapable of seeing it? The problem is that Spencer unquestioningly assumes the truth 
of the prevailing morality of his time and place: the utilitarian variant of what is, ultimately, the 
Christian morality of altruism, which says that the highest good is the happiness of the greatest 
number, inflected with a bourgeois capitalist ethos which claims that hedonic self-interest is both 
the fundamental human motivation and the greatest force for progress. This is what leads 
Spencer to set as the “horizon of desirability” the “eventual reconciliation of ‘egoism and 
altruism’” (GS 373). But Nietzsche and those like him see how petty and paltry this goal is: they 
see that it would lead to a society that aspires to nothing beyond universal comfort and moderate 
pleasure. Spencer’s ideal society is, effectively, the last men of the Prologue to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (see Z I, P 5). But Nietzsche claims that Spencer “had to experience [this] as his 
highest hope” (GS 373, emphasis added)66—because this is the natural consequence of the 
secular descendants of the Christian morality of altruism and compassion, whose foremost aim is 
to alleviate suffering. The contemptibility of the society that would result from following that 
morality to its ultimate goal raises for Nietzsche a question that scholars like Spencer are 
incapable of seeing: the question of the value of that prevailing morality itself; the question 
whether there are better, nobler, more ambitious ideals around which society might be structured. 
 Nietzsche makes the point somewhat more explicitly in the Note to GM I: 
The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and “morality”? should be viewed from 
the most divers perspectives; for the problem “value for what?” cannot be examined too subtly. 
Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a 
race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the preservation of 
the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of 
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producing a stronger type. The well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite 
viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of 
English biologists.  
 
Nietzsche’s remark about “English biologists” is most obviously read as a dig at Darwin, but as 
his complaint in GS 373 suggests, he also has in mind theorists like Herbert Spencer who 
attempted to extrapolate an ethical theory from Darwin’s theory of evolution (at least as he 
understood it). But for Nietzsche, finding moral principles in scientific theories is much like 
finding synthetic a priori truths in nature according to Kant: we can only get out of it what we 
put into it in the first place. I will explore more such examples of scientists implicitly assuming 
the universal truth of the prevailing value ideal of their age in subsection 3.3 below. 
 In 1882, when the first four books of The Gay Science were published, Nietzsche seemed 
not to have arrived yet at his mature view on the powers and limitations of science. GS 7 ends 
with an open question, which he calls “the most insidious question of all”: “whether science can 
furnish goals of action after it has shown that it can take such goals away and annihilate them.” 
But by 1887, when the second edition including Book V was published, Nietzsche has answered 
this question with a resounding “no.” In On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), he insists that 
science “first requires […] an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it 
could believe in itself—it never creates values” (GM III, 25) or, in the terms of GS 7, “furnish[es] 
goals of action.” Science finds truths about how the world works, which can often be translated 
into instructions for how to do something, and which questions it prioritizes depends on what 
some agent hopes to do with the answers; but science cannot ultimately tell people what they 
should want to do. As Nietzsche writes in a note from 1887: “The ascertaining of ‘truth’ and 
‘untruth,’ the ascertaining of facts in general, is fundamentally different from creative positing, 
from forming, shaping, overcoming, willing, such as is of the essence of philosophy” (KSA 




 One might object that science is pursued purely for the sake of knowledge, or truth, 
leaving scientists free to ask any questions at all (in an order dictated by curiosity—or, as it 
actually happens so often, by the needs of industry). But, as Nietzsche points out, this for the 
sake of knowledge already involves the conviction that acquiring as much knowledge as possible 
is a worthy goal, which is the kind of proposition that science itself could never discover. “We 
see that science also rests on a faith,” Nietzsche concludes—contrary to the supposed 
commitment of science to question everything and take nothing for granted; “there simply is no 
science ‘without presuppositions’” (GS 344). “[A] philosophy, a ‘faith,’ must always be there 
first of all, so that science can acquire from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to 
exist” (GM III, 24). Science pursued purely for the sake of truth or knowledge is not the same 
thing as science existing independent of any philosophical guidance, or science providing its own 
foundation. Rather, it is science guided by the philosophical view that truth is supremely 
valuable—the view that Nietzsche calls “the unconditional will to truth,” and whose motivation, 
justification, and value for human life he questions ruthlessly, as we have seen in Chapter 1.67 
Nietzsche’s view is that the genuinely useful investigative tools of science would be better 
employed in the service of a philosophical vision that advances individual and cultural 
achievement in a way that, he argues, the unconditional will to truth does not. 
 Not only can science not create values, according to Nietzsche, but it is generally ill-
suited to addressing questions about the meaning and value of phenomena. His complaint in GS 
373 about the overreaching of presumptuous scientists continues at some length, but it is a rich 
passage and worth quoting in full: 
It is no different with the faith which so many materialistic natural scientists rest content nowadays, 
the faith in a world that is supposed to have its equivalent and its measure in human thought and 
human valuations—a “world of truth” that can be mastered completely and forever with the aid of our 
                                                          




square little reason. What? Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this—
reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for mathematicians? Above all, 
one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity68: that is a dictate of good taste, 
gentlemen, the taste of reverence for everything that lies beyond your horizon. That the only 
justifiable interpretation of the world should be one in which you are justified because one can 
continue to work and do research scientifically in your sense (you really mean, mechanistically?)—an 
interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching, and nothing more—
that is a crudity and naïveté, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy. 
 Would it not rather be probable that, conversely, precisely the most superficial and external 
aspect of existence—what is most apparent, its skin and sensualization—would be grasped first—and 
might even be the only thing that allowed itself to be grasped? A “scientific” interpretation of the 
world, as you understand it, might therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible 
interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning. This thought is 
intended for the ears and consciences of our mechanists who nowadays like to pass as philosophers 
and insist that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and last laws on which all existence must be based 
as on a ground floor. But an essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially meaningless world. 
Assuming that one estimated the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be 
counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas: how absurd would such a “scientific” estimation of 
music be! What would one have comprehended, understood, grasped of it? Nothing, really nothing of 
what is “music” in it!              (GS 373) 
 
Nietzsche’s point here is an anti-reductionist one: he denies that an account in terms of what is 
supposed to be the most basic or fundamental level of reality—which, according to the 
“mechanists” he lambastes here, is the level of mechanical physics, of particles colliding with 
each other—can explain every feature of the universe. In particular, he is mocking the notion that 
a complete reduction of everything in the world to the (supposedly) most fundamental science, 
according to which any apparently more complex phenomenon “just is” a matter of particles 
colliding in a certain way, provides the deepest or most complete understanding of the 
phenomenon in question. On the contrary, he says: a reduction of the world to mechanical 
physics would not “explain away” the appearance of meaning, value, or “rich ambiguity”—i.e., 
the possibility of many interpretations—in the world; it could only ignore or overlook the 
meanings and the alternative interpretations that are there. 
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 Note the way Nietzsche places scare quotes around “science” and “scientific” throughout 
the section, including in its title, “‘Science’ as prejudice”; even where “scientifically” is not in 
scare quotes, Nietzsche still casts doubt on it with a dismissive modification: “scientifically in 
your sense.” He has in mind science as it is conceived by the most extreme defenders of the 
hegemony of science, who hold up physics—and within physics, elementary particle theory—as 
the archetype of all science and believe that all sciences should aspire not only to become like 
physics, but ultimately to dissolve themselves into it; science “that permits counting, calculating, 
weighing, seeing, and touching, and nothing more” as acceptable forms of evidence-gathering. 
That kind of “science,” Nietzsche says, is inadequate to the task of explaining the vast array of 
interpretations—overlapping, interdependent, or mutually contradictory—that have been 
ascribed to various aspects of the world. 
 Nietzsche’s scare quotes leave open the possibility of a wider conception of science that 
would be able to account for the multiplicity of meanings with which human beings have imbued 
the world around them. Indeed, Nietzsche’s term “Wissenschaft” encompasses the 
Geisteswissenchaften—the human or social sciences, including anthropology, economics, 
psychology, and even history and Nietzsche’s own former discipline of philology—as well as the 
Naturwissenschaften, the natural sciences, which are first brought to mind by the English word 
“science.” But there certainly were thinkers in Nietzsche’s time—notably, John Stuart Mill and 
his followers both in England and in the German-speaking world, including Ernst Mach 
(Anderson 2003: 222)—who held that the human sciences could only become truly scientific, or 
achieve the status of a “mature” science, if they modeled themselves after the natural sciences, 




the unique circumstances and significance of individual events and cultural practices.69 Even if 
Nietzsche thinks there is some practice that might be considered a science (which is to say, a 
Geisteswissenschaft) that could do justice to the meaning and value of a piece of music—music 
theory or musicology, perhaps—calling for a more expansive understanding of “science” and a 
place for distinctively humanistic, interpretive inquiry is still anti-scientistic in that it expresses 
opposition to the most extreme, restrictive versions of the hegemony of science. 
3. Value-creators and “scientific laborers” 
 In the last few sections of “We Scholars,” Nietzsche gives an account of the 
“philosophers of the future” (BGE 210) that he envisions. He “insist[s] that people should finally 
stop confounding philosophical laborers, and scientific men generally, with philosophers” (BGE 
211). Philosophers as he understands them are not primarily concerned with acquiring 
knowledge, although many of the “preconditions of [their] task” crucially involve knowledge. 
They must have a “passion for knowledge” and the virtues of the seeker after knowledge, 
including “cleanliness and severity in matters of the spirit” (BGE 210). “It may be necessary for 
the education of a genuine philosopher that he himself has also once stood on all those steps on 
which their servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy, remain standing” (BGE 211)—i.e., 
philosophers may need to have spent some time as a scientific researcher or philosophical 
scholar—not so much for the knowledge it imparts as for the skills, epistemic habits, and traits of 
character it nourishes: 
Science furthers ability, not knowledge.— The value of having for a time rigorously pursued a 
rigorous science does not derive precisely from the results obtained from it: for in relation to the 
ocean of things worth knowing these will be a mere droplet. But there will eventuate an increase in 
energy, in reasoning capacity, in toughness of endurance; one will have learned how to achieve an 
objective by the appropriate means.  (HAH I, 256)  
 
                                                          




In addition to instilling the discipline of method, the philosophers’ experience of inhabiting the 
various forms of the contemplative life, including the religious and artistic as well as the 
scientific, gives them firsthand knowledge of “the whole range of human values and value 
feelings” (BGE 211). More crucially, the experience of transitioning from each of these forms of 
life to the next gives philosophers practice with changing perspectives, a skill that is essential to 
the function of the philosopher, as I shall explain in section 3.2 below. 
 The philosopher’s “task itself,” however, “demands something different” from the mere 
acquisition of knowledge: “it demands that he create values” (BGE 211). As Nietzsche declares 
in the rousing conclusion to the section: “Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and 
legislators: they say, ‘thus it shall be!’ They first determine the Whither and For What of man 
[…] Their ‘knowing’ is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to 
power” (BGE 211). As examples of genuine philosophers of this kind, Nietzsche names 
“Heraclitus, Plato, Empedocles” (BGE 204). Nietzsche also indicates elsewhere that he thinks 
Plato has succeeded in reshaping the moral landscape of the world: he credits Plato with (and 
blames him for) the “invention of the pure spirit and the good as such,” and even labels 
Christianity “Platonism for ‘the people’” (BGE Preface). 
 Nietzsche contrasts these genuine philosophers with two kinds of thinkers who are 
commonly called “philosophers.” One group is “those hodgepodge philosophers” of Nietzsche’s 
own era “who call themselves ‘philosophers of reality’ or ‘positivists’” (BGE 204). Nietzsche 
scoffs that these are “at best scholars and specialists themselves,” who “resentfully” deny “the 
masterly task and masterfulness of philosophy” because they were not capable of performing it 
(204). One contemporary figure whom Nietzsche explicitly identifies as belonging to this 




the Genealogy as an “apostle of revenge […] who employs moral mumbo-jumbo more 
indecently and repulsively than anyone else in Germany today” (GM III, 14). According to 
George Stack (2005: 209 n. 5), Dühring was also an advocate of “materialistic positivism” who 
“argued for a strict realism and held that human knowledge apprehends reality as it is,” with “no 
ambiguities […] and no room for doubt.” Nietzsche may also have in mind mid-nineteenth-
century materialists like Jakob Moleschott, Ludwig Büchner, and Carl Vogt. Gregory Moore 
(2004: 7–8) writes that these so-called philosophers “worshiped at the altar of natural science, 
uncritically seizing upon the latest advances in physiology and chemistry to underpin a crudely 
materialist and mechanist worldview,” and claimed that “in systematizing the results and 
discoveries of the natural sciences, they had finally put an end to philosophy” or put it in its 
proper place as “nothing more than the theoretical aspect of the empirical sciences.” 
 It is with reference to these so-called philosophers that Nietzsche introduces the term “the 
hegemony of science,” which is how Kaufmann translates “die Botmässigkeit der Wissenschaft.” 
Nietzsche is playing with the expression “unter seine Botmässigkeit bringen,” meaning “to bring 
under one’s sway,” when he says of these “scholars and specialists” who have attempted 
unsuccessfully to play the philosopher that “das sind […] unter die Botmässigkeit der 
Wissenschaft Zurückgebrachte” (BGE 204): “they have been brought back under science’s 
sway.” That is, they have concluded from their own failure to become genuine philosophers that 
philosophy itself must become subordinate to science. This is how Nietzsche explains the 
apparently paradoxical situation that people who call themselves philosophers are calling for 





 Nietzsche takes a somewhat less dim view of the other group of merely purported 
philosophers: “philosophical laborers after the noble model of Kant and Hegel” (BGE 211, 
emphasis added). Their role is “to press into formulas, whether in the realm of logic or political 
(moral) thought or art […] former positings of values, creations of value which have become 
dominant and are for a time called ‘truths’” (BGE 211). Kant and Hegel, it is implied, merely 
rationalized the prevailing Christian morality, stripping it of theological ornamentation and 
making explicit the basic values it expresses.70 Although they do not count as genuine 
philosophers in Nietzsche’s sense, the “preliminary labor” of such “philosophical laborers” is 
still useful for actual philosophers to “have at their disposal” (hence the “noble model” 
description in BGE 211). This is because they can “make everything that has happened and been 
esteemed so far easy to look over, easy to think over, intelligible and manageable” for the benefit 
of the philosophical legislators: they distill the value-systems of the past into their core principles 
or their animating spirit, as data points for philosophers to consider when evaluating the 
consequences of adopting various tables of values. Thus they count among the philosopher’s 
“servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy” (BGE 211). 
3.1 Setting goals for scientists 
 On several occasions in his writings, Nietzsche issues “calls” for research into specific 
subject areas—almost always into moral phenomena. Here is one early example: 
Something for the industrious. — Anyone who now wishes to make a study of moral matters opens up 
for himself an immense field for work […] So far, all that has given color to existence still lacks a 
history. Where could you find a history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect 
for tradition, or of cruelty? Even a comparative history of law or at least of punishment is so far 
lacking completely. […] 
 The most industrious people will find that it involves too much work simply to observe how 
differently men’s instincts have grown, and might yet grow, depending on different moral climates. It 
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would require whole generations, and generations of scholars who would collaborate systematically, 
to exhaust the points of view and the material. […]  (GS 7) 
 
This passage is from Book I of The Gay Science (1882), which is relatively early and (as noted) 
does not always represent Nietzsche’s mature views, but it is representative in terms of the 
subject matter on which Nietzsche urges research. In almost all of these cases, the research he 
calls for is the kind that would enable a philosopher to accomplish step (2) in the value-creation 
project described above, i.e., to discover the means to realize his favored values in human 
society. Nietzsche encourages scientists (including, as noted before, historians, philologists, and 
anthropologists as well as psychologists and physiologists) to investigate the conditions under 
which various social institutions arise and their consequences for (a) the physical and 
psychological condition of individuals, and (b) cultural production. The philosopher can then 
evaluate for each set of institutions how well (a) and (b) satisfy her own favored values, and 
decide on that basis which ones to use as partial models for new institutions. The social 
institutions to be studied encompass the fine-grained and everyday customs that might be of 
interest to anthropologists and material historians (diet, work schedules, living arrangements: GS 
7); matters of larger-scale societal organization that concern political scientists (hierarchical as 
opposed to egalitarian class and governing structures; see BGE 257); religious creeds, practices, 
and attitudes (see, e.g., Nietzsche’s remarks in BGE 45 on the need for a study of the psychology 
of religiosity); and the basic values—honor, compassion, freedom, reason, honesty, etc.—
revered in the whole society, which are distilled from ordinary moral judgments and practices by 
“philosophical laborers” like Kant and Hegel (GS 7: “why is it that the sun of one fundamental 





 Here is a later typical example of Nietzsche issuing a call for scientific research into 
moral values and institutions: 
Note. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire […] 
that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of 
academic prize-essays—perhaps this book will serve as a powerful impetus in this direction. In case 
this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of 
philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophical scholars71: 
 “What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the 
evolution of moral concepts?” 
 On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in 
these problems (of the value of existing valuations) The question: what is the value of this or that 
table of values and “morality”? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem 
“value for what?” cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious 
value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of 
adaptation to a particular climate or to the preservation of the greatest number) would by no means 
possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-
being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the 
former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences 
have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as 
the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.  
  (GM I, Note) 
 
Once again, Nietzsche emphasizes that it is “the future task of the philosophers” to determine 
“the order of rank among values,” i.e., to decide which value system is best from the broadest 
possible perspective. Meanwhile, the snide remark about “English biologists”—which I 
excerpted from this longer passage and discussed in section 2—reinforces Nietzsche’s contention 
that mere scientists or “scholars” are unqualified to adjudicate among broad value ideals and 
choose one to implement, i.e., to create values. 
3.2 Nietzsche: philosopher or scientist? 
 The Note to GM I raises the question of what Nietzsche takes himself to be doing, and 
which side of the line between philosophers and “philosophical” or “scientific laborers” he takes 
himself to be on. Throughout Beyond Good and Evil he speaks of the “new philosophers” as 
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“coming up [heraufkommen]” (BGE 2, 44) rather than as presently existing; he poses as a 
question: “Are there such philosophers today? Have there been such philosophers yet? Must 
there not be such philosophers?” (BGE 211). On the Genealogy of Morality is itself a kind of 
“historical study of morality,” and GM I, 4–5 makes a start at answering the question Nietzsche 
proposes in the note above. What kind of “impetus” for these called-for studies is the 
Genealogy—an exemplar, or a programmatic prologue? For all Nietzsche’s talk of the 
importance for a genealogy of morals of “what is documented, what can actually be confirmed 
and has actually existed, in short the entire long hieroglyphic record […] of the moral past of 
mankind” (GM Pref. 7), Nietzsche does not provide much documentation for his claims about 
human history—nor could he, for his claims about human prehistory! Often one might 
reasonably suspect him of doing the same sort of “gazing around haphazardly in the blue” (GM 
Pref. 7) of which he accuses Paul Rée and the “English psychologists” who (according to 
Nietzsche) have made “the only attempts hitherto to arrive at a history of the origin of morality” 
(GM I, 1). 
 Brian Leiter (2002) claims that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist (M-Naturalist) of 
the “Methods Continuity” type (2002: 6–7): that “Nietzsche’s actual philosophical practice” 
(ibid, 6, n. 10), involves “construct[ing] philosophical theories that are continuous with the 
sciences […] in virtue of […] their employment and emulation of distinctively scientific ways of 
looking at and explaining things” (5). Accordingly, Leiter claims, “Nietzsche, the philosophical 
naturalist, aims to offer theories that explain various important human phenomena […] in ways 
that […] are modeled on science in the sense that they seek to reveal the causal determinants of 
these phenomena, typically in various physiological and psychological facts about persons” (8). 




“honorific” “for those who discharge a different kind of task than that of the naturalist: those 
who create or legislate values” (6, n. 10). He also implies that Nietzsche himself does undertake 
to earn this honorific and “utilize the information provided by ‘physiologists and doctors’ as to 
which values might contribute to […] ‘producing a stronger type’ (GM I: Note)” (2002: 68). But 
Leiter maintains that “most of Nietzsche’s books are devoted […] to the M-Naturalistic project,” 
and in particular that the Genealogy offers explanations “continuous with both the results and 
methods of the sciences” (11). This view of what Nietzsche does suggests that in the Genealogy, 
Nietzsche the philosopher (in the honorific sense) is, as it were, getting down in the mud with his 
scholarly servants and initiating the scientific researches needed to help him create the new 
values that will realize his vision for human life.72  
 However, I think that Nietzsche’s historical accounts in the Genealogy are far too sketchy 
to count as the kind of thorough historical, linguistic, physiological, and psychological 
investigations into moral phenomena that he calls for in GS 7 and the Note to GM I. Perhaps 
more to the point, the ever-present evaluative (indeed, polemical) elements—his interjected sighs 
of despair (GM I, 12) and longing (GM II, 24), cries of horror (GM II, 22) and disgust (GM I, 11 
and 14; GM III, 14 and 22)—point away from interpreting Nietzsche’s project as that of a 
scientific researcher. Not only would these elements seem out of place in a scientific treatise, but 
Nietzsche himself has indicated that he thinks science is an inappropriate tool for assessing 
matters of meaning and value. Instead, it might be more appropriate to see Nietzsche as 
performing another one of the tasks he assigns to genuine philosophers: “being the bad 
conscience of their time,” “applying the knife vivisectionally to the chest of the very virtues of 
                                                          
72 Though Leiter was not the first to discuss Nietzsche in connection with metaphysical or epistemological 
naturalism—Cox (1995), at least, beat him to it—his thesis has engendered a lively debate in recent Nietzsche 




their time,” in order to pave the way for “a new greatness of man […] a new untrodden way to 
his enhancement” (BGE 212). 
 Nietzsche’s list of roles that a philosopher might need to have played also contains a hint 
as to what role he now takes himself to occupy: 
It may be necessary for the education of a genuine philosopher that he himself has also once stood 
upon all these steps on which his servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy, remain standing […] 
Perhaps he himself must have been critic and skeptic and dogmatist and historian and also poet and 
collector and traveler and solver of riddles and moralist and seer and “free spirit” and almost 
everything in order to pass through the whole range of human values and value feelings […]  
  (BGE 211) 
 
This list is plausibly read as an account of the stages of Nietzsche’s own intellectual 
development (perhaps not in chronological order). As a professor of philology, Nietzsche has 
been a “historian”; as the writer of The Birth of Tragedy and a disciple of Wagner, he has been a 
“dogmatist”; in writing the Untimely Meditations, he became a “critic” of other writers (David 
Strauss in particular, but also, more covertly, Schopenhauer and Wagner) as well as 
contemporary culture in general; the Nietzsche of Human, All Too Human could be seen as a 
“skeptic” who proudly claimed the term “free spirit”; in the prelude and the appendix to The Gay 
Science, and throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche tried his hand at being a “poet”; and 
so on. Nietzsche presents these prior experiences as being not entirely necessary and certainly 
not sufficient for becoming a genuine philosopher, so we cannot straightforwardly infer that 
Nietzsche considers himself a genuine philosopher from the fact that he has gone through (very 
nearly) this exact set of experiences. Nonetheless, I think we can take the oblique reference to 
Nietzsche’s own indirect path to philosophy as significant. Nietzsche may be doing here 




detours he took on his way to becoming a philosopher not as setbacks or as wasted time and 
effort, but as needed training for becoming the philosopher he eventually became.73 
 Although the primary role of philosophers is not to acquire knowledge, they do possess 
(at least) two distinctive skills in that regard. One is the ability to take in and interpret great 
expanses of time and space, in order to perceive in them large-scale patterns of development, 
vast and abstract cultural trends. Nietzsche explains the rarity of this skill: 
“The wanderer” speaks.— If one would like to see our European morality for once as it looks from a 
distance, and if one would like to measure it against other moralities, past and future, then one has to 
proceed like a wanderer who wants to know how high the towers in a town are: he leaves the town. 
“Thoughts about moral prejudices,” if they are not meant to be prejudices about prejudices, 
presuppose a position outside morality, some point beyond good and evil to which one has to rise, 
climb, or fly […] the question is whether one really can get up there. 
 This may depend on manifold conditions. […] One has to be very light to drive one’s will to 
knowledge into such a distance and […] to create for oneself eyes to survey millennia […] One must 
have liberated oneself from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely 
us Europeans today. The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the supreme measures 
of value of his time must first of all “overcome” his time in himself—this is the test of his strength 
[…]  (GS 380) 
 
This kind of lightness, strength, and scope is characteristic of the philosopher as Nietzsche 
describes him in BGE 213: “the bold, light, delicate gait and course of his thoughts […], the 
loftiness of masterly glances and glances down,74 feeling separated from the crowd and its duties 
and virtues, […] the width of the will, the slow eye that rarely admires, rarely looks up, rarely 
loves—” And in order to write On the Genealogy of Morality, with its timescale reaching back to 
when humans were still “semi-animals” (GM II, 16), Nietzsche must have made just this kind of 
effort “to create for [him]self eyes that survey millennia” (GS 380). It is this ability to distill 
millennia of history into their broadest overarching patterns (as well as their experience as a 
scientific specialist or a critical scholar of philosophy) that qualifies the philosophers to assign 
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research tasks to scientists: it enables them to identify what more specific questions need to be 
asked and answered in order to choose the shape of the next several millennia of human history. 
 The other epistemic ability distinctive of philosophers, as I hinted earlier, is the ability to 
inhabit different perspectives. It is to develop this skill that it “may be necessary” for the 
philosopher to have occupied the many roles Nietzsche lists, “in order to pass through the whole 
range of human values and value feelings and to be able to see with many different eyes and 
consciences, from a height into every distance, from the depths into every height, from a nook 
into every expanse” (BGE 213). This ability, I would venture, is what qualifies philosophers for 
the “future task” Nietzsche assigns to them: “the solution of the problem of value, the 
determination of the order of rank among values.” It may seem strange for someone like 
Nietzsche, who rejects the notion of a universal morality or of a transcendent source of ultimate 
values (God or some other type of “metaphysical world,” as characterized in GS 344), to speak 
of “the solution of the problem of value” or “the order of rank among values” (my emphasis), as 
if there is only one correct answer to the question. It goes far beyond my project here to 
determine whether and why Nietzsche is, ultimately, a value monist or a pluralist. Nonetheless, 
he clearly thinks some value systems are better than others. And it stands to reason that 
philosophers who have seen the world through the lens of several different value frameworks, 
who know firsthand and can remember what it is like to judge according to various standards of 
value, are in a better position to make determinations about the relative quality (or “order of 
rank”) of value systems than people who have only ever lived in one. In the absence of a 
transcendent determinant of moral truth, “objectivity” in the ethical domain, as in every other, 
must become a matter of being able to see from a variety of perspectives rather than from some 




There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to 
speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more 
complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be.    (GM III, 12) 
 
3.3 Interpretive pointers and the autonomy of science 
 We have established that Nietzsche thinks philosophers are entitled to set the research 
agenda for scientists, i.e., to dictate (to some extent) what questions scientists seek to answer. 
But this raises another question: What kind of control does Nietzsche think philosophers have 
over the answers that science arrives at? Are philosophers also entitled to critique or revise the 
analyses offered by scientists, whether in answer to a question posed by the philosopher, or to 
questions the scientists came up with themselves? How much autonomy does science have from 
philosophy? 
 First of all, philosophers have no interest in falsifying the results of science, at least not 
for themselves; Nietzsche certainly thinks that the value-creators need accurate knowledge of 
cause-effect relations in order to choose the right means to their ends—and that it is possible, and 
usually disastrous, to have false beliefs on this score (on which see the whole of Twilight of the 
Idols Part VI: “The Four Great Errors”). This is why, in GS 335, Nietzsche says that to the end of 
“the creation of our own tables of what is good,”  
we must become the best learners and discoverers of all that is necessary in the world: we must 
become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and 
ideals have been based on ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it.     (GS 335) 
 
 In The Antichrist, Nietzsche names Christianity as a prime example of a value-system 
constructed in ignorance of natural necessities. He implies that one of the many reasons he has a 
higher opinion of Hinduism than of Christianity is that, while both Christianity and “the law of 
Manu” propagate a “holy lie” among their followers (A 55), Christian priests do not even allow 
themselves to see the falsity of their world-explanation in terms of “sin” and “redemption” (A 




lie in the sense of “wishing not to see something that one does see” (A 55). By contrast, 
Nietzsche claims, the “holy lies” involved in the law of Manu are merely “the means of assuring 
authority for a truth” that “sums up the experience, prudence, and experimental morality of 
many centuries” (A 57). 
 Whether Nietzsche thinks philosophers are entitled to strategically falsify the results of 
science for mass consumption is unclear. He does make clear, however, that where it would 
leave the predictive accuracy of a scientific account unchanged or even improve it, philosophers 
can suggest modifications—in the name not only of truth, but also of promoting their ideals. 
Nietzsche does this several times in Beyond Good and Evil, each time suggesting his concept of 
will to power as an alternative to some current model in the sciences—or, in the case of BGE 36, 
as an alternative to any current model in the sciences. Here are a couple of interesting examples: 
Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct 
of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to 
power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results. 
 In short, here as everywhere else, let us beware of superfluous teleological principles—one of 
which is the instinct of self-preservation […] Thus method, which must be essentially economy of 
principles, demands it. (BGE 13) 
 
[…] “nature’s conformity to law,” of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists 
only owing to your interpretation and bad “philology.” It is no matter of fact, no “text,” but rather 
only a naively humanitarian emendation and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant 
concessions to the democratic instincts of the modern soul! “Everywhere equality before the law; 
nature is no different in that respect, no better off than we are” […] But as said above, that is 
interpretation, not text; and somebody might come along who, with opposite intentions and modes of 
interpretation, could read out of the same “nature,” and with regard to the same phenomena, rather the 
tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power […] but he might, 
nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this world as you do, namely, that it has a “necessary” 
and “calculable” course, not because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and 
every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment. (BGE 22) 
 
 In BGE 13, as well as in BGE 36, Nietzsche the philosopher appeals to an internal 
methodological guideline of science in support of his reinterpretation: “economy of 
[explanatory] principles.” But in BGE 22, he does not disguise that his interests are ethical rather 




predispositions—which is to say, the ethical ideals set by earlier philosophers—to push them 
toward a particular model of explanation. Nietzsche does little to disguise that he sees “claims of 
power” where democratically-inclined physicists see “laws” because he has “opposite 
intentions,” and hopes to promote his vision of a spiritual hierarchy that distinguishes those with 
a “noble” character from the mediocre majority (this can be gathered especially from Parts VIII 
and IX of BGE, “Peoples and Fatherlands” and “What is Noble”). But he emphasizes that these 
disparate readings are made “out of the same ‘nature,’ and with regard to the same phenomena,” 
and that his proposed alternative would “end by asserting the same about this world as you do, 
namely, that it has a ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course” (BGE 22) —i.e., adopting it would not 
interfere with physicists’ ability to predict the course of natural events. Even though it would, of 
course, be an instance of the naturalistic fallacy to justify an ethical system by pointing to the 
organization of the natural world, adopting the will-to-power model in physics and biology 
would in a way reinforce Nietzsche’s social ideals by mirroring them, or harmonizing with them, 
in a different sphere of existence. 
 Nietzsche’s vague, allusive suggestions in these sections raise (at least) two inevitable 
questions: (1) What, exactly, would an evolutionary biology or a physics built around the 
principle of the will to power look like? And (2) would such theories actually do as well as the 
existing ones in accounting for and predicting the observed data, fulfilling Nietzsche’s promise 
that they would continue to show the “‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course” of nature (BGE 22)? 
The second question could only be answered experimentally—but not with any particular 
experiment of the kind that plays a role in an existing research program; it would have to be a 
long-term experiment involving a sizeable scientific community conducting a research program 




an answer to the first question, because to a great extent it would depend on how that large-scale 
experiment turned out, but I will briefly sketch what he might have had in mind with each 
hypothetical will-to-power theory. 
 First, to his remarks on biology in BGE 13: Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that the two 
basic instincts that supposedly lead to the perpetuation of a species or a lineage—the drives to 
self-preservation and reproduction—should be reduced to one, considered under the heading of 
“will to power,” which Nietzsche characterizes here as the impulse of a living thing “to 
discharge its strength.” I do not have the space to defend this view thoroughly here, but from a 
wide variety of uses of the term “will to power” throughout Nietzsche’s works, the unifying core 
feature I have extrapolated is the desire, impulse, or tendency (in the case of inanimate entities) 
to change the world in some distinctive way, to leave a lasting mark—in essence, to write on the 
world “I was here.”75 Reproduction can certainly be considered this way: it consumes the 
organism’s resources, but also makes a change in the world that will, ideally, last beyond the 
progenitor’s own lifespan. Some of the activities associated with the survival instinct can also be 
read this way, including the growth of a tree, or the destruction of other life for the purpose either 
of nutrition or of eliminating competition.76 But it is not completely clear how other survival-
related activities, such as a prey animal’s instinct to flee, can be explained under this rubric. 
 I think the will-to-power model fares better when we consider levels of selection other 
than the individual organism. Nietzsche might well have thought of species as units of selection, 
considering his speculation in GS 1 that every human impulse and behavior, however destructive 
                                                          
75 This reading unifies a number of disparate cases, including the standard examples of violence and state-building, 
but also the imposition of an interpretation on something or someone—which is what happens in cases of value-
creation (as, e.g., the priests’ propagation and establishment of slave morality’s interpretation of strength and 
weakness in GM I, or of the ascetic interpretation of the world in GM III)—considering that “it is enough to create 
new names and estimations […] in order to create in the long run new ‘things’” (GS 58). 
76 Indeed, in BGE 36, he suggests: “suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one 




on the individual level, serves “the most amazing economy of the preservation of the species”: 
“Pursue your best or your worst desires, above all perish! In both cases you are probably still in 
some way a promoter and benefactor of humanity.” In this early (1882) section, Nietzsche is still 
thinking of preservation of the species as the goal; later he places much more emphasis on 
development. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–4) he presents the ideal of the “overman” as a 
quasi-evolutionary development of the human species, and emphasizes that humankind as we 
know it would have to perish: “Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman […] What is great 
in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture 
and a going under” (Z I, P 4). Recall, also, the distinction he draws in the Note to GM I: 
“Something […] that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a 
race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the 
preservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a 
question […] of producing a stronger type.” A will-to-power biology would measure the success 
of a species in terms of the persistence of its legacy—the changing lineage it gives rise to—
rather than of its existence as such; a species’ success consists in its “self-overcoming,” its 
replacement by something new and better able to thrive under changing conditions, rather than 
its survival in its current form. In fact, evolutionary biology has developed in this direction as its 
understanding of the mechanisms of evolution has progressed. Consider, for example, the 
relatively recent discovery that dinosaurs did not, in fact, go extinct: we just call some of them 
“birds” now.77 The idea, championed by Dawkins (1976), of the gene rather than the organism as 
the fundamental unit of selection is also friendly to the notion of a will-to-power biology, 
considering that a gene secures its persistence in a lineage through the contribution that its 
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expression as a protein—which is a the way a gene “discharge[s] its strength,” so to speak—
makes to the organisms that are its vehicle; “self-preservation is only one of the indirect and 
most frequent results” (BGE 13). 
 There is more textual elaboration elsewhere in Nietzsche’s corpus of the will-to-power 
physics proposed in BGE 22. Other commentators have done extensive work to flesh out 
Nietzsche’s “physics” (which is set forth mainly in work never published during Nietzsche’s 
lifetime),78 but my goal here is only to sketch the conceptual contrast between the physics 
Nietzsche proposes and the established physics of the late nineteenth century (as he saw it) and 
illuminate the connections between Nietzsche’s scientific suggestions and his ethical aims. His 
objection to the notion of “nature’s conformity to law”—that it is “a concession to the 
democratic instincts of the modern soul” and an expression of the value of “equality before the 
law”—provides some clues. It seems that Nietzsche is objecting to a broadly Cartesian and later 
Newtonian understanding of physics, according to which all matter has the same minimal 
properties—extension and (on the Newtonian model) mass—but is intrinsically inert, and 
requires transcendent laws of nature, conceived of as being imposed by God or (somehow) by 
the universe, to dictate how it will move and interact with other matter. Nietzsche’s talk of the 
“enforcement of claims of power” indicates that his proposed alternative involves reviving the 
Aristotelian and later Leibnizian notion of powers inhering in things79—or rather in “centers of 
force,” since Nietzsche repudiates materialistic atomism (BGE 12) and even the notion of a 
“thing” (see GS 110; TI VI, 3) and hopes to explain the world wholly in terms of the interactions 
of forces (see KSA 13:14[79] and [186], published as WP 634–6, all from 1888). 
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79 Leibniz 1989 [1695]: 118ff. is instructive regarding the difference in conception between himself (whom he aligns 




 A note from 1885 or 1886—the period in which Beyond Good and Evil was written and 
published—both clarifies Nietzsche’s suggestion in BGE 22 and illuminates its connection to his 
ethical aims: 
“Regularity” in succession is only a metaphorical expression, as if a rule were being followed here; 
not a fact. In the same way “conformity with a law.” We discover a formula by which to express an 
ever-recurring kind of result: we have therewith discovered no “law,” even less a force that is the 
cause of the recurrence of a succession of results. That something always happens thus and thus is 
here interpreted as if a creature always acted thus and thus as a result of obedience to a law or a 
lawgiver, while it would be free to act otherwise if it were not for the “law.” But precisely this thus-
and-not-otherwise might be inherent in the creature, which might behave thus and thus, not in 
response to a law, but because it is constituted thus and thus. All it would mean is: something cannot 
be something else, cannot do now this and now something else, is neither free nor unfree but simply 
thus and thus. The mistake lies in the fictitious insertion of a subject.     
  (KSA 12:2[142], published as WP 632) 
 
Parts of this passage clearly anticipate the idea of GM I, 13: 
To demand of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to 
overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and 
triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. A 
quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect—more, it is nothing other than 
precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the 
fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as 
conditioned by something that causes effects, by a “subject,” can it appear otherwise. For just as the 
popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation 
of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, 
as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not 
to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the 
doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. 
 
WP 632’s links to both BGE 22 and GM I, 13 makes very clear how Nietzsche’s proposed 
reconception of physics relates to his ambition to reshape the ethical landscape. His primary aim 
in GM I, 13 is not to put forward the metaphysical thesis that there is no subject separate from 
and causally responsible for its actions. It is, rather, to criticize one of the premises of slave 
morality: that there is a free subject, with no defining characteristics other than its freedom, that 
can at any time choose to be either “good” (passive, peaceable, harmless) or “evil” (belligerent, 
domineering, possessive). Both Cartesian-Newtonian physics and Christian ethics involve a 




governed by a transcendent law, physical or moral, imposed from above. That the moral subject, 
unlike the physical subject, has the capacity to disobey the law is merely incidental; the 
mirroring between the models gives “laws of nature” a normative cast that suggests to the 
imagination the possibility that matter, too, could have done otherwise than obey the laws 
(perhaps if God had instituted different laws, or momentarily broken the laws for the sake of a 
miracle). It is because of this porousness between the physical metaphor and the ethical model 
that Nietzsche wants to eliminate the substratum in both the physical and the ethical realms and 
characterize the entities therein (bodies or persons) as consisting in their tendency to behave in 
certain ways: as the quantity of force they have to exert, in the physical or ethical domain, and 
the direction (or “purpose”) toward which they exert it (see GM 360 on this distinction). 
 Some of Nietzsche’s remarks in Beyond Good and Evil indicate that science can rule out 
some interpretations on its own, simply because they fit poorly with the facts. BGE 12 is a good 
example: 
As for materialistic atomism, it is one of the best refuted theories there are, and in Europe perhaps no 
one in the learned world is now so unscholarly as to attach serious significance to it, except for 
convenient household use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)—thanks chiefly to the 
Dalmatian Boscovich: he and the Pole Corpernicus have been the greatest and most successful 
opponents of visual evidence so far. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all 
the senses, that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last 
part of the earth that “stood fast”—the belief “in “substance,” in “matter,” in the earth-residuum and 
particle-atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has been gained on earth so far. 
 
Boscovich was an eighteenth-century mathematician and natural philosopher—in modern terms, 
a scientific theorist. He was not really a philosopher in Nietzsche’s sense, or even a 
“philosophical laborer” after the model of Kant or Hegel, though the line between physical and 
metaphysical theorizing in his time was blurry, if present at all. He was in conversation with the 
ideas of Leibniz and Newton, and to some extent attempted to reconcile them (Ansell-Pearson 




metaphysician, they both crossed frequently back and forth over that line. According to 
Boscovich, what appears as matter is made up of indivisible, immutable, non-extended 
mathematical points exerting attractive force at relatively large distances and repulsive force at 
very small distances (2000: 13). Like Nietzsche, he favored abandoning the “Klümpchen-Atom” 
(which Kaufmann translates as “particle-atom,” but which on a very literal level means “little 
clump-atom”) in favor of “centers of force” (KSA 13:14[188], published as WP 1066). 
 Boscovich’s motivation, however, seems to have been entirely theoretical rather than, 
like Nietzsche’s, part of a campaign toward a general change in society’s ethical as well as 
theoretical worldview. The same is probably true of Copernicus, the other example Nietzsche 
mentions in BGE 12, who nonetheless succeeded (perhaps without meaning to) in 
revolutionizing the worldview of modern Europeans—including not only their understanding of 
astronomy, but their self-understanding as human beings: as Nietzsche remarks in GM III, 25, 
“Since Copernicus, man […] is slipping faster and faster away from the center […] into a 
‘penetrating sense of his nothingness’.” Nietzsche does allow that scientific specialists can arrive 
at certain views and reject others on the basis of purely epistemic concerns such as consistency 
and adequacy to the evidence. Philosophers, according to Nietzsche, always seek in 
characteristic ways to shape the world around them in accordance with their own needs and 
values: by interpreting it in a certain way, usually without regard for evidence; often by 
promulgating that interpretation in hopes that it will become generally accepted as truth; perhaps 
even by actively striving to impose their vision on society. By contrast, “among scholars who are 
really scientific people80 […], you may actually find something like a drive for knowledge, some 
small, independent clockwork that, once well wound, works on vigorously without any essential 
                                                          




participation from all the other drives of the scholar” (BGE 6). In brief, then, science can arrive 
at results of great theoretical and practical import without instruction from philosophers. But 
Nietzsche would probably say that this is a lucky accident when it happens, and that science 
would be more fruitful for culture under the guidance of philosophy. 
 The creation of new values requires a collaboration between philosophers and scientists. 
As Richard Schacht puts it, science is “a needed partner” to philosophy in this project; “a junior 
partner, in the end, but a partner nonetheless” (2012: 185). Philosophy sets the ends, while 
science can furnish only means to these ends, and not ends of its own. But of course there are 
facts about cause-effect relations (which scientists can find out with no prompting from 
philosophers—though they may not know what to do with them), and hence facts about means-
ends relations; and philosophers need the diligence and careful method of science to ascertain 






James’s Defense of the Religious Attitude 
1. What James means by “the religious attitude” 
 When discussing James’s arguments in defense of the religious attitude, it is important to 
get clear on what, precisely, he is defending against the scientistic disparagers of religion. This 
would be considerably easier if it seemed that James had a clear and consistent idea of what he 
was defending. Throughout his writings he provides a number of different characterizations of 
the religious beliefs or religious attitude that, in each case, he hopes to vindicate. Here I will 
review a representative variety of them and extract some unifying features that constitute the 
core of the attitude that James wants to preserve from the encroachments of science. 
 Over the course of his career, James appears to move from relatively concrete and 
specific characterizations of religion toward increasingly abstract and general ones. Hollinger 
(2013) connects this shift with a shift in James’s strategy for defending religion from a “separate 
spheres” doctrine, which shields a particular class of beliefs from the epistemic standards of 
science, to the unitary epistemology of Pragmatism, according to which a certain form of 
religion will (he believes, or hopes) be vindicated according to the very same standards to which 
scientific theories must answer. 
 James’s earliest attempt to outline the religious belief he hopes to defend, in “Reflex 
Action and Theism” (1881), accordingly, displays the greatest amount of detail and metaphysical 
commitment. He unhesitatingly gives it the name of “theism,” which he later starts to withhold 
from his more nebulous characterizations of “religion” or “the religious hypothesis.” Indeed (as 
quoted in the General Introduction) James even pokes fun at more permissive characterizations 




What kind of a being would God be if he did exist? The word “God” has come to mean many things 
in in the history of human thought, from Venus and Jupiter to the “Idee” which figures in the pages of 
Hegel. Even the laws of physical nature have, in these positivistic times, been held worthy of divine 
honor and presented as the only fitting object of our reverence. Of course, if our discussion is to bear 
any fruit, we must mean something more definite than this. We must not call any object of our loyalty 
a “God” without more ado, simply because to awaken our loyalty happens to be one of God’s 
functions. He must have some intrinsic characteristics of his own besides […] 
 First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he 
must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. The personality need not be determined 
intrinsically any further than is involved in the holding of certain things dear, and in the recognition 
of our dispositions towards those things, the things themselves being all good and righteous things. 
But, extrinsically considered, so to speak, God’s personality is to be regarded, like any other 
personality, as something lying outside of my own and other than me, and whose existence I simply 
come upon and find. A power not ourselves, then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means 
it, and which recognizes us—such is the definition which I think nobody will be inclined to dispute. 
  (WB 97–8) 
 
Here James explicitly excludes any form of pantheism, be it the materialist pantheism of the 
positivist types or the idealist pantheism of the Hegelians, from his efforts to vindicate religion: 
the former, he argues, fails to satisfy our need for meaningful goals in life; the latter, which 
attempts to unify the deity with the self, goes beyond the evidence of our senses and intellect. 
 By the time he wrote “Is Life Worth Living?”, fourteen years later, James was no longer 
explicitly defending “theism,” but had shifted to “religion.” He no longer required a God with a 
“mental personality,” but he still insisted on a “supernatural” realm: 
Religion has meant many things in human history; but when from now onward I use the word I mean 
to use it in the supernaturalist sense, as declaring that the so-called order of nature […] is only one 
portion of the total universe, and that there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of 
which we now know nothing positive, but in its relation to which the true significance of our present 
mundane life consists. A man’s religious faith (whatever more special items of doctrine it may 
involve) means for me essentially his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which 
the riddles of the natural order may be found explained. In the more developed religions the natural 
world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world, 
and affirmed to be a sphere of education, trial, or redemption. In these religions, one must in some 
fashion die to the natural life before one can enter into life eternal. The notion that this physical world 
of wind and water […] is absolutely and ultimately the divinely aimed-at and established thing, is one 
which we find only in very early religions […] It is this natural religion (primitive still, in spite of the 
fact that poets and men of science whose good-will exceeds their perspicacity keep publishing it in 
new editions tuned to our contemporary ears) that […] has suffered definitive bankruptcy in the 
opinion of a circle of persons, among whom I must count myself […]. For such persons the physical 
order of nature, taken simply as science knows it, cannot be held to reveal any one harmonious 
spiritual intent. It is mere weather, as Chauncey Wright called it, doing and undoing without end. 




For all James’s concern for the concrete situation and well-being of earthly creatures, he might 
justly be suspected of endorsing a version of the ascetic ideal (as Nietzsche understands it) with 
his contentions that, according to the type of religion he favors, “the true significance of our 
present mundane life consists” in its relation to some “unseen world”; that the natural world is 
“the mere scaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world”; that “one must in some 
fashion die to the natural life before one can enter into life eternal.” Nietzsche would be quick to 
point out two critical errors: that James accepts “the physical order of nature, taken simply as 
science knows it” (my emphasis) to be the definitive account of the natural world, eliding the 
“rich ambiguity” (GS 373) it possesses in virtue of the multitude of possible (non-supernatural) 
interpretations; and that he demands of nature “one harmonious spiritual intent” (WB 49). 
Demanding a moral order from the natural world, Nietzsche would say, can only invite 
disillusionment; we are better off if we instead seek aesthetic meaning and value (see esp. GS 
107). 
 Richard Gale (1999) regards such supernaturalist religious impulses—the desire for 
communion with or revelation from a “truer world”—as contradicting James’s “Promethean 
pragmatism” (as seen in the analysis of the pragmatic conception of truth in Chapter 2), 
according to which the world is fundamentally what human beings make of it. Gale resists the 
strategy of resolving the contradiction by assigning the Prometheanism and the mysticism to 
different periods of James’s life, as have commentators who “depicted James as relinquishing by 
the end of his career the assertive self in favor of a religious acceptance of forces beyond its 
control” (Gale 1999: 258); Gale depicts it instead as an irresolvable tension within James’s 
philosophical personality. Hollinger (2013), however, makes a good case that if anything the 




religion over the course of his career, as revealed in the present survey, tend to reinforce that 
impression. 
 In “The Will to Believe”—which was written only one year after “Is Life Worth 
Living?”, as a rebuttal to a student’s objections to the earlier essay (Klein 2015: 82–3)—James’s 
summary of what he calls “the religious hypothesis” has become significantly less informative. 
He claims that this is a concession to the diversity of religions in the world—“Religions differ so 
much in their accidents that in discussing the religious question we must make it very generic 
and broad” (WB 29)—but the difference between this description and its predecessors has the air 
of a retreat: 
What then do we now mean by the religious hypothesis? Science says things are; morality says some 
things are better than other things; and religion says essentially two things. 
First, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in 
the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. “Perfection is eternal”—this 
phrase of Charles Secrétan seems a good way of putting this first affirmation of religion, an 
affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all. 
 The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first 
affirmation to be true. (WB 29–30) 
 
This characterization makes no reference either to mental personality or to the supernatural. In 
fact, the phrasing is so vague that, if we take this account literally, the view that whatever 
happens to last the longest is thereby the best (for example, that because the natural universe is 
likely to end in a permanent state of rest and uniform low temperature, that state is the highest 
good) would count as a religion. Clearly this is not what James intends: he is assuming that “the 
best” or “perfection” is to be defined antecedently by “morality,” and religion foretells the final 
victory of that principle. This need not involve the existence of a God who will ensure the 
triumph of good; it might be interpreted completely naturalistically as the faith that, in Martin 




 Klein (2015) interprets James’s description to be much more traditionally supernaturalist 
and theistic than it appears: “The hypothesis involves the prospect of an eternal afterlife, along 
with the prospect that the quality of this afterlife depends on whether we choose religious belief 
here and now” (2015: 77). To support this interpretation, Klein cites not only the passage I have 
just quoted from “The Will to Believe” (WB 29–30), but also the passage from “Is Life Worth 
Living?” cited previously (WB 48–9). Klein (2015: 77) also appeals to James’s brief reference to 
the Protestant doctrine of “justification by faith,” which he uses to introduce his project of a 
“justification of faith” (WB 13), as evidence that the “religious hypothesis” he is justifying faith 
in is none other than that of the salvation of the soul (the first affirmation) as a reward for faith in 
the present life (the second affirmation). 
 If that is what James had in mind with these two affirmations of religion, he certainly 
wasn’t being forthright about it. James never seems to place much importance on individual 
immortality81; instead, what he consistently emphasizes is the persistence of human ideals, the 
great deeds performed in the name of such ideals, and the memory of the individuals who 
performed them.82 Here is an example from Lecture III of Pragmatism (1906), “Some 
Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered,” in which he describes the pragmatic 
difference between “materialism” and “spiritualism.” In the following passage I emphasize in 
italics the phrases that bring out his concern not with personal immortality, but with the 
preservation of memory and a moral order, while emphasizing in bold the language that echoes 
his characterization of “the religious hypothesis” in “The Will to Believe”: 
                                                          
81 While he supposedly defends the possibility in “Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine” 
(first delivered as a lecture in 1893), the hypothesis he outlines seems to allow for the immortality of a universal 
mentality rather than of individual minds. 
82 Rorty compares this hope of James’s with “what Whitehead called objective immortality—the memory of human 




The notion of God […], however inferior it may be in clearness to those mathematical notions so 
current in mechanical philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that it guarantees 
an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A world with a God in it to say the last word, 
may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to 
bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and 
shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. […] Materialism means simply the denial 
that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the 
affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope. […] 
Even whilst admitting that spiritualism and materialism make different prophecies of the world’s 
future, you may yourselves pooh-pooh the difference as something so infinitely remote as to mean 
nothing for a sane mind. […] Religious melancholy is not disposed of by a simple flourish of the 
word insanity. The absolute things, the last things, the overlapping things, are the truly 
philosophic concerns; all superior minds feel seriously about them, and the mind with the shortest 
views is simply the mind of the more shallow man.  (P 55–6, bold and italic emphasis added) 
 
These similarities in wording provide only circumstantial evidence that in “The Will to 
Believe” James’s primary concern was already for the ultimate triumph of good in the world and 
with the permanence of human accomplishments rather than for personal immortality. But in 
either case, I believe that the significance of “[t]he second affirmation of religion,” “that we are 
better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true” (WB 30), has far less to do with 
securing the soul’s eternal reward after death than it does with bolstering the subject’s moral 
courage in life. For one thing, it is not clear how securing life after death makes the believer 
“better off even now,” except through the confidence that she has secured it. Even on a 
traditionally theistic interpretation of the first affirmation, the respect in which the believer is 
truly better off now is in the evidence of God’s grace in her life and actions: the virtue that 
(ideally) comes more easily once she has surrendered her will to God and the equanimity with 
which she suffers worldly misfortunes, knowing that everything is ultimately in God’s hands. 
These are the sorts of benefits that James cites in his effort to vindicate religious belief in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience (delivered as the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion at 
the University of Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902). Here his focus has shifted decisively away from 
the content of religious belief and toward its effects on and significance for the individual 




foremost and as a philosopher only secondarily (VRE 12), such a focus is only to be expected. In 
the lecture called “Circumscription of the Topic,” James characterizes the target of his inquiry as 
follows: “Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (VRE 34, original 
emphasis). What should we consider “the divine,” without making it so specific as to exclude 
any of the vast diversity of religious doctrines? 
For one thing, gods are conceived to be first things in the way of being and power. They overarch and 
envelop, and from them there is no escape. What relates to them is the first and last word in the way 
of truth. Whatever then were most primal and enveloping and deeply true might at this rate be treated 
as godlike, and a man’s religion might thus be identified with his attitude, whatever it might be, 
towards what he felt to be the primal truth.  (VRE 36) 
 
But James considers this to be too general, because it permits any “total reaction upon life” (VRE 
36), however cynical or irreverent, to be called religion. So he restricts it: 
There must be something solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude which we denominate 
religious. If glad, it must not grin or snicker; if sad, it must not scream or curse. It is precisely as 
being solemn experiences that I wish to interest you in religious experiences. So I propose—
arbitrarily again, if you please—to narrow our definition once more by saying that the word ‘divine,’ 
as employed therein, shall mean for us not merely the primal and enveloping and real, for that 
meaning if taken without restriction might well prove too broad. The divine shall mean for us only 
such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither 
by a curse nor a jest. (VRE 39) 
 
He elaborates a little later on what he means by “solemn”: 
Solemnity is a hard thing to define abstractly, but certain of its marks are patent enough. A solemn 
state of mind is never crude or simple; it seems to contain a certain measure of its own opposite in 
solution. A solemn joy preserves a sort of bitter in its sweetness; a solemn sorrow is one to which we 
intimately consent.  (VRE 47) 
 
What is the significance of James’s defining religion in this way? The characterization I 
have presented is so far, at least on the surface, purely qualitative. But James’s project is not 
merely to offer “a descriptive survey of […] religious propensities,” as he advertises it at the 




religious experience for human life (VRE 13). This, he says, can be determined by “the way in 
which it works on the whole” (VRE 24), or as he puts it at the beginning of the lectures on the 
topic of “Saintliness,” by its “practical fruits for life” (VRE 210). So it is not surprising that he 
turns quickly from his now suitably narrowed description of what counts as religion to remarks 
about its characteristic function. After all, he says, “It is a good rule in physiology, when we are 
studying the meaning of an organ, to ask after its most peculiar and characteristic sort of 
performance, and to seek its office in that one of its functions which no other organ can possibly 
exert” (VRE 44). What is religion’s distinctive function, according to James? 
[W]e are in the end absolutely dependent on the universe; and into sacrifices and surrenders of some 
sort, deliberately looked at and accepted, we are drawn and pressed as into our only permanent 
positions of repose. Now in those states of mind which fall short of religion [e.g., philosophical 
moralism], the surrender is submitted to as an imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone 
at the very best without complaint. In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and sacrifice are 
positively espoused: even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the happiness may 
increase. Religion thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary; and if it be the only 
agency that can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human faculty stands vindicated 
beyond dispute. It becomes an essential organ of our life, performing a function which no other 
portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill.       
  (VRE 49; emphasis original, bracketed remark added) 
 
 Alongside the shift over the course James’s career from more specific, theistic, and 
supernaturalistic characterizations of religion toward vaguer ones more focused on the human 
aspect, Hollinger (2013) observes a shift from defending the right of individual believers to 
maintain private religious beliefs regardless of the evidence for or against them83 to, essentially, 
making a bet that a certain form of religious belief can survive the kind of rigorous public debate 
to which political and even (in their own arena) scientific views are subject. Although James is 
                                                          
83 Rorty (1997) also emphasizes the importance of the privacy of religious belief to James’s (early) strategy for 
defending it: “It is a consequence of James’s utilitarian view of the nature of obligation that the obligation to justify 
one’s beliefs arises only when one’s habits of action interfere with the fulfillment of others’ needs. Insofar as one is 
engaged in a private project, that obligation lapses. The underlying strategy of James’s utilitarian/pragmatist 
philosophy of religion is to privatize religion. This privatization allows him to construe the supposed tension 





still pursuing the private-belief strategy in many of the essays in the collection (including, 
arguably, the title essay), this defense-in-the-public-square approach makes its first appearance 
in the preface to The Will to Believe and Other Essays (1897): 
After all, though, you will say, Why such an ado about a matter concerning which, however we may 
theoretically differ, we all practically agree? In this age of toleration, no scientist will ever try actively 
to interfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy it quietly with our friends and do not make a 
public nuisance of it in the market-place.84 But it is just on this matter of the marketplace that I think 
the utility of such essays as mine may turn. If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at 
all, then the active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the 
experimental tests by which they are verified, and the only means by which their truth or falsehood 
can be wrought out. The truest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, “works” best; and it can 
be no otherwise with religious hypotheses. Religious history proves that one hypothesis after another 
has worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world […]. Some articles 
of faith, however, have maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more 
vitality to-day than ever before: it is for the “science of religions” to tell us just which hypotheses 
these are. Meanwhile the freest competition of the various faiths with one another, and their openest 
application to life by their several champions, are the most favorable conditions under which the 
survival of the fittest can proceed. They ought therefore not to lie hid each under its bushel, indulged-
in quietly with friends. They ought to live in publicity, vying with each other; and it seems to me that 
(the régime of tolerance once granted, and a fair field shown) the scientist has nothing to fear for his 
own interests from the liveliest possible state of fermentation in the religious world of his time. Those 
faiths will best stand the test which adopt also his hypotheses, and make them integral elements of 
their own. He should welcome therefore every species of religious agitation and discussion, so long as 
he is willing to allow that some religious hypothesis may be true. (WB 8–9) 
 
James expresses a very similar view in the Varieties, suggesting that philosophy can play a role 
in this “science of religions”: 
Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local and the accidental from these definitions. Both 
from dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations. By confronting the spontaneous 
religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines that 
are now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous. (VRE 359) 
 
This proposal shows some curious similarities to both Nietzsche’s gay science and his 
proposed method for creating new values. James’s conception of “experimental tests” of 
religious hypotheses, conducted via “the active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing 
themselves in life” (WB 8), is not unlike the experiments in living according to different values 
                                                          
84 By “actively” I presume James means in some material fashion, in the way that religious regimes have “actively 





that Nietzsche advocates in various sections of The Gay Science (e.g., GS 7, 51, 335). The rather 
martial notion of “the […] competition of the various faiths with one another” through their 
“application to life by their several champions” calls to mind in particular GS 7, which proposes 
that “experimentation would be in order that would allow every kind of heroism to find 
satisfaction—centuries of experimentation that might eclipse all the great projects and sacrifices 
of history to date.”85 The task that James assigns to philosophers, of removing “historic 
incrustations” from religious doctrines and practices (VRE 359) to reduce them to their spiritual 
core, is much like the role that Nietzsche assigns to “philosophical laborers after the noble model 
of Kant and Hegel” (BGE 211). James, like Nietzsche, is concerned that philosophers should 
square their favored rules for living with the results of the best science. But unlike Nietzsche, he 
is not so presumptuous on behalf of philosophy as to suggest that philosophers should instruct 
scientists as to what questions they should investigate; he seems to assume that science will 
proceed independently, and philosophers will simply keep up with its progress insofar as it is 
relevant to various religious hypotheses. 
But the main difference between James’s and Nietzsche’s positions, even in James’s later 
experimentalist period, lies in their assessment of the viability of traditional religious belief. 
Nietzsche might not precisely agree with the dogmatic scientists James opposes that “science has 
already ruled all possible religious hypotheses out of court” (WB 9); perhaps he might favor the 
establishment of some sort of religion of reverence for life or nature conceived as capricious 
goddesses, as in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (II, 10; III, 15), or a religion founded on the ideal of 
affirming the eternal recurrence. But he would reject all the religions there have been so far 
because, as he argues, they have all been beholden to the ascetic ideal (GM III, 28). But as I have 
                                                          
85 James’s admiration for the martial virtues, in spite of his opposition to war, is on display in his essay “The Moral 




suggested in the introduction to Part II and earlier in this section, James has not fully freed 
himself from the assumptions of the ascetic ideal. Although his later characterizations of religion 
do not insist on a supernatural realm to provide meaning in human life and redemption of 
suffering, he still speaks in terms reminiscent of the ascetic ideal when he praises the 
indispensable function of religion: “In the religious life […] surrender and sacrifice are 
positively espoused: even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the happiness may 
increase” (VRE 49). James expresses skepticism and even occasionally horror at some of these 
“unnecessary givings-up” in his lectures on saintliness and its value (see esp. VRE 245–9, 272–
89).86 Nonetheless, James still has great sympathy for the basic spirit of traditional religions: the 
values of altruism, compassion, and self-sacrifice; the longing for a transcendent solution to the 
problem of the meaning of suffering. This is why he imagines a philosophical refinement of 
existing religions, along with practical experimentation with and competition among variations 
thereon, as the way to resolve the question of how human beings ought to live. Nietzsche, 
meanwhile, wants philosophers to invent new values—drawing inspiration from the past in 
certain respects, but making a definitive break with the ascetic and (in his terms) slave values 
that have shaped modern society. 
  
2. The similarities between science and religion 
One of James’s habitual strategies for defending the right to hold religious beliefs is to 
show their similarities both to the ordinary beliefs that guide us through the world and to the 
scientific beliefs of practicing scientists. This latter is especially important rhetorically and 
dialectically, considering that the most vocal opponents of religion, in the late nineteenth century 
                                                          
86 Hollinger (2013: 121–2) quite rightly points out that James’s skeptical attitude is reserved almost entirely for 




as now, tended to rest their arguments on the authority of science. And although James 
acknowledges in the preface to The Will to Believe that “what mankind at large most lacks is 
criticism and caution, not faith,” his arguments are directed at “academic audiences, fed already 
on science,” who suffer from “[p]aralysis of their native capacity for faith […] brought about by 
the notion, carefully instilled, that there is something called scientific evidence by waiting upon 
which they shall escape all danger of shipwreck in regard to truth” (WB 7). 
James argues that the beliefs of religious persons are not so different from those of 
scientists in respect both of the processes by which they are formed and of their claims to 
justification. I will present in turn James’s arguments for each point of similarity. First, I will 
discuss his argument that desire and (as he puts it in “The Will to Believe”) “our passional 
nature” more generally plays a role in the formation of everyday beliefs and scientists’ 
theoretical beliefs as well as religious ones. Then I will turn, specifically, to the central argument 
of “The Will to Believe”: that in a specific type of scenario—which I will call, following others 
in the literature, “will-to-believe cases”—it is not only permissible but (arguably) required to 
form a belief that goes beyond what is supported by the available evidence. I am counting this 
among James’s arguments from the similarity between science and religion because he argues 
that the process of scientific research (as well as ordinary practical life) presents will-to-believe 
cases analogous to the choice to adopt or reject “the religious hypothesis.” Finally, I will present 
James’s case that the genuinely open-minded empiricism which science supposedly embodies 
would take seriously the experiential evidence in favor of the religious hypothesis as well as the 






2.1 The role of desire in belief 
 James often defends religious belief from those who condemn it as mere wishful thinking 
by pointing out how many beliefs generally considered unexceptionable are fixed in part by the 
desires of the believer. James acknowledges in “The Will to Believe” that this will sound 
implausible if we consider, for example, whether we can, “just by willing it, believe that 
Abraham Lincoln’s existence is a myth” (WB 15), or whether a line of reasoning like Pascal’s 
wager can actually convince someone to adopt the tenets of Catholicism (WB 16). But he goes on 
to point out that “[i]t is only our already dead hypotheses”—the ones that we do not even 
consider as possibilities for belief—“that our willing nature is unable to bring to life again. But 
what has made them dead for us is for the most part a previous action of our willing nature” (WB 
18). 
James clarifies that his understanding of “our willing nature” includes “all such factors 
[…] as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of 
our caste and set” (WB 18). We decide which hypotheses seem plausible (i.e., potentially worthy 
of belief) not simply based on the raw evidence, but also in light of the popularity and “prestige” 
of certain hypotheses in our local context (WB 18). As James writes: 
Mr. Balfour gives the name of ‘authority’ to all those influences, born of the intellectual climate, that 
make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead. Here in this room, we all of us believe 
in molecules and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant 
Christianity and the duty of fighting for ‘the doctrine of the immortal Monroe,’ all for no reasons 
worthy of the name.  (WB 18) 
 
While Protestant Christianity may be a live possibility for a bourgeois New Englander of James’s 
milieu, Islam and even Catholicism most likely are not; and this has little to do with the amount 
of evidence for each of these faith systems, or their internal coherence, and much more to do 
with how many respectable people in a believer’s social circle subscribe to them. Even the 




unlikely to be based on the evidence that led scientists to formulate the theories in question, and 
far more likely to be based on the prestige or “authority” of modern science, as popularly 
understood, in their social circle. A member of a rural fundamentalist religious community will 
be much less likely to believe in these theories (or, to choose examples with more contemporary 
relevance, in the theory of evolution or anthropogenic climate change), not so much because they 
have a worse understanding of the available evidence as because the testimony of scientists 
carries much less authority in such communities, and one is more likely to secure the trust and 
respect of one’s peers by disbelieving the theories than by believing them. Thus the range of 
viable candidates for belief is circumscribed (albeit mostly through subconscious processes) by 
our loyalty to the social groups with which we identify and our desire to fit into those groups. 
In particular, James frequently emphasizes the role of emotion and desire in fixing the 
theoretical beliefs of practicing scientists—which, for people like Clifford, provide the paradigm 
of justified, responsibly formed belief. In “The Will to Believe,” James appears to draw a 
contrast between the context of discovery and the context of justification (avant la lettre) and the 
epistemic attitude proper to each.87 “[T]he purely judging mind” in the context of justification 
should, of course, “keep weighing reasons pro et contra with an indifferent hand” until the 
evidence is decisive one way or the other (WB 26). However, James continues: 
For purposes of discovery such indifference is to be less highly recommended, and science would be 
far less advanced than she is if the passionate desires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed 
had been kept out of the game. […] On the other hand, if you want an absolute duffer in an 
investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no interest whatever in its results: he is the 
warranted incapable, the positive fool. The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive 
observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen 
nervousness lest he become deceived. (WB 26) 
 
                                                          
87 Kasser (2015: 327) and Klein (2015: 89) both independently invoke these terms to characterize the distinction 




In an early essay, “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879–80), James even mentions Clifford as an 
example of a scientific thinker who, in spite of his own moral admonitions, has thrown himself 
behind one theory in the absence of evidence so compelling as to command universal assent: 
Faith in a religious dogma for which there is no outward proof, but which we are tempted to postulate 
for our emotional interests […] is branded by Professor Huxley as “the lowest depth of immorality.” 
[…] [Professor Clifford] calls it “guilt” and “sin” to believe even the truth without “scientific 
evidence.” But what is the use of being a genius, unless with the same scientific evidence as other 
men, one can reach more truth than they? Why does Clifford fearlessly proclaim his belief in the 
conscious-automaton theory, although the ‘proofs’ before him are the same which make Mr. Lewes88 
reject it? Why does he believe in primordial units of ‘mind-stuff’ on evidence which would seem 
quite worthless to Professor Bain89? Simply because, like every human being of the slightest mental 
originality, he is peculiarly sensitive to evidence that bears in some one direction. (WB 77) 
 
The suggestion here is that if several individuals with equally acute scientific minds come to 
different theoretical conclusions on the basis of the same body of experimental evidence, some 
factor must be involved beyond their dispassionate assessment of the evidence. “Pretend what we 
may,” James continues, “the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical 
opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion cooperate just as they do in practical affairs; and lucky 
it is if the passion be not something as petty as a love of personal conquest over the philosopher 
across the way” (WB 77). Where the evidence doesn’t tell decisively for one theory over its 
rivals, a truly neutral evaluator would suspend judgment. It must be “will, taste, [or] passion” 
that determines which a given thinker will support. 
In “Is Life Worth Living?” (1895), James extends this point about particular scientific 
theories to the foundation of the whole scientific enterprise. He once more challenges the notion 
that emotion and desire should play no role in forming beliefs with the following remark: 
Is it not sheer dogmatic folly to say that our inner interests can have no real connection with the 
forces that the hidden world may contain? In other cases divination based on inner interests have 
proved prophetic enough. Take science itself! Without an imperious inner demand on our part for 
ideal logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never have attained to proving that such 
harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world. Hardly a law 
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has been established in science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often with 
sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. (WB 51) 
 
Although he does not use the term here, what James appears to mean by “divination based on 
inner interests” that “proved prophetic” is a faith that has been subsequently vindicated by the 
evidence. In the previous passage from “The Sentiment of Rationality,” James strongly implies a 
comparison between “faith in a religious dogma” and scientists’ beliefs in controversial theories; 
and in the passage quoted from “The Will to Believe,” he explicitly refers to the favored 
hypotheses of interested scientific investigators as their “faiths” (WB 26). In “Is Life Worth 
Living?”, James says that modern science “began with Galileo” (WB 50). The above quotation 
from the same essay suggests that he takes it to have begun, more precisely, with Galileo’s faith 
that, in the terms of his famous dictum, the book of nature is written in the language of 
mathematics—a faith based on a desire (“an imperious inner demand”) to find “mathematical 
harmonies […] hidden between all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world” (WB 
51). But until modern science began uncovering a wealth of mathematical laws, it could only be 
unproven faith in their existence that led anyone to look for them. 
In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” James offers the following definition: “Faith means 
belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible” (WB 76). On the face 
of it, this definition seems wildly over-permissive. Doubt is theoretically possible about almost 
everything; does this mean that nearly all of our beliefs count as faiths? The wide reach of this 
definition may be a direct response to the stringency of the epistemic standards proposed by 
Clifford, whom James is already engaging as one of his main opponents. Here, as in “The Will to 
Believe,” James seems to be interpreting Clifford’s Principle more strictly than Clifford actually 
meant it. There, as noted in Chapter 2, James took “sufficient evidence” to mean “coercive 




appears to read the “believing on insufficient evidence” condemned by Clifford as “believing 
when doubt is still theoretically possible.” Klein (2015) suggests, following other commentators, 
that Clifford’s Principle is more reasonably and charitably construed to hold that “one is 
obligated to proportion the strength of one’s belief to the available evidence” (76, n. 6). 
However, it is not completely clear what James means by “theoretically possible.” The 
interpretation that first occurs to a contemporary reader—that someone looking very hard (some 
intellectually over-scrupulous philosopher, or a Pyrrhonian skeptic) could find grounds for 
doubt, but an ordinary person likely would not—is not anachronistic; the use of the word 
“theoretically” to mean “hypothetically” or “in theory” (as opposed to “actually” or “in 
practice”) was current in James’s time.90 However, he may have meant that doubt is still possible 
on theoretical grounds, i.e., as far as the evidence is concerned, while it may not be possible for 
practical or emotional reasons. 
The focus of the passage from “The Sentiment of Rationality” quoted above suggests that 
what James has in mind are cases where the evidence is not sufficiently strong or unequivocal to 
compel every reasonable assessor to come to the same conclusion. In such cases, doubt is not 
only theoretically possible (in the sense of hypothetically), but quite natural and probably 
warranted—especially in situations like the ones James describes, where the parties to the 
disagreement are all knowledgeable about the topic at issue and skilled in scientific methods of 
interpreting experimental evidence. Although doubt is possible on theoretical grounds, in the 
sense explained, people will nonetheless form beliefs for non-theoretical reasons: professional 
advancement, loyalty, aesthetic preference. Faith, then, would be a matter of committing oneself 
                                                          




to the theory that seems most plausible, and which may even seem completely compelling from 
one’s own standpoint, and being prepared to defend it against others who believe differently. 
James may also be using a strong enough notion of “doubt” that it is not theoretically 
possible to doubt everything, even if he does mean “theoretically” in the colloquial sense. In 
“The Fixation of Belief” (1877), C.S. Peirce characterizes doubt as “an uneasy and dissatisfied 
state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief” (CP 5.372). He 
makes a point of repudiating the philosophical conceit that everything is open to doubt: 
Some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only necessary to utter a question 
[…] and have even recommended us to begin our studies with questioning everything! But the mere 
putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after 
belief. There must be a real or living doubt, and without all this, discussion is idle.   
  (Peirce, CP 5.376) 
 
If James is appealing to Peirce’s understanding of doubt, then what he could mean by “faith” is 
settling on a belief when it is still possible—either for the subject herself, or for an equally 
reasonable subject with the same evidence—to remain in the “uneasy and dissatisfied state” that 
Peirce describes. This would be a much narrower construal of faith, especially if it is possible for 
the believing subject to remain in Peircean doubt; in that case, an element of will would be 
involved in the decision to rest content with a particular belief rather than continuing to consider 
the evidence or gather more. 
 Whatever James means by “doubt” or by “theoretically possible,” his definition of “faith” 
must be able to encompass a significant example that James cites in “The Sentiment of 
Rationality,” one even more basic and foundational to the scientific enterprise than Galileo’s 
faith in mathematical harmonies: 
The necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude is strongly insisted on by the scientific 
philosophers of the present day; but by a singularly arbitrary caprice they say that it is only legitimate 
in the interests of one particular proposition—the proposition, namely, that the course of nature is 
uniform. That nature will follow tomorrow the same laws that she follows today is, they all admit, a 




or assume it. As Helmholtz says: “Hier gilt nur der eine Rath: vertraue und handle! [Here only one 
piece of advice is valid: trust and act!]” And Professor Bain urges: “Our only error is in proposing to 
give any reason or justification of the postulate, or to treat it as otherwise than begged at the very 
outset.” (WB 76–7) 
 
In “The Ethics of Belief,” Clifford permits this assumption as the only principle based on which 
we can make inferences about things outside our experience: “We may go beyond experience by 
assuming that what we do not know is like what we do know; or, in other words, we may add to 
our experience on the assumption of a uniformity in nature” (Clifford 1999 [1877]: 93). He 
declines to discuss “[w]hat precisely this uniformity is” (93) or how the assumption is justified 
(which Bain, apparently, would consider wise). 
 Why does James (as well as Helmholtz and Bain) consider the belief in the uniformity of 
nature a faith, about which “doubt is still theoretically possible”? This view can be traced back to 
Hume’s investigation in his Treatise of Human Nature of how we are justified in making 
inferences about the future based on past experience. Hume argues that we can have neither 
demonstrative nor probable knowledge “that instances, of which we have had no experience, 
must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues 
always uniformly the same” (THN I.iii.6, 89). We cannot prove this principle of the uniformity of 
nature (or “PUN,” as it is commonly abbreviated) demonstratively (by which Hume means a 
priori, with the force of logical necessity) because “[w]e can at least conceive a change in the 
course of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible” 
(I.iii.6, 89). But we cannot even establish PUN as “probable” knowledge—i.e., that while it is 
not a necessary truth, it is true as a matter of fact—because any such argument would be circular. 
All reasoning about matters of fact, as opposed to “relations of ideas” (definitional or conceptual 
truths), must have some basis in experience, which is either present (sensation) or past 




inferences have been borne out by events; that things which had always occurred together in the 
more distant past have continued occurring together into the more recent past) to the claim that 
the course of nature will always be uniform in the future, we must already presuppose PUN (see 
THN I.iii.6, 89–90). All of our scientific reasoning relies on the assumption of PUN: when we 
posit a causal relation between two events, we are claiming not only that they always have 
occurred together in the past, but that they will always continue to occur together in the future; 
when we establish a principle as a law of nature, we claim that natural phenomena will continue 
to obey it forever, not only that they always have obeyed it hitherto. But PUN itself cannot be 
proven, either a priori or by experience; we must simply presuppose it. 
 This is a case in which doubt is possible both in the colloquial sense of “theoretically” 
(i.e., it is possible for some hypothetical over-scrupulous philosopher to doubt), and on 
theoretical grounds: we lack any theoretical proof for PUN, either demonstrative or probable (in 
Hume’s terms), a priori or empirical (to use Kantian language). In fact, no amount of experience 
could ever count as sufficient evidence for the principle, because it only counts as evidence at all 
on the prior assumption that the principle is true. Why, then, do scientists believe it to the extent 
that they base all their scientific practice on the assumption? Why, in particular, does Clifford 
appear to exempt it from his principle that one should believe nothing for which one does not 
have sufficient evidence? 
One might suggest that Clifford and other scientists do not, in fact, believe in the 
uniformity of nature, and that their assumption of it has some epistemic status different from 
belief. Bas van Fraassen’s notion of acceptance—an attitude that involves the willingness to act 
as one would if one believed that some proposition were true, without actually believing it—is 




Wright’s analysis of “acceptance of a proposition,” as “a more general attitude than belief […] 
which comes apart from belief in cases where one is warranted in acting on the assumption that P 
or taking it for granted that P or trusting that P for reasons that do not bear on the likely truth of 
P” (2004: 177), may also be helpful. Wright argues that one is warranted in accepting that P, i.e., 
acting as if one believed that P, in cases where so acting is a dominant strategy: a course of 
action that will turn out no worse than any of the alternatives under any circumstances, and could 
go much better under some.91 Wright even discusses PUN as an example of a proposition that we 
are warranted in accepting on the grounds that it is a dominant strategy: using inductive 
reasoning is clearly a good strategy in case nature is uniform; and if it is not, then we won’t be 
able to predict the course of nature reliably by any means, so inductive reasoning is no worse 
than any other strategy.92 
So Clifford may be able to defend himself against the charge that he disobeys his own 
strictures by believing in PUN: he can claim that he does not believe it, he simply accepts it, i.e., 
assumes it for the purposes of action. Toward the end of “The Ethics of Belief,” he hedges in a 
way that may indicate such a position: 
Are we then bound to believe that nature is absolutely and universally uniform? Certainly not, we 
have no right to believe anything of this kind. The rule only tells us that in forming beliefs which go 
beyond our experience we may make the assumption that nature is practically uniform so far as we 
are concerned. Within the range of human action and verification, we may form, by help of this 
assumption, actual beliefs; beyond it, only those hypotheses which serve for the more accurate asking 
of questions. (Clifford 1999 [1877]: 95–6) 
 
But Clifford, as noted, does not explain why we are permitted to make this assumption and use it 
not only to act, but to form beliefs. Do beliefs formed on the basis of a warranted acceptance 
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inherit its warrant? If so, are they warranted as full-fledged beliefs, or only as acceptances? If we 
take seriously Hume’s challenge to PUN’s justification, then Clifford’s Principle, when followed 
consistently, may not even permit us to believe the results of the best science. 
In any case, James probably would not be satisfied by this van Fraassen- and Wright-
inspired defense, since he understood belief to be tied up very closely with propensities to act, as 
he indicates in the section of The Principles of Psychology (1890) on the topic of Belief: 
What characterizes both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation, through the advent 
of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory ideas. 
When this is the case, motor effects are apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, 
characterized by repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately connected with subsequent 
practical activity. (PP 913–4) 
 
In this he follows Peirce, who wrote in “The Fixation of Belief” (1877): “The feeling of 
believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit 
which will determine our actions” (CP 5.371). James’s definition of faith in “The Sentiment of 
Rationality,” which I quoted above, continues: “as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may 
say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us 
in advance” (WB 76). The way James sees it, insofar as Clifford, Huxley, and the other prophets 
of scientific rationality act as if they believed that the course of nature is uniform—which they 
do by practicing science and endorsing its latest findings—they display a faith in the uniformity 
of nature. All scientific belief and practice, James wishes us to realize, rests on a faith. In this 
respect, the practitioners and devotees of science are no more epistemically virtuous than 
religious believers. 
2.2 Will-to-believe cases 
 Many of the arguments discussed in subsection 2.1 are either supplemental to the main 
argument of “The Will to Believe” or, in some sense, preparatory to it—considering that “The 




Believe,” but had the same goal: the defense of religious belief against scientistic challengers. 
James’s point is not simply that beliefs of all kinds are, as a matter of fact, partly determined by 
emotion and desire. Rather, the thesis he argues for is, as he states it: “Our passional nature not 
only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine 
option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds” (WB 20). The condition he 
specifies is what is meant by a “will-to-believe case.” In this section I propose an interpretation 
of James’s argument that takes inspiration from that offered by Alexander Klein in “Science, 
Religion, and ‘The Will to Believe’” (2015) while differing from his reading in a few key ways. 
 What is a “genuine option,” for James? An option is a choice between two incompatible 
hypotheses “proposed to our belief” (WB 14); a genuine option is one that is living, forced, and 
momentous. An option is living just in case both of the hypotheses under consideration are live: 
each “appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed” (WB 14). This specification 
rules out cases where it is impossible to will oneself to believe something, such as the example of 
believing that Abraham Lincoln did not exist or the naïve interpretation of Pascal’s wager, 
discussed in the previous subsection. An option is forced if there is no way to avoid choosing 
between the proposed hypotheses. “Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with 
no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind” (WB 15). An option between 
hypotheses of the form p and not-p, where the alternatives are not only mutually exclusive but 
exhaustive, is forced when it is not practically possible to suspend judgment. Here James’s 
action-focused (which is to say, pragmatic) understanding of belief is crucial. If the belief in p or 
not-p has any consequences for action, at least in the near term, the choice is forced. Klein (2015: 
76) points to an evocative example that James gives in “Is Life Worth Living?”: “If I doubt the 




50–1). James gives this example by way of illustrating the general claim that “[o]ur only way 
[…] of doubting, or refusing to believe, that a certain thing is, is continuing to act as if it 
were not” (WB 50). Of course the central example he has in mind is that of believing that God is; 
but the principle has more general application, as I shall discuss. Finally, an option is momentous 
if the belief and the actions that follow from it will make an important difference to the subject’s 
life. 
 What does James mean by the condition that the issue “cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds”? He is not, as it may at first appear, limiting his thesis to intractable 
metaphysical questions, like the existence of God or an afterlife or free will,93 which “by their 
nature” cannot be decided by empirical evidence because there cannot be any. Nor is he claiming 
that the question of God’s existence can never be decided “on intellectual grounds,” considering 
that in the preface to The Will to Believe and again in The Varieties of Religious Experience, he 
suggests a way that it might eventually be adjudicated. Rather, James has in mind situations in 
which a decision must be made before it is even possible to obtain the kind of evidence that 
would settle the question. 
 Klein (2015: 73–4) identifies two distinct points of disagreement in the literature over the 
interpretation of James’s thesis in “The Will to Believe.” The two questions on which various 
commentators disagree are these: 
1) Is James proposing (a) a unitary set of epistemic standards governing both science and 
religion, or (b) a “separate spheres” doctrine according to which religious belief obeys 
different epistemic rules than scientific belief? 
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2) Does James consider the subject’s interests and desires to be (a) evidence for the 
proposition she wishes to be true or (b) a non-evidential tie-breaker in cases that evidence 
cannot decide? 
Klein identifies Misak (2013) as answering both questions with option (a)—thus portraying 
James as a kind of revised evidentialist who agrees with Clifford that belief should not go 
beyond the evidence, but disagrees on what counts as evidence—while Hollinger (2013) answers 
both with (b), giving an anti-evidentialist reading. Rorty (1997) agrees with Hollinger on both 
questions. 
However, this division does not quite capture the range of interpretive options. In many 
of the examples that James presents as will-to-believe cases, the subject’s belief that a state of 
affairs obtains plays a role in bringing about that state of affairs. Gale (1999: 103) refers to this, 
appropriately enough, as the “belief-helping-to-make-true condition”; Aikin (2014: 151) calls it 
“doxastic efficacy,” which comes in the strong version of “doxastic preconditions” (i.e., the 
subject’s prior belief is necessary for realizing the state of affairs) and the weaker version of 
“doxastic contribution”; Klein (2015: 103) calls the relevant states of affairs “faith-dependent 
facts.” I will focus on three clear examples that James offers, which I will call the Mountain 
Climber case, the New Friendship case, and the Train Robbery case. 
Although it is probably the best known of James’s examples of doxastic efficacy, the 
Mountain Climber case does not occur in “The Will to Believe,” but in its precursor, “Is Life 
Worth Living?” 
[O]ften enough our faith beforehand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result 
come true. Suppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain, and have worked yourself into a 
position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Have faith that you can successfully make it, 
and your feet are nerved to its accomplishment. But mistrust yourself […] and you will hesitate so 
long that, at last, all unstrung and trembling, and launching yourself in a moment of despair, you roll 




James hints already in this essay that the example “belongs to an enormous class” of 
similar ones, but does not provide more of its kind until “The Will to Believe.” The first is the 
New Friendship case: 
Turn now from these wide questions of good to a certain class of questions of fact, questions 
concerning personal relations, states of mind between one man and another. Do you like me or not?—
for example. Whether you do or not depends, in countless instances, on whether I meet you half-way, 
am willing to assume that you must like me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith 
on my part in your liking’s existence is in such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand 
aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence, until you shall have done 
something apt, as the absolutists say, ad extorquendum assensum meum [to force my assent], ten to 
one your liking never comes. (WB 28) 
 
James goes on from this case of individual social interaction to make a point about the prior trust 
required for social cooperation more generally, then makes this point especially vivid with an 
example in which this trust is lacking—the Train Robbery case (the relevant text is italicized): 
A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to 
his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired 
result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure 
consequence of the pre-cursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, 
an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without 
which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted. A whole train of passengers 
(individually brave enough) will be looted by a few highwaymen, simply because the latter can count 
on one another, while each passenger fears that if he makes a movement of resistance, he will be shot 
before anyone else backs him up. If we believed that the whole car-full would rise at once with us, we 
should each severally rise, and train-robbing would never even be attempted.        (WB 29, my italics) 
 
James states the upshot of all these examples as follows: 
There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its 
coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should 
say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the ‘lowest kind of immorality’ into which a 
thinking being can fall. Yet such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate 
our lives! (WB 29, original emphasis) 
 
It is not clear whether James intends the dependence of facts on prior faith to be a 
condition on all will-to-believe cases and play a crucial role in securing the “lawfulness” of 
believing in excess of the evidence. This question also divides commentators: 




The answer to this question is closely connected to the answer to question (2). Both Gale (1999: 
103) and Aikin (2014: 157–8) answer “yes” to question (3), but they differ on question (2), 
which leads them to very different conclusions about the effectiveness of James’s argument. 
Gale takes the subject’s interests as non-evidential, and sees doxastic efficacy, or belief-helping-
to-make-true, as the key to making James’s argument for justifying “epistemically nonwarranted 
belief” work (1999: 104). But Aikin takes the doxastic efficacy requirement to nullify James’s 
disagreement with Clifford and turn him into an evidentialist, precisely because efficacious 
beliefs themselves provide evidence in favor of the proposition believed by increasing its 
likelihood (2014: 159). Klein (2015: 103) holds that the existence of faith-dependent facts 
“actually provides a separate argument for the permissibility of religious belief,” independent of 
the argument regarding genuine options that evidence cannot decide by the time the subject must 
act. 
 Of course, the answer to question (3) is also closely connected with the interpretation of 
James’s “religious hypothesis”: because the aim of “The Will to Believe” is to justify belief in 
the religious hypothesis, doxastic efficacy can only be seen as a necessary feature of will-to-
believe cases if the religious hypothesis is interpreted in such a way that it could be a faith-
dependent fact. Both Gale (1999: 112) and Aikin (2014: 161) interpret James’s religious 
hypothesis as the non-supernatural “good will win out in the long run,” which is faith-dependent 
in that believing it can help bolster the spirits and courage of moral agents, enabling them to do 
more to promote good.94 If one moral agent for whom this is the case believes it despite the 
absence of compelling evidence (to use James’s strong interpretation of Clifford’s Principle), or 
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believes it more strongly than is warranted by the available evidence (on the more moderate 
interpretation), this will increase the probability that the religious hypothesis will turn out to be 
true only very slightly; but if a large number of moral agents do (assuming that their moral 
beliefs are mostly in alignment), it will more significantly increase the probability. However, it is 
harder to see how the existence of a supernatural God or an afterlife could depend on human 
subjects’ belief therein. As Klein (2015: 103, n. 51) points out, James does entertain such an idea 
in “Is Life Worth Living?”: 
I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the 
personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may 
draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity. (WB 55) 
 
However, that would be a strange and highly unorthodox conception of God, and unlikely to 
appeal to the kind of person who is seeking justification for (continued) belief in God. 
 The interpretation I propose draws on Klein’s (2015) very convincing argument that 
James regards scientific hypotheses as posing will-to-believe cases—not for an observer 
considering the experimental evidence in the context of justification, but for a research scientist 
in the context of discovery. As we have seen in section 2.1, James often tries to legitimate 
religious beliefs by drawing analogies with scientific beliefs that his science-admiring opponent 
would surely consider legitimate. Klein’s thesis is that the core argument of “The Will to 
Believe” is an instance of the same strategy, and we should therefore interpret James as 
endorsing a single epistemic standard for both science and religion. As Klein argues, “James 
thinks good scientific methodology permits us (in special cases) to allow belief to run ahead of 
the evidence” (Klein 2015: 87)—namely, when a researcher is embarking on a new research 
program in an area where there is as yet very little experimental evidence. At the beginning of 




nature”: a hunch, a flash of inspiration, aesthetic preference. James characterizes the production 
of scientific hypotheses this way in The Principles of Psychology: 
Every scientific conception is in the first instance a ‘spontaneous variation’ in someone’s brain. For 
one that proves useful and applicable there are a thousand that perish through their worthlessness. 
Their genesis is strictly akin to that of the flashes of poetry and sallies of wit to which the instable 
brain-paths equally give rise. But whereas the poetry and wit […] are their ‘own excuse for being,’ 
and have to run the gauntlet of no farther test, the ‘scientific’ conceptions must prove their worth by 
being ‘verified.’ This test, however, is the cause of their preservation, not that of their production; 
and one might as well account for the origin of Artemus Ward’s jokes by the ‘cohesion’ of subjects 
with predicates in proportion to the ‘persistence of the outer relations’ to which they ‘correspond’ as 
to treat the genesis of scientific conceptions in the same ponderously unreal way. (PP 1232–3) 
 
 The situation of a scientist beginning a new research program in a new and still-contested 
area of inquiry fits the criteria for a will-to-believe case as laid out above. If there are two or 
more candidates that all seem reasonably plausible, given the data that the new line of inquiry is 
intended to explain, the choice between the rival hypotheses is a living option. Assuming that the 
scientist is invested in the question (perhaps she has received a grant to study it), she must strike 
off in some direction or other, so the option is forced.95 The hypothesis she chooses will 
determine the direction of her career at least in the near future, perhaps for many years, perhaps 
even for the rest of her working life, so the choice is momentous. The question “cannot by its 
nature be decided on intellectual grounds” (WB 20) at the time when the scientist must make a 
decision: she needs to choose a hypothesis to pursue in order to design the very kinds of 
experiments that would enable her to answer the question as to its truth, or the likelihood of its 
truth relative to competing hypotheses. 
Two questions will no doubt occur to the reader at this point. First: does a researcher 
really need to believe her hypothesis in order to design experiments based on it—as opposed to 
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of “The Will to Believe,” quoting from Fitzjames Stephen: “‘We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling 
snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand 
still, we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road, we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know 




just “accepting” it, in van Fraassen’s sense (i.e., acting, at least in the research context, as if she 
believed it to be true, without actually believing it)? Second: would the researcher count as being 
in a will-to-believe scenario if we include doxastic contribution (i.e., the subject’s belief helping 
to make the believed proposition true) as one of the necessary criteria? 
I propose a take on James’s thesis in “The Will to Believe” that enables us to answer both 
questions with a conditional “yes.” My proposal also enables James to unify the religious case 
that is the target of his argument with both the scientific and social trust cases that he leverages 
as examples, and to respond to the moderate version of the Cliffordian evidentialist who holds 
only that “one is obligated to proportion the strength of one’s belief to the available evidence,” 
not (as James would have it) that one is permitted to believe only in the face of coercive 
evidence. 
James’s Thesis, Reinterpreted: A subject faced with a genuine option is permitted  to 
believe in a favored hypothesis to a greater extent than the available evidence supports when 
this is necessary for obtaining the kind of evidence that would confirm it. 
James often speaks as if belief is an all-or-nothing matter, but he does indicate in “The Will to 
Believe” that he recognizes that there can be degrees of belief or of credence that falls short of 
belief: “deadness and liveness in an hypothesis […] are measured by [one’s] willingness to act. 
The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that 
means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all” 
(WB 14). To believe in a hypothesis to a greater extent than the available evidence supports is to 
be more willing to act on it, or to be willing to act on it in higher-stakes situations, than is 




 Considering that James connects belief so closely with the propensity to act (while 
stopping just short of defining belief in terms of propensity to act), he is, as I remarked in the 
previous subsection, unlikely to recognize a distinction between belief and acceptance. 
Acceptance, he might say, is just belief that the subject does not want to admit as such, perhaps 
because she cannot defend it on strictly evidentialist grounds. But supposing James did recognize 
the distinction, or setting aside his views on the nature of belief, we can still defend James’s 
thesis by recalling that, as Gale (1999: 109) puts it, “a will-to-believe option is relative to a 
person at a time because human psychology is variable”—in regard not only to which 
propositions are live and momentous, but also to whether a person is capable of acting as if she 
believed a proposition without actually believing it. A subject who can derive all the practical 
benefits of believing while withholding what she (or van Fraassen) calls “belief” would not be in 
a will-to-believe situation, as characterized in my reinterpretation of James’s thesis: it would not 
be necessary to believe the proposition in order to obtain the relevant evidence. 
 The condition that I specified in addition to James’s criteria for a “genuine option”—that 
belief is necessary for obtaining the kind of evidence that would confirm the proposition in 
question—is weaker and more general than “doxastic contribution” or “belief-helping-to-make-
true.” Let us call this condition doxastic evidence-generation. Doxastic contribution, it turns out, 
is a special case of doxastic evidence-generation, because helping to make a proposition true is 
one way of bringing forth evidence that supports it. It was not clear whether all of the cases that 
interest James—including scientific hypotheses and the religious hypothesis—involve doxastic 
contribution, but I think we can safely say that they all involve doxastic evidence-generation. 
Believing her favored hypothesis—not too firmly or dogmatically, but in preference to other 




research scientist to design an experimental program whose results can provide either provisional 
confirmation or decisive disconfirmation of the hypothesis. Believing the religious hypothesis, 
according to the non-supernatural construal that good will triumph in the long run, makes it 
slightly more likely that it will turn out to be true by encouraging the subject in her pursuit of 
good aims; but by the same token it helps to furnish evidence of its truth, both by making the 
subject more likely to encounter moral successes (her own) and by making her more attentive to 
the good in the world. On the more traditionally theistic construal of the religious hypothesis, it 
would be very odd to think that a subject’s belief helped to make it true (although, as we have 
seen, James did entertain that possibility). It is far less odd to think that a subject’s belief gives 
her access to evidence for the religious hypothesis by making her open to religious experience, as 
James suggests in “The Will to Believe”: 
The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any relation that may be 
possible from person to person might be possible here. […] We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion 
to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless 
we met the hypothesis half-way. To take a trivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of 
gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one’s word 
without proof, would cut himself off by such churlishness from all the social rewards that a more 
trusting spirit would earn—so here, one who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to 
make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from 
his only opportunity of making the gods’ acquaintance. (WB 31) 
 
 Here, as we see, James is appealing to an analogy with the social trust cases he described 
earlier in the essay, especially New Friendship. Insofar as these are cases of doxastic 
contribution, they are also cases of doxastic evidence-generation. Some of these social cases can 
illustrate why James is on firmer ground if we place the emphasis on the role of “over-belief” 
(James’s term for a belief that goes beyond what the evidence supports) in generating evidence 
for the proposition rather than contributing to its truth, and if we speak of believing to a greater 
extent than is supported by the evidence rather than believing, tout court, without sufficient 




relationship where trust has been broken. In either case, it does not make sense to have full belief 
right away that the other person is worthy of trust or (in New Friendship) that they will return the 
subject’s liking. Instead, it is reasonable to extend a little more belief than warranted by the 
available evidence—which is virtually none, in New Friendship, and the experience of past 
betrayal in Rebuilding Trust—in order to invite the other person to provide further evidence that 
they are trustworthy or open to friendship. If they do provide such evidence, the subject takes 
that into consideration and then, once more, extends her belief a little farther than the (now more 
plentiful) evidence warrants, providing another opportunity for the other person to supply more 
evidence of their trustworthiness. In the ideal case, the positive feedback loop continues until a 
firm friendship is formed, or a strong trusting relationship restored. However, focusing on the 
fact that the subject is over-extending her belief not only in order to increase the likelihood of its 
truth but to gather evidence for it reminds us that if no such evidence is forthcoming—if the 
other person remains indifferent, in New Friendship, or betrays her again, in Rebuilding Trust—
then at some point she is no longer justified in believing beyond the evidence: her over-belief has 
proven useless as an evidence-generating mechanism. 
In just the same way, a researcher whose experiments fail to yield evidence in favor of 
her guiding hypothesis, or even produce contrary evidence, is required to abandon it and try 
pursuing another. And on this interpretation, the religious hypothesis, too, is vulnerable to defeat 
by the evidence—which seems to be the direction James was moving in through his later works, 
including The Varieties of Religious Experience and Pragmatism. The point at which belief in 
the religious hypothesis ceases to generate evidence for it will be subject-relative, as with any 
will-to-believe case, and different subjects may hold out longer before determining that no 




their trust. But this is also true in the social and scientific cases, and it may be just as difficult to 
specify the point when a subject should give up trust in a partner, the possibility of a friendship, 
or a scientific hypothesis. 
 It is important to remark that James’s argument in “The Will to Believe” does not 
presuppose the pragmatist conception of truth outlined in Chapter 2. This may be because James 
had not yet arrived at his mature pragmatist doctrine (“The Will to Believe” was written ten 
years before Pragmatism); or it may be, as Gale (1999: 95) contends, that James was avoiding 
making any unnecessarily controversial assumptions in his premises in order to avoid alienating 
his audience from the outset. If James had been assuming the pragmatist conception of truth, the 
argument would look very different. He would not have said that “in our dealings with objective 
nature we obviously are recorders, not makers, of the truth” (WB 26), because according to 
pragmatism, human beings do play a role in making the truth even in the realm of natural 
science. The truth is what epistemic subjects will converge on in the long run, but where we end 
up will surely depend, to some degree, on how we got there, on which theories and conceptions 
won out at earlier stages of inquiry. According to this picture, there is an element of doxastic 
contribution every time a subject forms a belief: her believing it increases the likelihood, 
however slightly, that it will be part of the final consensus. If the belief runs contrary to sensory 
evidence, it will not go very far. But pursuing one scientific hypothesis as opposed to another, 
when either (given suitable refinement) might have worked just as well, can have the effect of 
ensuring that that hypothesis, or its descendant, ends up in the final collection of theories. And 
persisting in believing in God—if the belief is never contradicted by experience, and especially if 
it makes believers more successful in their moral projects—also increases the likelihood that 




2.3 Open-minded empiricism 
 In his argument against Clifford’s Principle in “The Will to Believe,” James appeals to a 
distinction in epistemic attitudes between what he calls absolutism and empiricism. 
We may talk of the empiricist way and of the absolutist way of believing in truth. The absolutists in 
this matter say that we not only can attain to knowing truth, but we can know when we have attained 
to knowing it; whilst the empiricists think that although we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know 
when. To know is one thing, and to know for certain that we know is another. One may hold to the 
first being possible without the second; hence the empiricists and the absolutists, although neither of 
them is a sceptic in the usual philosophic sense of the term, show very different degrees of dogmatism 
in their lives. (WB 20–21) 
 
This is, as I remarked in Chapter 2, a very odd definition of empiricism, which is more 
standardly understood as the doctrine that all knowledge comes from experience. What James 
labels “empiricism” here is better known as fallibilism. But what the two doctrines have in 
common is the attitude that we are epistemically at the mercy of the outside world: we must 
always be ready for the possibility that a new experience will overthrow the conceptions that had 
been constructed from previous experience, along with an inevitable admixture of human 
imagination and prejudice. 
 Officially, as James notes (WB 21), empiricism is the epistemic outlook of the modern 
sciences. But James often points out that the most outspoken champions of the scientific 
outlook—especially those who condemn or ridicule religion and its adherents in the name of 
science—are themselves inconsistent in their empiricism:  
The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on reflection: when left to their instincts, they 
dogmatize like infallible popes. When the Cliffords tell us how sinful it is to be Christians on such 
“insufficient evidence,” insufficiency is really the last thing they have in mind. For them the evidence 
is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way. They believe so completely in an anti-christian 
order of the universe that there is no living option: Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start. 
  (WB 21–2) 
 
The hypocrisy of which James accuses Clifford and his allies is that they disguise their own 
brand of dogmatism—their firm belief in “an anti-christian order of the universe” (which James 




of withholding belief from a proposition until it is supported by ample empirical evidence. But 
James suspects that they would not be open to any experiential evidence that challenges their 
atheistic, usually materialistic worldview. As he says a few pages earlier: 
Why do so few “scientists” even look at the evidence for telepathy, so called? Because they think, as 
a leading biologist, now dead, once said to me, that even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to 
band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature and all 
sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits. But if this very man had 
been shown something which as a scientist he might do with telepathy, he might not only have 
examined the evidence, but even have found it good enough. This very law which the logicians would 
impose upon us—if I may give the name of logicians to those who would rule out our willing nature 
here—is based on nothing but their own natural wish to exclude all elements for which they, in their 
professional quality of logicians, can find no use. (WB 19) 
 
It seems to me that this “leading biologist,” if James is reporting his views correctly, 
simply lacked imagination if he was so convinced that telepathy would undo the uniformity of 
nature; surely inventive scientists could figure out the patterns according to which it operates and 
integrate it into a broader understanding of the natural world. More likely what he meant was 
that it would undermine the materialistic or, more precisely, mechanistic understanding of the 
world that, as we saw in Chapter 3, was very popular with certain late nineteenth-century 
upholders of the hegemony of science. James might well have pointed out that the real danger in 
evidence for telepathy (or any of the other objects of the “psychical research” of which James 
was a great proponent96) was not that “scientists [could] not carry on their pursuits” (WB 19) at 
all, but that they could not carry on their pursuits in exactly the same way. Here Nietzsche’s 
words are apropos: 
That the only justifiable interpretation of the world should be one in which you are justified because 
one can continue to work and do research scientifically in your sense (you mean, mechanistically?)—
an interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, touching, and nothing more—
that is a crudity and a naïveté […] (GS 373) 
 
                                                          
96 He was a founding member of the American Society for Psychical Research, and an entire volume of the Harvard 




 In the preface to The Will to Believe (1897), James calls his own attitude “radical 
empiricism,”97 and contrasts it as follows with other attitudes that go under the name of 
empiricism: 
Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I should call it that of radical 
empiricism, in spite of the fact that such brief nicknames are nowhere more misleading than in 
philosophy. I say “empiricism,” because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions 
concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and 
I say “radical,” because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of 
the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific 
naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to 
square. (WB 5) 
 
What James means by “monism” is (as he characterizes it in Lecture IV of Pragmatism, “The 
One and the Many”) roughly the idea that everything in the world can be unified in a single 
theory: that it is all ultimately the same kind of thing (be it matter or thought) and follows the 
same set of laws. As a radical empiricist, James is open to the idea that not all parts of the 
universe can be brought under the same laws.98 This is not to say that James thinks we should 
give up looking for a unifying theory; he describes monism (using a Kantian term) as a 
“Grenzbegriff,” a boundary or limit concept that can be used to guide inquiry. Theoretical unity 
is, for James, an ideal, not a given; and it is certainly not permissible to ignore experiential 
evidence in order to preserve a supposedly achieved unity. 
 James specifies in the preface to Pragmatism that his pragmatism is logically independent 
of his radical empiricism, and one can accept one doctrine while rejecting the other (P 6). 
Nonetheless, they share a spirit of openness to evidence of all kinds, even from unexpected 
sources. In Lecture II of Pragmatism James contrasts his pragmatism with what he is calling 
                                                          
97 James continued to use this term for his epistemological view throughout his later writings. A volume called 
Essays in Radical Empiricism was published in 1912, after James’s death, by James’s student and biographer Ralph 
Barton Perry, based on a table of contents that James wrote down under that title in 1907 (see Bowers 1976: 203–8). 





“empiricism” for polemical reasons, but by which he clearly means “the half-way empiricism 
that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism” (WB 5): 
You see by this what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator and reconciler and said, 
borrowing the word from Papini, that she ‘unstiffens’ our theories. She has in fact no prejudices 
whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. […] She will entertain 
any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field she is at a great 
advantage both over positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious 
rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the abstract in the way 
of conception. 
In short, she widens the field of search for God. Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. 
Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic 
or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical 
experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of 
private fact—if that should seem a likely place to find him. 
Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of 
life best and combines with the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted. If 
theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could 
pragmatism possibly deny God’s existence? She could see no meaning in treating as ‘not true’ a 
notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth could there be, for her, than all 
this agreement with concrete reality? (P 43–4) 
 
Note what James says about the kind of empiricism against which he is positioning his 
pragmatism: “Empiricism sticks to the external senses.” More accurately he might have said that 
“positivistic empiricism” (as he calls it later in the passage) sticks to the external senses. James’s 
radical empiricism takes seriously the evidence of (to use another Kantian term) inner sense as 
well as outer sense. This is not to say that inner sense can trump outer sense: as discussed in 
Chapter 2, it is surely not a practical policy to believe what “feels good” to believe in defiance of 
the evidence of one’s senses (as pragmatism’s detractors so often accuse it of encouraging; see, 
again, P 43, P 111–2). But a truly radical empiricism will, as James says, count “mystical 
experiences,” which are entirely interior and private, as evidence of the existence of another 
plane of being “if they have practical consequences.” After all, successful action-guiding is the 
ultimate warrant for every kind of belief, according to pragmatism. 
 This statement in Pragmatism echoes the conclusion James comes to in the lecture of The 




usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they 
come” (VRE 335). He explains: 
As a matter of psychological fact, mystical states of a well-pronounced and emphatic sort are usually 
authoritative over those who have them. They have been ‘there,’ and know. It is vain for rationalism 
to grumble about this. If the mystical truth that comes to a man proves to be a force that he can live 
by, what mandate have we of the majority to order him to live in another way? […] Our own more 
‘rational’ beliefs are based on evidence exactly similar in nature to that which mystics quote for 
theirs. Our senses, namely, have assured us of certain states of fact; but mystical experiences are as 
direct perceptions of fact for those who have them as any sensations ever were for us. The records 
show that even though the five senses be in abeyance in them, they are absolutely sensational in their 
epistemological quality […] —that is, they are face to face presentations of what seems immediately 
to exist.  (VRE 335–6)99 
 
James goes on to specify that “mystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept the 
deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and feel no private call 
thereto” (VRE 336). Mystical experiences are thus not exactly like sensory experiences, because 
we do tend to accept the testimony of the sole witness to some external event unless we have a 
reason to believe them untrustworthy. Nonetheless, he insists, 
the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the 
sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe. As a rule, mystical states merely add a 
supersensuous meaning to the ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the 
emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already objectively before us 
fall into a new expressiveness and make a new connexion with our active life. They do not contradict 
these facts as such, or deny anything that our senses have immediately seized. It is the rationalistic 
critic rather who plays the part of denier in the controversy, and his denials have no strength, for there 
never can be a state of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be added, provided the mind 
ascend to a more enveloping point of view. It must always remain an open question whether mystical 
states may not possibly be such superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out 
upon a more extensive and inclusive world. The difference of the views seen from the different 
mystical windows need not prevent us from entertaining this supposition. The wider world would in 
that case prove to have a mixed constitution like that of this world, that is all. It would have its 
celestial and its infernal regions, its tempting and its saving moments, its valid experiences and its 
counterfeit ones, just as our world has them; but it would be a wider world all the same. We should 
have to use its experiences by selecting and subordinating and substituting just as is our custom in 
this ordinary naturalistic world; we should be liable to error just as we are now; yet the counting in of 
that wider world of meanings, and the serious dealing with it, might, in spite of all the perplexity, be 
indispensable stages in our approach to the final fullness of the truth.  (VRE 338–9) 
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Despite James’s friendliness to ascetic religious traditions (including Christianity) and the 
possibility of the supernatural, which Nietzsche does not share, the attitude expressed in this 
passage bears certain resemblances to that expressed by Nietzsche in his protest against 
mechanistic reductionism in GS 373. Both defend the possibility that earthly states of affairs 
have a plurality of meanings that go beyond what physical theories can account for. James 
suggests that communication from the wider universe comes through the subconscious mind 
(VRE 403), but mystical experiences might be understood to come from the subconscious mind 
without thereby losing their profound significance for those who undergo them. James even 
gestures at a naturalistic understanding of mystical states when he says, “They are excitements 
like the emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already 
objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness […]” (VRE 338, emphasis added). The claim 
that “there never can be a state of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be added, 
provided the mind ascend to a more enveloping point of view,” if detached from the notion that 
these wider points of view must be supernatural ones, seems much in the same spirit as 
Nietzsche’s declaration that “the world [has] become ‘infinite’ for us all over again, inasmuch as 
we cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations” (GS 374, original 
emphasis). 
3. The limitations of science 
In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” James distinguishes two respects in which a 
conception of the world can be rational or irrational. The first is what he calls the “theoretic” 
respect: the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the intellect with the way the conception accounts 
for the features of the world. In order to satisfy the intellect, to seem rational, a theory must 




explanatory power, the “pleasure at finding that a chaos of facts is the expression of a single 
underlying fact” (WB 58); and the demand for adequacy to the full detail of concrete particulars 
(WB 59). Theories that unify and simplify, that place things under the broadest possible 
headings, tend to elide the peculiarities of individual cases; theories that dwell too much on 
peculiarities tend to lose sight of the general explanatory principles that provide “economy of 
means in thought” (WB 59) and enable us to make predictions. The second respect in which a 
conception can be rational or irrational, as distinguished from the theoretic, is the practical. Just 
as we find a conception rational in the theoretic sense if it satisfies the demands of our intellect, 
we find a conception practically rational if it satisfies our “active impulses” (WB 66): if it 
promises that our actions can be efficacious, and are not doomed to failure. Or, as he puts the 
same point in “Reflex Action and Theism” (1881), any “universal formula” or “system of 
philosophy” will inevitably fail to gain acceptance if 
it has dropped out of its net some of our impressions of sense—what we call the facts of nature—or it 
has left the theoretic and defining department [of the mind] with a lot of inconsistencies and 
unmediated transitions on its hands; or else, finally, it has left some one of more of our fundamental 
active and emotional powers with no object outside of themselves to react on or to live for. 
(WB 100) 
 
Throughout his writings, James points to both the epistemic and the practical limitations 
of science—or in the terms of “The Sentiment of Rationality,” to the respects in which the 
worldview it delivers strikes many minds (including his) as both theoretically and practically 
irrational. James agrees with Nietzsche on one of the most important epistemic limitations of 
science: its inability to perceive or account for the human meaning and value of phenomena. 
Consider the following passage from “The Sentiment of Rationality”: 
There is nothing improbable in the supposition that an analysis of the world may yield a number of 
formulae, all consistent with the facts. In physical science different formulae may explain the 
phenomena equally well—the one-fluid and the two-fluid theories of electricity, for example. Why 
may it not be so with the world? Why may there not be different points of view for surveying it, 




between, or simply cumulate one upon another? A Beethoven string-quartet is truly, as someone has 
said, a scraping of horses’ tails on cats’ bowels, and may be exhaustively described in such terms; but 
the application of this description in no way precludes the simultaneous applicability of an entirely 
different description. Just so a thorough-going interpretation of the world in terms of mechanical 
sequence is compatible with its being interpreted teleologically, for the mechanism itself may be 
designed.  (WB 66) 
 
It is yet another remarkable coincidence that James should express the idea that the scientific 
view of the world is merely partial, and in important respects severely limited, in terms so similar 
to Nietzsche’s: “Assuming that one estimated the value of a piece of music according to how 
much of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas: how absurd would such a 
‘scientific’ estimation of music be! What would one have comprehended, understood, grasped of 
it? Nothing, really nothing of what is ‘music’ in it!” (GS 373). Nietzsche surely would balk at 
James’s proposal that the natural world could be interpreted “teleologically” as well as 
mechanistically, but once again, they are united in their insistence on a multiplicity of possible 
interpretations. 
 James also maintains along with Nietzsche that science cannot posit values. In “The Will 
to Believe” he writes: 
Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible 
proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be 
good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and 
of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself 
consults her heart when she lays it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correction of 
false belief are the supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement, and science can only repeat it 
oracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment and correction bring man all sorts of 
other goods which man’s heart in turn declares. (WB 27; italics original, bold emphasis mine) 
 
The sentence I have emphasized in bold expresses much the same idea that Nietzsche did in GS 
344 when he wrote, “We see that science also rests on a faith […] The question whether truth is 
needed must not only have been affirmed in advance, but affirmed to such a degree that the 
principle, the faith, the conviction finds expression: ‘Nothing is needed more than truth, and in 




 Arguably, however, James regards the practical limitations of science to be even more 
fatal than its epistemic limitations. In “Reflex Action and Theism,” James endorses the 
physiological and psychological theory—very much in line with the pragmatist philosophy he 
would develop later—that “perception and thinking are only there for behavior’s sake”: 
The current of life which runs in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out at our hands, feet, or lips. The 
only use of the thoughts it occasions while inside is to determine its direction to whichever of these 
organs shall, on the whole, under the circumstances actually present, act in the way most propitious to 
our welfare. (WB 92) 
 
But James finds that the worldview presented by science, which the champions of the hegemony 
of science insist is the only defensible worldview, fails to meet the needs of what he calls “the 
willing department of our nature” (WB 92): 
Materialism and agnosticism, even were they true, could never gain universal and popular acceptance; 
for they both, alike, give a solution of things which is irrational to the practical third of our nature, 
and in which we can never volitionally feel at home. Each comes out of the […] theoretic stage of 
mental functioning, with its definition of the essential nature of things, its formula of formulas 
prepared. The whole array of active forces of our nature stands waiting, impatient for the word which 
shall tell them how to discharge themselves most deeply and worthily upon life. “Well!” cry they, 
“what shall we do?” “Ignoramus, ignorabimus!” says agnosticism. “React upon atoms and their 
concussions!” says materialism. What a collapse! The mental train misses fire, the middle fails to 
ignite the end, the cycle breaks down half-way to its conclusion; and the active powers left alone, 
with no proper object on which to vent their energy, must either atrophy, sicken, and die, or else by 
their pent-up convulsions and excitement keep the whole machinery in a fever until some less 
incommensurable solution, some more practically rational formula, shall provide a normal issue for 
the currents of the soul. (WB 100–1) 
 
This conclusion may seem rather hyperbolic; but as we have seen both in Chapter 2 and 
in section 1 of the present chapter, James’s profound objection to the materialistic worldview has 
to do with the end it foretells and the implications for our present action. In Lecture III of 
Pragmatism, “Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered,” James concedes that the 
behavior of matter might be sufficient to explain everything that has ever existed, and that from 
the retrospective standpoint, saying it was caused by God “surely can lend it no increase of 




But philosophy is prospective also, and, after finding what the world has been and done, and yielded, 
still asks the further question ‘what does the world promise?’ Give us a matter that promises success, 
that is bound by its laws to lead our world ever nearer to perfection, and any rational man will 
worship that matter […] 
Theism and materialism, so indifferent when taken retrospectively, point, when we take them 
prospectively, to wholly different outlooks of experience. For, according to the theory of mechanical 
evolution, the laws of redistribution of matter and motion, though they are certainly to thank for all 
the good hours which our organisms have every yielded us and for all the ideals which our minds now 
frame, are yet fatally certain to undo their work again, and to redissolve everything that they have 
once evolved. (P 53–4) 
 
Somehow or other, the physical world in which we live is bound to come to an end: our sun will 
someday burn out, and even if we manage to find a habitable place elsewhere, thermodynamics 
predicts the eventual heat death of the universe. Accepting that the world as science describes it 
is all there is to the world means accepting that dissolution is the ultimate fate of everything that 
matters to us. Given that all our accomplishments are inevitably temporary, that no end we work 
for can be secured for good, it is natural to wonder why it is worthwhile to work for any ends at 
all. 
Allowing ourselves to believe that there is more to the universe than science can tell us 
about, whether this is a God specifically or a more vaguely “spiritualistic faith” in “an ideal order 
that shall be permanently preserved” (P 55–6), allows us the hope that all our striving is not 
ultimately Sisyphean labor—a hope that, James suggests in “Reflex Action and Theism,” can 
release our active impulses from the hobbles that materialism’s gloomy prophecy placed on them 
(WB 101). And to those who will inevitably object that it is inappropriate and impermissible to 
allow our practical interests to dictate our beliefs, James responds in the theme that we saw 
already in section 2.1 above: 
As if the mind could […] be a reactionless sheet at all! As if conception could possibly occur except 
for a teleological purpose, except to show us the way from a state of things our senses cognize to 
another state of things our will desires! As if “science” itself were anything else than such an end of 
desire, and a most peculiar one at that! And as if the “truths” of bare physics in particular, which these 
sticklers for intellectual purity contend to be the only uncontaminated form, were not as great an 
alteration and falsification of the simply “given” order of the world, into an order conceived solely for 




 […] At any rate, to operate upon [the given world] is our only chance of approaching it; for never 
can we get a glimpse of it in the unimaginable insipidity of its virgin estate.100 To bid the man’s 
subjective interests be passive till truth express itself from out the environment, is to bid the sculptor’s 
chisel be passive till the statue express itself from out the stone. Operate we must! and the only choice 
left us is that between operating to poor or to rich results. The only possible duty there can be in the 
matter is the duty of getting the richest results that the material given will allow. […] 
 These most conscientious gentlemen [i.e., the scientistic objectors] think they have jumped off 
their own feet—emancipated their mental operations from the control of their subjective propensities 
at large and in toto. But they are deluded. They have simply chosen from among the entire set of 
propensities at their command those that were certain to construct, out of the materials given, the 
leanest, lowest, aridest result—namely, the bare molecular world—and they have sacrificed all the 
rest. (WB 103–4) 
 
We can see already, in this essay from 1881, the seeds of the pragmatism that will reach its 
mature form twenty-five years later—not only in the view that perception and thought exist only 
for the sake of action, but in the insistence that all of our ideas, all of our “truths,” inevitably bear 
the imprint of the human minds that formed them, and are ultimately shaped by our practical 
interests. “The only possible duty there can be in the matter is the duty of getting the richest 
results that the material given will allow” is a forerunner of the conclusion that what is true—i.e., 
what we have a “duty” (though an instrumental, not a categorical one) to believe—is what it will 
be most beneficial for human beings, in the long run, to believe. 
4. Conclusion 
We can see, through all of James’s efforts to defend the right to religious belief from 
scientistic efforts to outlaw it, the respect he maintains for the practice of science, even while he 
resists the hegemony of science, i.e., the attempt to extend science’s epistemic authority to all 
domains of life and deny epistemic authority to the practices that traditionally governed those 
domains. As Hollinger (1997: 73–4) observed, James’s increasingly metaphysically 
noncommittal characterizations of “the religious hypothesis” indicate a desire to remain 
                                                          
100 This phrase, “the unimaginable insipidity of its virgin estate,” is amusingly echoed in Nietzsche’s assertion of 




consistent with the deliverances of science—or at least not to contradict them outright—while 
not conceding that they exhaust what may be true about the universe. True, his favored defensive 
strategy of pointing out the way that the beliefs of practicing scientists and even the conclusions 
of institutional science are similar to the religious beliefs of the faithful (in being formed under 
the influence of passions and preferences) often has the rhetorical force of a tu quoque. But I 
think it also reflects James’s confidence in the effectiveness of scientific practice—especially the 
appeal to the analogy between scientific hypotheses and the religious hypothesis which, I have 
contended, underlies the argument of “The Will to Believe.” 
Nonetheless, James, like Nietzsche, still preserves a domain—the domain of ultimate 
value—in which science has no authority (indeed, no ability) to pronounce. For various reasons I 
have canvassed, most notably their different judgments about the value of the altruistic morality 
expressed in most traditional religions, James reserves the domain of value for traditional 
religion while Nietzsche appropriates it for a reinvented philosophy. But in any case, they agree 
that, contra the attitude of the hegemony of science, science cannot answer every question worth 
asking and is not the only practice with epistemic merit: art, philosophy, humanistic inquiry, and 
(at least for James) religion give us access to a very real realm of meaning and value in which 
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